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THE GREEK QUESTION

By AUGUSTE GAUVAIN

Formerly Minister Plenipotentiary of France, and now Political Director of the *Journal des Débats*

TRANSLATED BY

CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph.D.
The College of the City of New York

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PREFACE

It is not altogether easy, when the whole world is making such sacrifice and enduring such suffering in the cause of liberty, to dwell upon some of the happier accomplishments of the war for a new world. It is beyond question, however, that the pressure of military necessity has brought the people of the Allied nations into much closer and more intimate relationship than ever before and has forged new bonds of mutual confidence and understanding between them. Such a bond is the American Hellenic Society, recently founded, which aims to do for the people of the United States and those of Greece what similar societies, earlier established, have done for the people of Great Britain, of France and of Japan.

Greece is a name to conjure with. No man or woman who knows the history of Western civilization can fail to respond with a thrill of interest and appreciation when the name of Greece is heard. The place of Ancient Greece is secure. Her achievements in art, in letters and in science will never be seriously challenged. Modern Greece, however, is not alone the descendant of the Greece of ancient days, but also in no small part the product of forces and conditions which have influenced it, and before which it has sometimes been almost helpless. It appears that a happier day for Greece is about to dawn. Under the inspiring leadership of M. Venizelos, whose statesmanlike qualities are one of the ornaments of our generation, Greece has taken its natural place with the friends and defenders of liberty and in opposition to the forces of autocratic power and the rule of military might. The stimulus of this conflict and the satisfaction of these associations bid fair to

unite the whole Greek people through a new spirit of patriotic fervor and devotion. Modern Greece will then come to occupy the place in the world of to-day which is due to a people of its traditions and its characteristics.

The American Hellenic Society will constantly aim to make known the position, the interests and the ambitions of Greece, and to promote sympathy with them. It will aim to make the people of Greece and those of the United States more intimately acquainted one with the other by promoting in America the study of the ancient and modern language and literature of Greece and by promoting in Greece the study of the English language and of American history, literature and institutions.

Surely this aim is a noble one and one that will call forth and receive widespread sympathy and support. To this cause the series of publications, of which the present volume is the first, is dedicated.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
December 1, 1917.

INTRODUCTION

THE series of articles on the Greek question by M. Auguste Gauvain well deserves to be made accessible to all thoughtful Americans who are interested in the problems connected with the great European war. Its author, because of his extensive political and journalistic experience, is splendidly qualified to treat of this extremely complex question. With a clearness and frankness which does M. Gauvain the greatest credit he casts light upon the responsibility which rests on the different nations, and upon the errors committed by them.

The essay reveals facts as yet unknown to the general public, facts that are incontestably true in that they are authenticated by documents the publication of which has been rendered possible only by the recent solution of the Greek crisis. It permits the reader, as he follows the startling events that succeeded one another in this crisis from which Greece has happily emerged, to understand the attitude taken by the Greek people. Because of their inactivity and their nonresistant attitude the Greeks were credited, in the judgment of many foreigners, with approving the pro-German policy of their king and with condoning all those abuses of power by which Constantine sought to impose his will upon the people.

M. Gauvain at the very beginning shows the fundamental error which characterized the policy of the Entente toward the Balkan powers. The sentiments of the Greek people and of the Greek government were at the beginning of the war decidedly friendly toward the Allied powers, while the attitude of Bulgaria on the other hand was, to say the least, doubtful. In the vain hope of drawing Bulgaria to their side the

Allies conceived the idea of the cession of Greek and Serbian territories to Bulgaria. Such a ceding of national domain is repugnant to any people, but it was even tragical in this case, for it was a question of surrendering territories which were inhabited by more than a million Greeks and Serbs, who had just gained their freedom as a result of the victorious wars of 1912-13.

The attitude of Bulgaria did not disabuse the Allies of their false point of view. Even the loan negotiated by her in Germany did not serve to dissipate their illusions. They obstinately insisted on demanding sacrifices on the part of Greece.

The masses in a country never make any effort to understand the psychological basis of actions; they prefer to pin their attention to the brute facts. Greek public opinion was therefore deeply stirred upon learning that the friends and protectors of Greece wished to lessen her territories and her influence, and at once the feeling was aroused in the national consciousness that Greece was being cruelly wronged. This bitter feeling was all the more increased and intensified by the fact that these sacrifices were demanded for the benefit and advantage of a people who were obsessed, as the Greeks had come to know by centuries of fighting with them for their own freedom, by the wild desire to dominate the near East.

It is easy to understand how Constantine and the agents of the German propaganda could profit by this error so as to present Germany as the defender of the territorial integrity of Greece. An attempt was thus made to create an anti-Ally sentiment in the minds of the Greeks.

M. Gauvain next examines the attitude of these same powers toward Constantine after he had dismissed Mr. Venizelos in October, 1915, and had begun, through the agency of ministers subservient to the royal will, his

provocations of the Allies and his machinations against their military forces at Saloniki, as well as those acts of espionage practiced against these same troops by his personal agents.

The Entente powers continued to preserve the same friendly attitude toward Constantine as in the past. Conference succeeded conference; the representatives of the Allies came forth from these interviews completely charmed, and their impressions were purposely spread abroad so as to hoodwink the people and hinder them from seeing whither they were being led.

Constantine was, moreover, at that time extremely popular in Greece. As a result of the victories of 1912-13, which had been cleverly exploited so as to give him the whole credit for the success of the Greek arms, the people had come to regard the king as that Constantine XII of Greek legend who was destined to liberate Constantinople, the city of the Byzantine emperors, thus restoring to Christendom the national Greek sanctuary, Saint Sophia, and to unite under his scepter all the Greeks, whether subject to Bulgar or Turk. It was, then, not to be wondered at that the people should have implicit confidence in their king.

This confidence of theirs was naturally strengthened by the attitude of the Allies toward him, for their friendliness was set before the people as a convincing proof of the sincerity of the king's declarations.

Some of his acts, however, which were not fully in accord with his words, finally began to provoke a certain restlessness in the minds of the people and to arouse in them a feeling of distrust. Constantine became aware of this, and foresaw the possibility of resistance. He instigated a reign of terror in order to prevent criticism of his acts. By virtue of a law passed by the Venizelist government, which prescribed the surrender of all arms in the possession of private citizens, the government, as the servile tool of the king, disarmed all citizens of whose

abject submission it was not sure. The last step in this policy of intimidation was the organizing of the League of Reservists, who were immediately equipped with regular army rifles.

The result was that nobody dared to utter a word of criticism. Enlightenment finally came, however, through the fight begun by the liberal party, for, as soon as the liberals felt themselves protected by the Allied fleet which anchored off Salamis in June, 1916, they hastened to make their will known. The people of Athens in a huge mass-meeting with one accord declared that Greece proposed to fulfill her duty as an ally toward Serbia and demanded that the king respect the oath that he had taken to support the Constitution.

The people of Athens presented their resolutions in a respectful form, for they hoped that Constantine would be induced to think and act as a Greek and would follow the decision of the people. But the Entente powers, far from supporting the stand taken by the people, continued through their official and obliging representatives in Athens to overwhelm Constantine with civilities and to treat him as a sincere friend who was anxious for one thing alone—the strict preservation of Greece's neutrality.

We are now in a position to understand fully how this whole attitude of the Allies was exploited, and thus to appreciate what anxiety and perplexity it must have produced in the minds of the Greek people, who were utterly misled by these strange contradictions.

The time finally came when Mr. Venizelos, despairing of his ability to bring Constantine to a full realization of his duties toward Greece and the Constitution, determined to have recourse to a revolutionary movement in order to save his country. The effect on the people of Mr. Venizelos' departure for Saloniki was enormous. If the Allied powers had at that time recognized the government of Saloniki as the only legal government

in Greece, Constantine would long since have yielded or abdicated.

Indecision, however, still characterized the policy of the Allies. Recognition of the government of Saloniki, even as a separate government, was long delayed, while friendliness continued to govern the relations between Constantine and the Allies. They carried this solicitude to such a point as to guarantee the king against any liberal propaganda in the territories which had not been able to free themselves from his jurisdiction, and Mr. Venizelos was even obliged to make reassuring declarations as to the non-antidynastic nature of the liberal movement.

Even after the criminal outrages of the king against the Allied troops disembarked at Athens, the attitude of the Allies continued to show the same contradictions. Furthermore, although some of the Allied governments were to all appearances fighting the Venizelist movement, yet it was the people alone that were made to suffer by the coercive measures employed against Greece.

It was in a chaos of this sort that the Greek people lived for a long time, and it was in the midst of all these contradictions that the liberal movement arose. It ought logically to have failed, but it did succeed. Do you ask why? Because it was in fundamental agreement with the deepest convictions of the Greek people, whose true sentiments and whose real aspirations it reflected. The most striking proof of this lies in the attitude of the Greek people toward the liberal movement.

Mr. Venizelos, applying to the letter his political motto, "The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," impressed upon the people that, in spite of their bereavements in the Balkan wars, in spite of their financial bankruptcy and the war-weariness of the nation, the march of circumstances imposed on Greece far greater efforts and more costly sacrifices. Mr. Venizelos knew as well as anyone that when men are called

upon to make personal sacrifices their ardor is likely to cool, for selfishness is a dominant element in human nature. He dared to make this appeal to the Greeks because he understood their way of thinking, their fundamental good sense and their love of country. He did it although he knew that Constantine, in opposing his policy, was appealing to the lower and more selfish instincts of men, declaring that there was no need of the Greeks subjecting themselves to sacrifices of their blood and treasure, but that it was rather their duty to enrich themselves and enjoy their acquired wealth.

The Greek people may well be proud of the proofs they have given the world of self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of an ideal. Rejecting the doctrine of a king whom they loved, they chose the *via dolorosa.* More than 30,000 volunteers replied to Mr. Venizelos' call to arms and hastened to Saloniki to offer their most precious possession, their lives, for no other object than to save the nation's honor, compromised by the arbitrary acts of Constantine and a handful of bullies that had terrorized the people. When one beholds a spectacle like this, when one sees so many men rushing into a frightful struggle for the sake of an ideal, the only possible explanation is that the surroundings in which these men lived, the very atmosphere which they breathed, was surcharged with these same ideas. Only thus are sentiments like these aroused and exalted to such a pitch that the individual is led to make the supreme sacrifice. The French Revolution is the most striking example of this truth. This is the proof positive of the actual feelings which dominated the Greek soul in spite of the king's teachings, in spite of the privations and humiliations which were imposed upon Greece as a result of a long-continued failure to understand her aims.

These sentiments were and are to-day an ardent love for the ideals of justice and liberty, a craving for national honesty and political uprightness, an attachment to the

democratic principles which form the groundwork of Greece's Constitution, and along with these a feeling of intense gratitude and affection for the nations that have contributed to the Greek renaissance in the nineteenth century.

After a blockade which lasted for ten months and which resulted in untold suffering on the part of the people, the soldiers of France and England on disembarking at Pireus in June, 1917, were received as brothers. Constantine did not fail to grasp the situation. He abdicated, without attempting the slightest resistance. He knew that he would find few Greeks disposed to attack the Allied troops, and he understood that the people as a whole did not share those sentiments which he had never dared to reveal and which have only recently come to the knowledge of the Greek people through the publication of documents of state.

Upon the departure of King Constantine and his courtiers, all apostles of the Pan-German idea, the Greek people once again breathed an atmosphere purely Greek. They began work at once in preparation for the fulfillment of their whole duty.

The day is at hand when all Hellas will take the part that by right belongs to it in that struggle for grand ideals pursued by the noble nations of the world. It cannot be otherwise. It is incredible, nay impossible, that the people who gave the world ideals of supernal beauty and of sublime thought that have never been surpassed should fail to share the great fight against base materialism and brutal might.

AMERICAN HELLENIC SOCIETY.

THE GREEK QUESTION

PART I

THE deplorable turn which Greek affairs took toward the close of last year is the consequence of the weak policy which has been pursued by the Triple Entente in the Balkans ever since the beginning of the European war. The errors committed during this period by the Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd have been numerous and grave. They may, in the last analysis, be traced back to two fundamentally wrong conceptions. In the first place, the governments of the three Allied countries misunderstood the nature of the great struggle that had just broken out and failed to make use of the appropriate means to end it according to their real interests. Secondly, they, at the start, interpreted the intentions of Turkey in a sense diametrically opposed to the facts of the case and at a later period committed the same blunder with regard to Bulgaria.

The ministers who directed foreign affairs in France, England and Russia during the second half of 1914 were all men of extended experience. In the course of their careers, they had had many matters of the greatest importance to arrange. They were personally acquainted, were in confidential relations with one another and could easily unite in a course of action. They were represented, each in the others' countries by ambassadors who loyally supported their policies. All conditions seemed united to permit them to conduct the diplomacy of the Entente with a firm and steady hand. They gave at the very beginning an evidence of clear-sightedness by signing the agreement of September 5, 1914, which bound

the three states together under reciprocal obligations for the duration of the war, and for the conclusion of peace. Unhappily in all that concerns the Balkans, they thought and acted as a Metternich would have acted. Attached as they were to a policy to be pursued simply for the good of the state, preoccupied rather with the end of the war than with the logical means of bringing it to an end, taking into account the maps of countries rather than the wishes of their peoples, they set themselves to pursue solutions which were based on the arbitrary re-distributing of territories. They imagined that by cutting the Macedonian provinces into shreds and by thoroughly recasting from top to bottom the Treaty of Bucharest of the 10th of August, 1913, they could succeed in satisfying all the Balkan States and in uniting them for a common purpose against our common enemies. In trying to nullify the Treaty of Bucharest, M. Delcassé, Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof acted against the most elementary political morality. Moreover, they undertook a rôle that did not belong to them. The Treaty of Bucharest was the just penalty for the sudden attack of Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece at the end of June, 1913. It certainly contained no clause that was harsher for Bulgaria than were the penalties contemplated by the three ministers against Austro-Germany for her sudden attack of August, 1914. It gave to Bulgaria more than it took from her. Except for the portion of Dobrudja ceded to Rumania, it deprived her only of hopes. These hopes were, it is true, great hopes, but they actually aimed at the establishment of the Bulgarian hegemony in the peninsula.

Certainly it was not for the interest of France, England or Russia to encourage or rouse these hopes. It was to the common interest of these three powers to interpose, in the Balkans, Serbia and Greece on the one side and Rumania on the other between Germany

and the Aegean Sea so that Germany might not control the routes to the Orient. The creation of a Greater Bulgaria, the declared rival of Rumania, Greece and Serbia, imperiled our influence from the Danube to the Persian Gulf. The historical and linguistic arguments invoked by the Bulgarians in support of their contention were not enough to make us approve designs contrary to our interest.

Besides, these arguments were specious arguments. They closely resembled the arguments advanced by Germany to justify its claims to the right to expand. The regions arrogated by the Bulgarian agents as having belonged to the Bulgarian Empire had belonged also to the Serbian and the Byzantine Empire. The historical rights, a never-failing source of conflict, balanced each other. The use of a language in a country gives to a neighboring country which speaks the same language no rights over it. Furthermore, the dialect used by the inhabitants of the greater part of the disputed Macedonian territory was closer to the Serbian language than to the Bulgarian. The Greek language confessedly preponderated in many villages claimed by the Bulgarians. There remained to be considered the desires of the inhabitants. In the eyes of liberal and constitutional states like France and England, this ought to have been taken into serious consideration. There is no evidence that the Cabinets of Paris and London troubled themselves about it at all during the first year of the war. In offering to Bulgaria certain territories, they forgot that their inhabitants had been living and acting as faithful subjects of Greece and Serbia since August, 1913. In common with the Cabinet of Petrograd, they left the moral aspect of the question entirely out of account. In the summer of 1913, with the complicity of Austro-Germany, Bulgaria treacherously attacked her two allies with the avowed purpose of despoiling them and, after subduing them, turning upon Rumania. Her calcula-

tions and her course of procedure were analogous to those of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia and England and were just as inexcusable. Politically and morally the sudden attacks of 1913 and of 1914 are closely allied. How, then, could the states that were the victims of the second have dealings with the authors of the first? How did they dare to exercise in Bulgaria's favor a pressure on the lawful victors of 1913? In virtue of what principle did they wish to suppress the just terms of the Treaty of Bucharest. Their conduct is to be explained only by the fact that at this moment they were guided by no fixed principle. They had in view only expedients. We must acknowledge that from the declaration of war by Germany to the intervention of the United States, the diplomacy of the Triple and then Quadruple Entente was one of expediency only. It drew its inspiration from unmoral diplomatic combinations. It busied itself with the allotment of Europe on the basis of plans decided on in the secrecy of the Cabinets. Apportionments were made in accord with desires rather than in accord with right. As a theoretical principle, there was much talk of the rights of nationalities, but these are susceptible of quite different interpretations, and it was perhaps just on this account that they were put so much in the foreground. There was less talk of the right of civilized peoples to dispose of themselves, for the application of this principle would have cramped these architects of the new Europe. They carried on their negotiations in the dark because they feared that broad daylight would disclose ugly facts. They thought themselves clever, but this very cleverness came near compromising the triumph of the cause of the civilized world. In short, at the most critical moment of modern history they gave themselves up in the diplomatic arena to such intrigues as are customary in parliamentary lobbies. Instead of taking their place fairly and squarely at the side of our friends

and against our enemies, the attempt was made to seduce an accomplice of our enemies by making a place for him at the cost of our friends. It is in some such way as this that a Prime Minister, when compelled to reform his Cabinet, sometimes tries to find a place for an adversary in the hope of rendering him harmless, instead of strengthening his ministerial majority by the addition of a reliable friend. He sometimes succeeds in prolonging in this way a poor existence as minister, but at other times he simply hastens his fall. In any case, he cuts no great figure in the world.

There would have been no great glory in obtaining a provisional success by winning over for the time being a Bulgaria which would without doubt a little later have seized the opportunity to put all in question by a course of blackmail. But to every attentive observer of the affairs of the Orient who lived in the sphere of realities and not in that of imagination, Bulgaria was riveted to the Central Powers by iron bonds. I shall have occasion to say later and at greater length in what these bonds consisted. I shall show also how no reasonable statesman of the Triple Entente ought to have given credence to the Turkish government's protestations of friendship. But contenting myself at present with the examination of the relations of the Entente with Greece, I shall try to prove that it was impossible in 1915 to satisfy Bulgaria without delivering continental Greece a mortal blow. From the entrance into line of Turkey in the autumn of 1914 up to the Bulgarian mobilization in September, 1915,—that is to say, during all the period of negotiation between the Entente and the Cabinet in Sofia,—not once did the latter formulate any precise conditions, the acceptance of which would have been followed by the signing of a lasting treaty. It veiled its replies in vague phrases and awaited proposals. Not only did this general attitude show clearly that it had no intention of treating and that it sought only to gain

time, but numerous indications in detail revealed clearly the purposes which it was very anxious to conceal.

At the very beginning it affected to consider as of no importance any enlargement of the country's territories at the expense of Turkey. Now the plan of the Entente was actually based on the possibility of compensating Bulgaria at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, which had just attacked Rùssia. The idea was a good one. If Bulgaria, in order to ally herself with us, had been contented with the annexation of Ottoman territory and rectification of her frontiers in Macedonia, no exception could have been taken to the affair. It was our business to try to sound her by negotiations in order to know where she stood. The mistake lay in following the negotiations up after we had discovered that the Bulgarian government demanded the hegemony in the Balkans. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria, without defining limits, let it be clearly understood that she must have the whole of Macedonia, and that she wanted to enter into possession of the Serbian and Greek territories, claimed by her immediately after the signing of the treaty, before Serbia and Greece should have received any compensation. It is what M. Ghénadief, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a time when the Cabinets of the Entente flattered themselves with having won him over to their cause, expressed as follows: "We must be paid. We want Macedonia to become once more Bulgarian, for it is inhabited by our sons. France had to recover Alsace-Lorraine, just as Italy had to recover Trieste. We have, you may as well understand, four Alsaces to recover—Turkish Thrace, Serbian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia and the Dobrudja. We wish to occupy at once the part of Macedonia held by Greece and Serbia." This declaration emanated from a man whom the governing parties in Sofia accused of lukewarmness in the national cause. It dates, it is true, from June, 1915, but it reproduces faithfully the aspirations of

the Bulgarian people, and the purposes of its government since the autumn of 1914 and even since the year 1913. The language of the press and of statesmen in Sofia leaves no doubt as to this point.

Hardly had the Treaty of Bucharest been signed, when at the instigation of Baron von Wangenheim, Ambassador of Germany at Constantinople, the Cabinet of Sofia entered into an arrangement with the Turks, and this too in spite of the fact that the latter had a few months before taken advantage of the embarrassment of Bulgaria to reoccupy and hold Adrianople. From this moment, the Bulgarians were dominated by the passion for Macedonia. They reconciled themselves with the Turks, sharing their hatred of Greece. In the hope of conquering Saloniki and Cavalla, they promised the Sultan all Thrace and the islands of the Cyclades. On their part, the Turks were roused by the desire to regain Mitylene and Chios. The Austro-Germans knew how to inflame these desires and the arrangement was actually consummated in October, 1913. It was agreed that comitadjis would on every occasion foment trouble in Macedonia and Albania and that they would always hold in readiness some cause for an intervention either by Turkey or by the Central Powers. In fact, comitadjis, armed with Bulgarian weapons, did not cease to terrorize now Albania and now Macedonia. It needed all the patience of the Serbian government to prevent the outbreak of a third Balkan war. The drama of Serajevo at the end of June, 1914, furnished Austro-Germany an unexpected pretext for the European conflict. The struggle in the east was for the time relegated to the background, but all its elements continued to subsist.

In more general ways, too, the Bulgarians have never made any secret of their intentions. They signed the Treaty of Bucharest under protest, because they were constrained and compelled to do so. Even in the treaty

itself, a paragraph records their mental reservations. Serbia had left them free to choose either the district of Kotchana or that of Strumitsa, and they preferred the latter, though less populous and more remote, because it projected out toward the railroad line of the Vardar. This became the base of operations for the comitadjis, who sallied forth again and again from this bastion to cut the railroad line in the valley of the Vardar, a line which formed a vital artery of communication for Serbia. According to the statesmen of Bulgaria then, who passed as friends of the Entente, Greek Macedonia was thus one of the four Alsaces of Bulgaria, a country whose official independence went back to 1908, and whose real independence began with 1878. It comprised all the territories situated between the Kara Sou on the east and the mountains of Albania on the west. In speaking of the cession of Cavalla, they were not serious. If it had been a question of this district alone, Greece would finally have yielded, for even Venizelos himself at one time (January-February, 1915) had been disposed to yield on this point. But Cavalla formed a little piece of Greek Macedonia. If the Bulgarians were particularly desirous to get it, this was due to its exceptional richness and in particular to its strategical importance in any move against Saloniki. The Greek government had acted very wisely at Bucharest in 1913 in insisting on keeping this in spite of the Russian protests, for it knew that Bulgaria, intent on getting its revenge, would make use of this as a base for the conquest of Saloniki. Furthermore, Cavalla is a city almost exclusively inhabited by Greeks. The Cabinet of Sofia in their brief occupation of the city in 1912-13, could not, according to the avowal of King Ferdinand's agents, find in the place a Bulgarian capable of discharging the duties of mayor. The Cabinets of London and Paris obstinately persisted, none the less, in their unpractical plans. They refused to listen to the Greek and Serbian statesmen in

spite of the fact that they knew their Bulgarian neighbors far better than M. Delcassé and Sir Edward Grey. As for Russia, she was a perfect M. Perrichon in her policy toward Bulgaria. Having contributed to create Bulgaria, she constituted herself her protector against all and sundry, although her protégé had passed over to Austria ever since the time of Stamboulof. She was possessed by the idea of bringing back the prodigal to the Slav fold, while he, freed from his leading-strings, lavished fair words on his old guardian, but in secret sought means to break away more completely from her guardianship.

Not to go into the details of the negotiations that were carried on in secret, and that are still imperfectly known, the account that I have given serves to show the underlying cause of that uneasiness of mind on the part of the Greeks which permitted our enemies to mock at our intentions and to turn against us a part of the population of the country. The desire to be truthful obliges us to confess our errors, and these errors that we have made will help us to understand, though we cannot excuse, those errors of a far more serious nature of which King Constantine has been guilty toward us.

The Greek question would not have arisen if the assassination of King George I at Saloniki in March, 1913, had not prematurely brought the Crown Prince Constantine to the throne. This prince, the husband of Princess Sophie, the sister of William II, had ideas as to the royal power that were diametrically opposed to those of his father. The former had respected the constitutional régime and had adapted himself to parliamentary customs, leaving the direction of affairs now to the leaders of one party and now to those of the other. But his son despised the democratic form of government. Educated at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, he admired William II's way of keeping things under his personal

control, and regarded as a family fief the kingdom over which George I had been called to reign under fixed conditions by the protecting powers and the will of the people, and he acted as the Lord's Anointed, although it must be said that his mind had no religious bent. He and his brother had adopted the principles of the old dynasties. During the life of George I they had enjoyed little prestige. They had even been excluded from the army after the revolution of 1909. It was Venizelos who brought the sons of George I again to power. At the time that he assumed control in 1910 he was convinced that Greece was not ripe for a democratic form of government, that she needed a dynasty, and that the thing to do was to strengthen the one that existed. He recalled the princes, restored to them their rank and set himself to increase as much as he could the prestige of the Crown Prince so as to facilitate later his royal task. He brought into prominence his military successes during the first Balkan war and followed the same course after the change of reign. Quite unlike ministers who try to eclipse their sovereign, Venizelos neglected no opportunity to enhance the glory of Constantine. This was not the flattery of a courtier, for at this time he was the uncontested master of Greece. It was done in the interest of a dynasty the strength of which seemed to him necessary to the maintenance of order in the country.

During the early part of the new reign the differences in temperament and tendency between minister and sovereign called forth no serious clash. Venizelos possessed within and without the country an authority which impressed itself even on his enemies. In less than four years he had transformed Greece from a disorganized and discredited country into a well-ordered state, glorious and prosperous, and with an area twice as large as before. Wherever he had gone in other countries he had been regarded as a statesman. His judgment was admired and his character respected. He inspired feel-

ings of confidence. Within Greece, the old leaders, jealous though they were, had to bow before the restorer of their country. The liberal party, created by Mr. Venizelos after the revolution, rallied to itself the majority of the people. It became a real force in the state and was a decided novelty. Before that time the kingdom had been divided into fiefs dependent upon families that had taken a prominent part in the war for Greek independence in 1821. Although the state was essentially democratic, a sort of feudalism had established itself. An oligarchy governed the country, but an oligarchy without a program or fixed principles. Each clan had its chief and each chief wished to get into power in order to satisfy his followers and his own ambition. There had become established among the different chiefs of clan a way of "taking turns" at being leader. Spoils were divided in alternation with one another. Laws were passed to suit the circumstances of the hour, and the administration was entrusted to a personnel chosen because it resembled in its point of view the chief then in power. Charilaos Trikoupis was perhaps the only exception in this staff of prebendaries. Venizelos upset this rotten system and built up a real party founded on the deeper sentiments of the people and the permanent interests of the country.

Up to that time the people had submitted to the oligarchic régime, trying to profit by it. But they were not attached to it. Those who could go away to pursue fame and fortune did not fail to do so. Thus in both hemispheres, but notably in Egypt, France and England, there were established vigorous colonies of Greeks, disgusted with this succession of parties, and desirous to adorn Hellas with a new order and a new glory. Keeping up a regular contact with the land of their birth, they continued to exert an influence there. They recognized at once in Eleutherios Venizelos the man who could accomplish the work of regeneration. They encouraged

and supported him. Immediately after he had taken the reins of government into his hands, the former Cretan leader revealed what he really was. Though he was the product of a military revolution, he sent the officers back to their barracks and forced them to submit to discipline. He re-established the constitutional régime, which had been warped by misuse. He guaranteed an honest administration of local affairs, stimulated the productive power of the country, lightened the burden of taxes, had laws passed that protected labor and restored the independence of the courts. In the Chamber of Deputies he rallied a devoted majority. The old parties disappeared. None of the old leaders could gather solid supporters about him. Only an impalpable residuum of objectors was left. To the regret even of the Prime Minister, who would have liked to find before him a constituted party to discuss measures, there was no longer any opposition in the parliamentary sense of the word. The government had not suppressed it by the means in use in other countries—Rumania, for example. It had simply disappeared like the mist before the sun. Venizelism represented not a dictatorship, not the preponderating influence of one man, but a régime with methods and ideas shaped according to the reasoned will of the upper classes of the citizens and the instinctive desires of the masses.

At the moment when the European war broke out the liberal party was all-powerful and the king could not dream of imposing his personal political views. It was due to external events that the design to substitute personal for constitutional government took shape.

Mr. Venizelos was at Munich, en route for Brussels, where he was to meet the Grand-Vizir in order to settle the question of the islands, when he learned of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He at once took his stand. On the 25th of July, right from Munich, he

telegraphed instructions to Athens, to the following effect: "It is of supreme importance not to allow any doubt to exist as to the intentions of Greece. Greece cannot stand with arms folded in the presence of a possible attack on Serbia by Bulgaria. She could not tolerate such an attack, for it would lead to an aggrandizement of Bulgaria and would put in question the Treaty of Bucharest. This attitude is imposed upon her alike by her duties as the ally of Serbia and by the instinct of self-preservation." At the same time, he sent a dispatch of like import to Mr. Theotokis (junior), minister of Greece in Berlin, begging him to inform the German government that if Bulgaria attacked Serbia it would be impossible for Greece to remain neutral. While still in Munich, he received a dispatch from Mr. Pachitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, begging to know what attitude Greece was to take. He replied at once that being, as he was, at a distance from Athens, he could give no official pronouncement, but that on returning to the capital he would support the following opinion: Greece must hold her forces ready to oppose Bulgaria in case she attacks Serbia; she must protect the latter against the danger of an attack in the rear and guarantee respect for the Treaty of Bucharest.

On August 2, after a meeting of the Cabinet, Mr. Venizelos addressed to Mr. Pachitch an official dispatch of which the tenor was about as follows:

The fact that the independence and territorial integrity of Serbia constitute a capital factor of the Balkan equilibrium, created by the Treaty of Bucharest, to which Greece is resolutely attached, is enough to dictate to the Greek government the measures that it must take for the present in order to come to the aid of Serbia, a friendly and allied country, in the most effective way. The Greek government thinks that it can best fulfill its duty as friend and ally by holding itself ready to repulse every attack against Serbia on the part of Bulgaria. An immediate armed intervention by Greece would be fatal to Serbia. In fact, Greece could send only weak forces to succor

Serbia against Austria-Hungary, and besides, her situation as a belligerent state would expose Saloniki—the only route open for supplying Serbia with food and munitions—to a decisive attack. The duty of Greece is to hold her forces intact in view of a possible Bulgarian offensive that might endanger the safety of the two countries.

The same day Mr. Venizelos caused dispatches of the same purport to be sent to London, Paris, Petrograd and also (*mutatis mutandis*) to Sofia. With the clear view of a man who took in the whole political horizon, he decided without losing an instant, and made known his decision. At this moment William II, having determined to array the maximum of strength against the enemy, urged Constantine to give him his active support. He sent him several telegrams in German, attempting to dissuade him from joining in with the *Meuchelmörder* of Serbia, and warning him that if the policy of Greece was opposed to that of Germany the family relations of the king would suffer for it. Constantine I at that time resisted this pressure because his Prime Minister wished him to do so, and because he knew, from personal experience, that his imperial brother-in-law cared little for Greece. In the spring of the preceding year he had secretly sounded William II, without the knowledge of the Greek government, through the agency of Mr. Theotokis, former Prime Minister, who had been sent to Berlin to announce the accession of Constantine I. At the bidding of the king, Mr. Theotokis had asked William II if Greece could, come what might, count on the permanent friendship of Germany. At the time the emperor was unwilling to answer, but he later caused the following reply to be sent to the king through Count Quadt, his minister at Athens:

The imperial government finds itself unable to adopt the Greek point of view. The alliance which unites her to Austria-Hungary and Italy prevents her from entering into negotiations

on subjects that touch the interests of her allies. Germany regards it as her duty to second these interests without any evasion, and this duty hinders her from taking any initiative in a question that lies within the sphere of influence of her allies. Unfortunately, Germany can do nothing for Greece. All the interests of the empire push her toward states whose views do not accord with those of Hellenism.

This billet-doux was sent before the sudden attack of Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece. No matter how much of a Germano-maniac he was, Constantine must have experienced a shudder in connecting the last words of his brother-in-law's rebuff with the Bulgarian treachery of the 29th of June.

After the Treaty of Bucharest the German ill-will toward Greece persisted. In the month of January, 1914, in London, Mr. Venizelos sounded the British government as to the pressure that the great powers would have to exert upon Turkey, in order to impose upon her the decision of Europe in the matter of the islands. Sir Edward Grey replied that England would go so far as to make a naval demonstration in order to enforce respect for the decision of the Conference of London, with the distinct understanding, however, that Germany's consent should first be obtained. Germany, when sounded in her turn, "refused to co-operate or even to consent to any action against Turkey that had an avowedly unfriendly character." Nay more, she refused later to take part in what was a merely formal warning sent by the great powers to the Sublime Porte. She persisted in the same attitude throughout the whole of the Eastern crisis. In the month of April, 1914, Von Bethmann-Hollweg and Baron von Wangenheim, who accompanied William II to Corfu, declared peremptorily to Mr. Venizelos and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Streit, that Greece could not count on the help of Germany in her relations with Turkey and that if the islands were to pass under the control of Greece in con-

sequence of the weakness of Turkey, this state of things could not be regarded as permanent or definitive. According to Von Wangenheim the islands, following the natural law, would pass under the control of the master of the Asiatic coast at the time of the settlement of the Eastern Question. No political influence and certainly no Greek political influence could be admitted in the neighborhood.

Thus in what concerns Greece, Germany declared that she was inspired not only by her formal alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy, but also by a secret alliance with Turkey. At bottom she sustained the Cabinet of Enver Talaat, whose bloody accession she had helped to bring about in January, 1913. She urged him on in his policy of forcing the subject populations to embrace Mohammedanism, and to become Turks. She approved the war against the privileges of the Greek patriarchate. Far from thinking of facilitating or tolerating the dismemberment of Turkey, she tried her best to galvanize the sick man of Europe. From a military point of view she needed his aid against Russia and England; from the point of view of economical advantage she wished to keep for herself the commercial and industrial exploitation of vast regions destined to a great future. In short, she was fundamentally anti-Greek. If she had in August, 1913, voiced her opinion that the Treaty of Bucharest be not submitted to the revision of the great powers, it was not for the sake of showing herself friendly to Greece; it was in order not to offend the king of Rumania, who meant to keep what he had gained by his intervention and who had declared to his two Germanic allies that he would not stand for a Greater Bulgaria. William II had at that time soothed Austria-Hungary by promising her a fine revenge at no distant time for her last disappointments in the Balkans. Meanwhile, he had not ceased to sustain her claims in Albania and Epirus as against the interests of Greece. In all these questions,

as in that of the islands, the Cabinet at Athens found support only in the Triple Entente. In spite of certain failures the Entente had as its guiding principle that the Christian peoples under the Ottoman domination had a right to certain liberties and that if the Ottoman Empire was to be broken up in whole or in part, these peoples ought to be called upon to form independent states. On the contrary Germany was for denying these peoples any autonomous existence. The only reason she excepted Albania was because the autonomy demanded for this lawless country effectively concealed an Austrian protectorate. Prince William of Wied, appointed *bret* of Albania by the Conference of London, was simply a lackey of Vienna and Berlin. He was charged with the duty of thwarting with all his power Serbian and Greek influences.

Under these circumstances, Venizelos must have had little difficulty in the first days of August, 1914, in getting Constantine to support his views. With his habitual frankness he explained his position plainly to Count Quadt. He set forth to him that in the war which was beginning, it was inconceivable that Greece should take part against the three protecting powers whose interests were in accord with her own. Consequently, she would remain neutral as long as the Balkan equilibrium created by the Treaty of Bucharest was not compromised. In an official dispatch of the month of August, the German government recognized the soundness of the position taken by the Cabinet of Athens, and Bulgaria, since she was willing not to intervene as long as Greece guaranteed to remain neutral, kept out of the war for the time being. William II did not insist on her acting because the staff in Berlin, fully engaged with more important operations elsewhere, did not yet wish to commit itself deeply to any Balkan movement. It put into play other means.

In the second fortnight of August Mr. Venizelos in-

sisted on defining before the Entente the attitude of the government which he directed. At the very height of the German onset against France, he thought it proper to inform the Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd that he was in sympathy with them, and that Greece could put her forces at their disposal for future operations in the Balkans. France and England acknowledged the receipt of this offer and replied that they would take advantage of it as circumstances required. Further George V sent a telegram to King Constantine to thank him and to inform him that he had ordered the British Admiralty to come to an understanding with the Greek staff on the method of co-operation of the forces of the two countries. Constantine I replied with a friendly telegram, stating that the Greek naval staff was prepared to confer with England's representatives. This exchange of dispatches took place through Admiral Kerr as the intermediary.

At this time a significant incident took place. The Greco-Turkish conference which was to have occurred at Brussels in order to settle the differences between the two countries was transferred to Bucharest. There, Talaat Bey was not content with formulating unacceptable claims as to the islands; he strove to form a coalition of the Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks and Rumanians against Serbia. In spite of his finessing, he betrayed the game of Germany, whose cards he held. Mr. Venizelos refused downright to have anything to do with the plan, and recalled his two delegates, Messrs. Zaïmis and Politis. William II was not discouraged. Realizing that as long as Mr. Venizelos was in power, he constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of his Balkan plan, he undertook with the aid of the old parties to overthrow him. Mr. Streit, Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose competence in international affairs Mr. Venizelos had thought he could utilize, never thinking of the possibility of treason on his part, became the tool of this plot

and recommended war against Serbia. Mr. Venizelos at once foiled the scheme. He requested Mr. Streit's resignation and rejected the German proposition in these words: "Greece is too small a country to commit so infamous an act." He maintained 120,000 men under arms and furnished Serbia every facility that she desired for renewing her supplies of munitions and war materials by way of Saloniki and the Vardar railroad.

Even as late as the end of autumn, 1914, the Berlin staff did not seem to have decided on action in the Balkans. There is every reason to believe that it was not in favor of the second Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia. But General Potiorek, who was in command of the forces of the Dual Monarchy on this front, was impatient to win his laurels. Full of contempt for the Serbians, he thought that he could easily gain the victory over them. He entered upon the campaign before the Berlin Cabinet had arranged for the co-operation of Bulgaria. Czar Ferdinand, always a deceiver, did not put his armies in movement. He pretended that he was observing an official neutrality so as not to provoke a counter-intervention on the part of Greece. But he mobilized his comitadjis, furnished them with arms and even with cannon, and permitted them to make an inroad right into Serbian territory. In December, when the Serbs were in a nearly desperate condition, the Bulgarian comitadjis invaded Serbia and blew up the bridges on the Vardar and near Zaïtchar, which formed the only routes of communication by which Serbia was connected with friendly countries. The Cabinet at Sofia washed its hands of the matter, pretending that these raiders were Macedonians. Macedonians or not, these men were armed and paid by the famous Interior Organization of Bulgaria, which was in close relations with the government and could only operate with its connivance. If Serbia, contrary to

expectation, had not by a superhuman effort recovered herself, Bulgaria would have rushed upon her so as to be in at the death. But the armies of Potiorek were finally completely defeated. They were forced back over the frontier after having been subjected to enormous losses in men and material. The Interior Organization recalled its comitadjis and Bulgaria awaited a more opportune occasion.

For fear that she might be discouraged and be tempted under the pressure of Russophiles to go over to the Entente, Germany concluded with her, in the early days of 1915 a financial arrangement complementary to the loan-contract which had been signed shortly before the war but which owing to circumstances had not been executed. The syndicate of German and Austro-Hungarian banks which had undertaken to lend five hundred million francs to Bulgaria agreed to advance to her, in exchange for treasury notes accepted at par, one hundred and fifty million francs at seven and one-half per cent., of which seventy-five millions were payable at once, and the rest at the rate of ten millions every fortnight beginning with the 14th of April. By means of these fortnightly payments Austro-Germany held in leash the Radoslavof Cabinet.

About the same time, after long delays, the Triple Entente decided to undertake against the Dardanelles a movement designed to reopen its communications with the Black Sea and to checkmate Turkey. Desirous also of protecting Serbia against a new offensive she was eager to secure Greece's material aid, which was valuable to her for the sake of the intimidation of Bulgaria, the use of her fleet for purposes of transport and patrol and the occupation of bases of operation in the vicinity of the Dardanelles. On January 24 Sir Francis Elliot, Minister of England at Athens, communicated to Mr. Venizelos a telegram from Sir Edward Grey suggesting to Greece a concerted action in the Balkans, "in return

for very important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor." At this time the Cabinet in London still cherished illusions as to Bulgaria. In spite of all that had happened, it hoped that she would yield to its solicitation and would consent to align herself on the side of the Allies. Mr. Venizelos was so captivated by the prospect of re-establishing Greece as she had once existed in Asia Minor, that he showed himself disposed to cede to Bulgaria the districts of Cavalla, Sari-Chaban and Drama (*c.*2000 square kilometers) and also not to oppose the cession to her of a part of Serbian Macedonia. He laid down conditions for this which appear to have been finally agreed upon by the council of ministers and the king. But the hostile attitude of Bulgaria and the decision of Rumania to hold off hindered the execution of this first project.* It was taken up a little later in connection with the Dardanelles expedition alone. It was on this occasion that the first clash between Mr. Venizelos and Constantine I occurred.

The Cabinets of Paris and London at that time renewed their offers as to Asia Minor, demanding in return only the co-operation of Greece against the Dardanelles. After some rather hurried negotiations, Mr. Venizelos was in a position to present a definite proposition, which was discussed March 3 and 5, in two Crown Councils in which the ex-Prime Ministers took part. According to the terms proposed and agreed to by Paris and London, the whole Greek fleet was to co-operate with the Anglo-French fleet, but the participation of the land forces was to be limited to a single division (15,000 men), the rest of the army being required to overawe Bulgaria. Many objections were made. Attention was called to the fact that the proposals came from France and England alone, and that Russia was opposed to the entrance of Greek troops into

* The detailed account of these negotiations will be found in M. Leon Maccas' book, *Ainsi parla Venizelos*, pp. 34 ff.

Constantinople. Mr. Venizelos was able to reply that Russia had given her consent, and that the Cabinets of London and Paris undertook to reconcile in matters of detail the Greek and Russian points of view. As another argument a great deal was made of the adverse opinion of the Greek staff. According to this the Dardanelles could not be forced by an isolated naval action. As a result of profound study of the question, the staff had reached the conclusion that it was necessary to land at least three divisions on the shores of the Gulf of Saros. This objection was only too well founded. But it could be countered by directly recommending to the Allies the action on land in the indicated region, a region which was, as a matter of fact, very well chosen. Difficulties as to the delimitation and administration of the territories promised in Asia Minor were also raised. Mr. Venizelos met all these arguments, and devoted himself to showing how immensely important it was for Greece to appear in the Orient at the side of the Western powers, and incidentally to assure herself a magnificent domain of 120,000 square kilometers inhabited by flourishing Greek colonies. This would in a marvelous degree supplement the present possessions of the realm and would strengthen Greece's hold on the islands. The king broke off the second session without reaching any decision, but on the following day he made known his refusal. Mr. Venizelos submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Mr. Gounaris was charged with the duty of forming a new Cabinet with power to dissolve the Chamber. He associated with himself as Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Zographos, former High Commissioner in Epirus.

Mr. Venizelos did not think it proper at this time to provoke a struggle as to the constitutionality of the king's action. In an interview granted to the correspondent of the Havas Agency (March 13, 1917) he thus justifies his course: "In February, 1915, the action

of the king might have been regarded as constitutional, at any rate, formally, for a disagreement as to policy having arisen between the king and myself, it was possible to hold the opinion that, inasmuch as the last elections dated back to three years earlier and New Greece had as yet no parliamentary representatives it was possible, I say, to hold the opinion, that it was the duty of the country to decide the point at issue. I might well regret this procedure and might even find it injurious, but I could not rebel." He did not rebel, but he immediately exposed the critical situation created by his fall. Calling to his house the deputies of the liberal party, he showed them the consequences of the decision of Constantine I. "We have let a unique opportunity escape us. The harm done is irreparable. Nothing can make things right again even supposing that our government should be recalled to power and invited to enforce the decision taken by it." When attacked later by his successor and the court, he published two communications which he had addressed to the king in the last days of the crisis. These two letters have an historical interest. With prophetic lucidity the minister explained to his sovereign that the fate of Hellenism was deeply involved in the success of the Triple Entente, and that if Austro-Germany should triumph, Bulgaria would seize all Macedonia with Saloniki included, Turkey would again take possession of the islands, Hellenism in Asia Minor would be rooted out and Greece would fall back into the stagnant condition in which she had been prior to the first Balkan war. The consequences to Greece could not possibly be more disastrous if, in alliance with the Triple Entente, she were to be defeated along with her. Her vital interests bade her take advantage of the state of war which existed between Turkey and the Entente in order to deliver the hundreds of thousands of Greeks living on the shores of Asia, to permit the 200,000 refugees of

Asia Minor to recover their homes and to double again the extent of the kingdom which had already been doubled once since 1912. "Your Majesty," said Mr. Venizelos at the end, "is in the very prime of life for creating by your sword a Greater Greece, and for firmly establishing this military exploit by a complete political reorganization of the new state. You can pass on to your heir and successor, when the hour comes, an achieved task of superhuman grandeur, such as is given few princes to consummate."

The question had been precisely put, and had been decided against the convictions of Mr. Venizelos and the general sentiment of the people. The former Prime Ministers who had been invited to attend the Crown Councils had recognized that the government was in accord with public sentiment, and Mr. Theotokis, though he was in the opposition, had declared to the king that he could not undertake to follow out his policy. We do not know to what extent Constantine I was then committed to William II. He could hardly at this early date appeal as an excuse to the danger of Greece's being crushed. The Russians were still in the Carpathians and Przemysl, completely invested, was to surrender a few weeks later. Negotiations were being carried on to bring about the intervention of Italy. At all events, during the Gounaris ministry negotiations between Athens and the Entente were again taken up and Mr. Zographos did not cease to affirm his friendly feelings toward the protecting powers. On April 14, in reply to a request of April 10 that Greece should participate in the war against Turkey, he proposed that Greece should give military aid on condition that the Entente would guarantee the continental and insular integrity of Greece during the war and for a certain time afterward, that a naval and military agreement between the staffs should govern the conditions under which they should operate and that a treaty should fix the extent of the territorial

concessions promised in Asia Minor. It would have to be understood that the definitive object of the war was to be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Were these proposals made in good faith? It would be bold to affirm it. In any case, they deserved to be taken into serious consideration. They contained no unacceptable demand. The clause about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire raised, it seems, some anxiety. It was, however, very natural that the Greek government should wish to protect itself against a spurious solution which would have left her, at the peace convention, face to face with a Turkey eager for revenge. If the diplomats of western Europe took fright at the vista thus opened before them, it was because they had a less clear comprehension than the Orientals of the elements of this distinctly Oriental question. The guarantee of territorial integrity was clearly due. It was this, however, that seems to have hindered the negotiations from coming to a head. Still possessed with the idea of winning over Bulgaria, the diplomats of the Entente wanted to keep it in their power to offer to her eastern Macedonia and Serbian Macedonia. They permitted the proposals of the 14th of April to fall through, and this decided Mr. Gounaris' career. This politician, ambitious to become a party leader, would have been flattered to direct an intervention policy and to substitute himself for Mr. Venizelos. Repulsed by the Entente, he turned toward the pro-Germans and created an anti-Venizelist party. He proceeded to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, headed a furious campaign against the Venizelist candidates, bound his ministers to the king in a real solidarity, and proclaimed to the electors that they would have to choose between the policy of Mr. Venizelos and that of the king. Constantine, being seriously ill, interfered neither with his words nor his deeds. His protracted illness gave him, free as he was, by virtue of the Constitution, from any

personal responsibility, a convenient excuse for not breaking away from a shameful campaign.

The general elections of the 13th of June gave the Venizelists 184 seats as against 130 for the Gounarists. This was not a crushing majority, but the districts of the Greece of the time before 1912 had supported him almost in their totality. The Gounarist successes, on the other hand, had been won in New Greece, especially by Mohammedan and Jewish candidates. This was due to an intense pressure which was easily exerted by the government on heterogeneous populations which had been freed from the Turkish domination only three years before. The liberal party thus issued victorious from a very difficult test. Parliamentary custom required that Mr. Gounaris should retire and that Mr. Venizelos should be recalled to power. Nothing of the sort took place. Mr. Gounaris did not budge, and the king did not ask him to resign his place to the victor. The ministerial press continued with impunity to calumniate Mr. Venizelos. The calling together of the new Chamber was postponed under the pretext of the king's illness. If any doubt existed in the month of March as to the sentiments of Constantine I, such doubt could no longer exist in the month of July. His attitude can be explained only by his desire to resist the wishes of the people and by his faith in the victory of Germany.

It was probably in the month of July that the pact was made between the brothers-in-law. At this time, the Russians had been thrown back from the Carpathians and the Italian offensive had been stopped. The staff in Berlin had resolved to destroy Serbia. William II informed Constantine I that he was about to attack the Serbians with 400,000 men, that Bulgaria was in accord with him, and that he counted on Greece's remaining neutral. This notification was accompanied by a threat in case he was disobeyed and by a promise guaranteeing

the territorial integrity of Greece if Constantine followed his advice. The king yielded. His staff, which, up to that time, had shown itself hostile to Bulgaria, was willing to be convinced that, after all, they might just as well come to terms with her at the expense of Serbia; the main thing was to protect themselves against the Slav peril, springing from the union of two Slav neighbors; it made very little difference which of the two was crushed, provided one of them was put out of the way. This reasoning was fundamentally wrong, in view of the fact that Serbia desired no Greek territory, while Bulgaria wished to annex eastern Macedonia. Unfortunately, at this very time, in a note dated August 3, the Triple Entente demanded of the Cabinet in Athens that Greece should consent under certain conditions to cede eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria in order to permit the reconstruction of the Balkan confederation. This false step at such a critical time had deadly results. It cast into the shade the distant Bulgarian peril and brought into high relief the immediate sacrifices that were demanded. There was, it is true, no comparison between the extent of the districts that Bulgaria coveted and that of the districts which the Entente wanted Greece and Serbia to cede. But William II assumed responsibility towards Greece for the behavior of Bulgaria, which was moreover to be so generously compensated by her gains in Serbia that she would not claim anything elsewhere. This was without doubt an idle guarantee, but in the eyes of courtiers and intriguers it was quite enough to protect a sovereign and ministers who were disposed to permit themselves to be convinced.*

* Germany's bad faith in the matter seems established by the publication (October 9, 1915) in the Venizelist newspapers *Patris* and *Hestia* of a Germano-Bulgarian treaty dating from the previous July 17. This treaty, concluded at Sofia, gave Bulgaria all Albania, all New Serbia, Monastir, Guevgheli, Doïran, Cavalla, Seres, Florina and Castoria. The tenor of this document was said to have been communicated by the English Legation in Athens. The German Legation denied its authenticity. But, on the other hand, it was maintained that the information was exact. If this is the case, we may well ask how England, knowing of this treaty, could have kept up her negotiations with Bulgaria until the beginning of October, 1915.

In the interview mentioned above, Mr. Venizelos estimates the importance of the incident as follows:

> Between the elections and my return to the leadership of the government an important event had happened. The protecting powers had proposed to Greece to cede eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria. This proposition, apart from the fact that it did not satisfy Bulgarian ambitions, as was seen by what followed, was treacherously exploited by the pro-German propaganda and helped the cause of the royalists, who at once took the stand that Greece's territorial integrity must at all costs be maintained. I do not exaggerate when I say that if it had not been for this step the king would never have dared to repudiate the obligations imposed upon us by our treaty with Serbia. You ask me whether all this is simply an impression of mine. It is more than this; it is an absolute certainty based on facts and documents of which I had cognizance at that time. Further, it was only three or four weeks later that Mr. Gounaris let Rumania know that in case of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, Greece would not go to the assistance of her ally.

One thing brought on another. The failure of the Greek government carried with it that of the Rumanian government. Although it was even more to Rumania's interest than to Greece's not to let Serbia be crushed, because this put her vital communications and consequently her very existence at the mercy of Germany, she committed the same sin, the same crime against herself.

It was under these circumstances that the king recalled Mr. Venizelos to power without making him aware of his personal dealings with his brother-in-law. Some days later Bulgaria signed a treaty with Turkey by which the latter allowed her a very appreciable improvement of her frontiers, in particular at the very gates of Adrianople. This agreement was the counterpart of the one that followed the Treaty of Bucharest. It indicated that the time to act had come. The Turks had no notion of dispossessing themselves of valuable territories, without the certainty of material aid against the holders of Chios and Mitylene. Instead of determining the

Allies to take energetic precautions against Bulgaria, this arrangement moved them to show themselves more generous toward her. On the 14th of September, after long and painful pressure upon Serbia, they offered Bulgaria the spoils of Macedonia. Those were gloomy days for Mr. Pachitch and Mr. Venizelos. Yielding to the insistence of the Entente the latter resigned himself to Serbia's cession of Monastir to Bulgaria on condition that Albania should be divided between Greece and Serbia in such a way that these two countries should have a common frontier. Bulgaria answered by decreeing a general mobilization. Some Western Europeans suggested that this mobilization might perhaps be directed against Turkey; their blindness bordered on insanity. A man like Mr. Venizelos could not be deceived even for an instant. He submitted to the king and made him sign a decree ordering the mobilization of the Greek army (September 23).

Was harmony between minister and sovereign to be once more established? Mere spectators might have supposed this to be the case, for the evidence of the nation's peril was before all eyes. People who had been initiated into the ways of the Greek court were not so sanguine. They suspected that the pro-Germans had advocated the general mobilization so that the men under arms might be prevented from making any manifestations in Venizelos' favor and from supporting him by force in case a new disagreement with the monarch should cause his removal. This explanation seems too complicated to be right. At any rate, it was not to the taste of Bulgaria. When he learned the news of the Greek mobilization, Mr. Radoslavof made a scene before William II's minister: "You have cheated us," he cried, and launched into reproaches. William II was deeply interested in safeguarding his reputation and his interests. With furious intensity he put into operation every means that he had of influencing Constantine I.

The Gounarists who had lost their positions, the former ministers who were in retirement, such as Mr. Streit, the staff officers imbued with the spirit of the Kriegsakademie, the snobs of the court and the people who were paid salaries by the German propaganda, joined with Queen Sophie and the king's brothers against Mr. Venizelos. This statesman who sought only the good of his country was a thorn in the flesh of all these people. The pressure of the Entente in the opposite direction was insignificant, formal and uncoördinated.

On the 29th of September the new Chamber met. Mr. Venizelos set forth the situation in the most gloomy light. However, since Bulgaria still pretended at this time that her mobilization had as its only object an armed neutrality, he contented himself with declaring that he returned to his earlier program as thus formulated. "The government is held by the obligations imposed upon it by its alliance with one of the belligerents, Serbia, and is determined to fulfill these obligations if the *casus foederis* arises." Mr. Gounaris maintained that the mobilization ought to serve only to protect the vital interests of the country, to the exclusion of any obligation imposed upon the country by the treaty of alliance with Serbia. On the 3d of October Russia, at last undeceived, called upon the Bulgarian government "openly to break inside of twenty-four hours with the enemies of the Slav cause and Russia" and to proceed at once to the discharge of officers belonging to the armies of states which were at war with the powers forming the Entente.

On October 4 the Greek Chamber held an exciting session, which was prolonged far into the night. The former leaders, Messrs. Dragoumis, Rhallis, Theotokis and Gounaris, made violent attacks on the Cabinet in connection with the dealings with Bulgaria. Taking advantage of a speech of the 28th of September, in which Sir Edward Grey, while threatening the Bul-

garians, again made proposals to them, they claimed that the Entente was manipulating things so as to renew negotiations at the cost of Greece. Mr. Venizelos replied that formal and official assurances had been given him that the promises concerning concessions to Bulgaria, even those on the part of Serbia, could be considered from now on as having lapsed. He added, "I am really convinced that if latterly there had not existed in Bulgaria a misunderstanding as to our policy, a misunderstanding due perhaps to the fact that in the last days of the government of the Hon. Mr. Gounaris, the ideas of the government underwent a certain alteration or a certain unsettling, if, I say, Bulgaria had not found herself misled as to the declarations of Greece touching this question, I have reason to believe that she would not have decided to mobilize, thus running the risk of lighting a conflagration in the Balkans." This was a thrust delivered straight at Mr. Gounaris. The former Prime Minister recoiled and dodged. When pressed by his successor, he did not dare to deny that a change of the nature indicated had taken place in the last days of his ministry. His connivance with Germany was thus clearly established. As it was only in accord with the king that he had acted, the conflict between the crown and the government became inevitable.

This came about *à propos* of the *casus foederis*. Mr. Venizelos declared categorically that Greece was bound to succor Serbia in virtue of the treaty of June 3, 1913, which had been concluded for a period of ten years. As to this point, I quote here the extract from the official record of the session:

> At this time I no longer regard myself as justified in concealing from the representatives of the country and the country itself the fact that our treaty of alliance with Serbia is a general defensive treaty, on the basis of which each of the states binds itself to aid the other if one of them, without provocation on its part, is attacked by a third.

Mr. Popp.—By any third whatsoever?

Mr. Venizelos.—There is no "whatsoever"; the word is "third"! It was on the basis of this treaty, gentlemen, that when in May, 1914, our relations with the Ottoman Empire reached an acute stage, we addressed ourselves to Serbia, explaining to her the motives on account of which we were about to face a new war against Turkey, a war which we regarded as defensive, even though we were the first to attack, because the provocations on the other side had become intolerable. It was on this basis, I say, that we turned to Serbia to invoke her aid in case, during the war, we should be attacked by another state.

The Prime Minister might have stopped at that point. But consistently with his character and perhaps also to anticipate by a formal vote of the deputies the resistance that he foresaw on the part of the king, he tackled at once the eventuality of hostilities with the Central Powers. His words were these:

I certainly do not propose to you that we should declare war on Germany and Austria; but, gentlemen, if, in putting into execution our national program, if, while discharging what is for us a debt of honor, while fulfilling our duties as Allies, while defending the vital interests of the state, we find ourselves brought face to face with powerful nations, I am certain that, while expressing our regrets, we shall do our duty. [Applause!]

Before the manifest danger that comes on us from the north, threatening to rob us of what we have gained in the course of the last two wars, I should have proved myself irresolute and cowardly in not hastening to take such decisions as duty, honor and the highest interest impose on the nation. [Prolonged applause!]

After a passionate debate, these declarations were approved by the Chamber by 147 votes out of 257. If we add the nine ministers who abstained from voting, the effective majority was forty-six votes. This was not enormous, but if we take into account the conditions under which the dissolution of the Chamber and the new elections had taken place, and the vehemence of the debates, the majority was large. It would certainly

have approached being unanimous, if there had not been a feeling that the king was behind Mr. Gounaris. So the king's intrigue against Mr. Venizelos had failed. Constantine I ought to have recognized this. He could have cleared himself in the sight of his accomplices in Berlin by saying that he had done for them all that he could, but that being a constitutional sovereign he was absolutely prevented from going any farther. Now, Constantine, in lack of other qualities, is obstinate. He decided to override the vote of the Chamber. Making a pretext of the allusion to hostilities against the Central Powers, of which apparently there had been no mention in the Council of the Ministers held before the session, he informed Mr. Venizelos that he had gone beyond his rights and demanded his resignation. It was the plainest possible avowal of secret agreements with Germany. The king would never have dared to decide on such a stroke if his personal obligations had not run counter to the fulfillment of his duty as a constitutional sovereign. He gave the preference to the former. The minister thus affronted might have resisted, but he preferred to yield.

These two decisions of the 5th of October, 1915, were responsible for tremendous consequences. That of the king is not to be justified or excused from any point of view. It was a violation of his oath of accession, and it constituted an act of treason to the country. The soundness of the minister's decision is open to question. The Greeks of future ages will perhaps excite themselves about this as those of past ages have turned over again and again the question as to what would have happened if Alexander the Great had not died prematurely. What would have happened if Mr. Venizelos had kept the power in spite of Constantine I? Naturally this will never be known. Mr. Venizelos has developed at length the reasons for his docility in his

interview of the 13th of last May. He affirms that, left as he was to his own resources, he could not have resisted the king effectively; not being able to count on the support of the army, whose officers were for the most part devoted to the sovereign, he would have provoked the annihilation of the liberal party if civil war had broken out. These attempts at self-justification show as much as anything can that the old Cretan revolutionary had developed, that he had become more inclined to counsels of reflection than to the daring of inspiration, and that he counted more on time than on force. They show also that if Mr. Venizelos had not been left to his own resources, he could have triumphed over the king.

Since his second dismissal, Mr. Venizelos has not indulged in any recriminations against the three protecting powers. He has climbed his Calvary without a word of complaint. He is sustained by an invincible patriotic faith. His hope is in the reparations of the future. But the responsibilities of France, England and Russia are none the less great. During an entire year the three Allied Cabinets had meddled in Balkan affairs only to muddle them. They had permitted Turkey to give refuge to the German warships, to close the Dardanelles to commerce and to organize the defense of the straits through the agency of German officers who replaced those of the British naval mission. Then when their friends in Constantinople tricked them, they had been hard put to it to stir up enemies against them. Instead of forming once more against Turkey the league that had in 1913 been so successful against Bulgaria, who was now Turkey's ally, they had persistently offered to Bulgaria the territories of members of this league, especially of Serbia, their ally in fact, and of Greece, their prospective ally. They had compromised the warmest and surest friend that they had in Greece and when this friend, whose support was indispensable to them in the realization of their plans, was attacked by

his sovereign, they deserted him. At the moment when the Anglo-French troops were landing at Saloniki to hasten to the defense of Serbia, France and England suffered the minister who had invited them there to be driven out, and left the fate of the expeditionary force in the hands of a sovereign who had perjured himself. What a strange aberration, and how imprudent!

It was during these early days of October that the fate of Greece and of the Saloniki expedition hung in the balance. The two questions were bound up together. From the 23d of September, the date of the publication of the decree authorizing the Greek mobilization, Mr. Venizelos had requested from the ministers of England and France the dispatch of 150,000 troops intended to replace the same number of troops which Serbia, according to the terms of the treaty of June 3, 1913, had been expected to put in line on her southern frontier in order to benefit by the *casus foederis*. The Cabinets of London and Paris had agreed. Desirous of making amends for their previous errors, they had actively taken the necessary executive measures. Constantine I had sought to avoid responsibility, and Mr. Venizelos on October 2 had had to address a purely formal protest * to M. Guillemin, who had just notified him of the prospective arrival at Saloniki of a first contingent of French troops. The debarkation began October 5, at 3 P.M.† Mr. Venizelos had handed in his resignation at one o'clock. Is it conceivable that at such a critical moment the Cabinets of London and Paris and their representatives at Athens, forewarned of the hostile intentions of the king, should not have made every effort to minimize their effect? It was of no use to organize a military expedition, if measures were not taken to assure it a friendly reception and free play in the country which was to serve as its

* "To preserve neutrality up to the time when the *casus foederis* should present itself."

† On October 5 at Karaboroun, and on October 13 at Saloniki.

base of operations. The whole arrangement presupposed, if not the active co-operation of the Greek army, at least the political support of Greece. That being so, how could the originators of the enterprise sit quietly by with their arms folded when Mr. Venizelos was dismissed? If the Cabinets of Paris and of London had acted as energetically as that of Berlin, Mr. Venizelos would have found in their support the strength necessary to checkmate the king. They alleged that they had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign state. This excuse, which the official organs repeated *ad nauseam,* is a wretchedly poor one.

The excuse would not have amounted to anything, even if England, France and Russia had not been bound to Greece by a treaty. As it was, the Greek ministry had just come through general elections which had given it an imposing majority, after a campaign in which its opponents, at that time in power, had taken neutrality as their program and the name of the king for their party-emblem. The country, solemnly consulted by means of a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, had declared itself in favor of political accord with the Triple Entente as against the policy of Mr. Gounaris and the king. According to the Constitution, the government ought to be freely administered by the leader of the victorious party. In once more dismissing this leader from power for the identical reason that had determined his first discharge, the king became guilty of an unfriendly act toward the Entente. He at one and the same time deliberately rebelled against the Constitution and antagonized the three powers who possessed the declared sympathy of the country. These powers found themselves, therefore, quite legitimately on the defensive against the king.

But they possessed another right. In virtue of the treaties of July 6, 1827, February 3, 1830, May 7, 1832, July 13, 1863, and March 29, 1864, they had been made

"protecting powers of Greece," sureties for her independence and her constitution. The treaty of 1863 was especially in point. It had been concluded after the decree of forfeiture had been pronounced against King Otho on account of his misgovernment and anti-constitutional attitude, and had stipulated that the three powers were calling to the Greek throne Prince William of Denmark (George I) in order to realize the wishes of the Greek nation. Article III was thus conceived: "Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the guarantee of the three courts, forms a monarchical, independent, constitutional state." Article X established for the new king a personal endowment consisting of the sum-total of the credits on the Greek treasury which each one of the three courts therewith resigned. In accordance with Article XI the three courts were to see to it that Prince William was recognized as king of the Greeks by all the sovereigns and states with which they were in relations. Never was the right of intervention better established.

In the first days of October, 1915, Constantine I had not yet committed that series of acts outraging the independence and Constitution of Greece which characterized the following eighteen months, but all these acts were latent in the decision of the 5th of October. It was evident that if the king discharged the minister whose policy the electors and the Chamber of Deputies, acting in full cognizance of the case, had just approved, it was done to inaugurate with all its consequences the absolutist régime, which had been repudiated by the treaty of 1863. On ascending the throne Constantine I had pronounced the following oath before the representatives of the people: "I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity, consubstantial and indivisible, to protect the dominant religion of the Greeks, to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Greek nation and to preserve and defend the national independence and integrity

of the Greek state." On the 5th of October he had broken this oath. He had abused the country and its legal representatives. He had compromised the national independence and integrity of the state. Were the protecting powers to delay protesting till the country was crushed under foot, till its independence was suppressed and its integrity violated? It was not only their right but their duty to intervene immediately between the people and the king. Their inertia was in great part the cause of the catastrophies that followed.

Some authorities have claimed that Constantine's *coup-d'état* ought to have determined France and England to abandon the Saloniki expedition rather than to attempt to break down the resistance of the king. This is strange reasoning. These two powers, in accord with Russia, had thought it necessary to go to the rescue of Serbia, their common ally, making use of the territory and the help of Greece, which was also in alliance with Serbia. The treachery of Constantine I rendered this help even more necessary and more urgent. Instead of changing their plan the guaranteeing powers ought to have followed out its execution with redoubled energy. By lowering their flag before the king, by withdrawing from Saloniki the troops that had just arrived, by abandoning Serbia, they would have covered themselves with shame. Furthermore, they would have abandoned all the Orient with its resources and its coasts to Austro-Germany. Right soon they would have been unable to maintain their commerce in the eastern Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal. They knew it. Unfortunately they lacked reasoning power and conscience. They abandoned the Greek people to a despot and trusted to luck.

PART II

No sooner had Mr. Venizelos been dismissed by the king than the three protecting powers became aware of the consequences of their inaction at the time of the *coup-d'état* of Constantine I. It was no longer a question of the participation of Greece in the hostilities against the Central Powers, but of the execution of the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece. The king had demanded the resignation of Mr. Venizelos on the pretext that as president of the Council of Ministers he had brought Germany and Austria into the case, without being authorized to do so. But the Greco-Serbian treaty subsisted as an indivisible whole, the Chamber had called for its fulfillment and the new government ought to have conformed to the obligations assumed toward Greece's ally and to the express commands of the Chamber. This was so clear that Mr. Zaïmis, the new Prime Minister, did not dare at first to take his stand against it. In appearing before the Chamber on October 11, he did not repudiate Greece's obligations toward Serbia. He simply reserved for himself the power to adapt the policy of Greece to events, "in order better to assure the vital interests of the nation." He even declared that his policy "rested on the same basis as the policy followed by Greece since the beginning of the European war." He said not a word of what he would do if Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria. In fact, he permitted the allies of Serbia to transport their troops over Greek territory in order to help the armies of King Peter. Mr. Venizelos, therefore, did not regard it as his duty to break at once with his successor. He maintained that he did not want to cast the country into internal difficulties and promised to give his support to the government "just

so long as it did not overturn the fundamental principles of the Venizelist policy."

Thus this œcumenical ministry could take its place without any opposition and get possession of all the instruments of power without difficulty. On his part the king had a free field for carrying on his negotiations. Thanks to the extreme scrupulousness of Mr. Venizelos and the inertia of the Triple Entente, he cleared without accident the dangerous part of the road which led him toward a dictatorship. From that time he had no need to worry. Master of the staff and the army, freed from all control, he felt himself in a position to resist all parliamentary or constitutional pressure. Furthermore, his prestige was increased by the very success of his authority as exerted. His praises were sung in a tone almost of adoration by a chorus of journalists richly paid by the propaganda of Baron Schenk. Mr. Zaïmis could then, without provoking a new crisis, reject outright the obligation to help Serbia. On the day but one after the session in which Mr. Venizelos had accorded him a provisional parliamentary support, that is, on the 13th of October, he notified Mr. Pachitch that the Greco-Serbian treaty had in view exclusively the hypothesis of an attack by Bulgaria alone, and that owing to the lining up of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Serbia, the treaty no longer applied.

This interpretation, contrary to the actual provisions of the treaty, which established no such distinction, was insulting not only to the Chamber which had expressed the opposite opinion but also to Serbia and to the protecting powers, her allies. The Cabinet of Pachitch drank the bitter cup to the dregs without any recriminations. Probably in the hope that friendly relations with Greece would be resumed later, and in the desire

* The ministry was thus christened by public opinion because it comprised five former Prime Ministers—Messrs. Zaïmis, Theotokis, Dragoumis, Rhallis and Gounaris.

not to offend a state whose position on her southern border was of great value to her, Serbia did not break off diplomatic relations with the perjured government. It did not even publish the text of the treaty, the divulgation of which would have exposed the bad faith of the Cabinet of Athens. As for the protecting powers, they flattered themselves that they could win back Constantine I by offering new advantages to him. England offered him as the price of aiding Serbia the cession of the island of Cyprus, which she had held since 1878 in virtue of the treaty concluded June 4 of that year with Turkey. At other times the prospect of acquiring Cyprus, that large island with 285,000 inhabitants of whom 235,000 are Greeks, would have roused the enthusiastic approbation of Greece. Sir Edward Grey in all probability imagined that this would either suffice to bring the king back to their side, or would at least permit public opinion to exert upon him a decisive pressure. He had not correctly estimated the full extent of the damage done by the Entente's weak policy and the success of the German propaganda. Mr. Zaïmis refused in a disdainful way this unexpected gift, which was subject only to the condition that Greece should give military aid to Serbia regardless of what the issue of the war might be. In a note of October 22 to the Cabinet in London he declared that the Austro-German attack released Greece from the obligation to interfere by force of arms, since the treaty of 1913 had had exclusively in view a Balkan war. This refusal is virtually a proof in black and white of the connivance of Constantine I with Germany. That the Greek government did not eagerly jump at the chance to incorporate in its realm such a valuable island as Cyprus must be due to the fact that it had other more alluring promises. According to men in the confidence of Mr. Venizelos

* Interview with Mr. Diomedis, former minister, in the *Gazette de Lausanne*, June 6, 1917.

these promises consisted of an extension of Greek territory in Albania, of the annexation of the Cyclades and of the island of Cyprus. Now, although the fate of Albania depended in some measure on Austria-Germany, that of the Cyclades and of Cyprus depended on the great maritime powers. These would require to have been destroyed, therefore, before the promise of William II could have been fulfilled. But Constantine's faith in the victory of Germany was so strong that he preferred the emperor's two birds in the bush to England's bird in the hand. Without troubling themselves further about the consequences of this situation, France and England pursued in Macedonia the task imposed on them by circumstances.

The Greek Chamber of Deputies, however, took offense almost immediately. The new Minister of War, General Yannakitsas, acted in a way so lacking in respect toward the Chamber that Mr. Venizelos provoked a political debate in the course of which he delivered two great speeches (sitting of the 3d of November, prolonged till 4 A.M. of the 4th). General Yannakitsas having refused to express his regrets, and the Cabinet having rallied to his support in spite of the adverse vote of three of its members, Mr. Venizelos raised the question of a vote of confidence in the government. Unmasking the ministry, he denounced the unconstitutional nature of its power. He maintained that the Greek constitutional monarchy was a republic with a king at its head. As the name of the king had thus been mentioned he explained his position as to the sovereign's intervention in the following words:

I admit as justifiable a disagreement between the Crown and the responsible government when the Crown believes that the latter is not in harmony with the opinion of the people. It was under such conditions that in February, 1915, the change in our policy was made. It was in this spirit that the Crown and the government disagreed in February. But this disagree-

ment was decisively ended by the vote of the people. If you think that the Crown is excusable, according to the spirit of our parliamentary régime, for disregarding this will as expressed by the people in their free elections, free at any rate as far as the manner in which the opposition carried on the contest is concerned, though not free in view of the means employed by the government; if you believe, I say, that the Crown has the right, after appeal has been made to the people and the people has expressed its will, not to follow this expressed will of the people but to proceed to a new dissolution in order to demand the so-called verdict of the people again and again, then this means that you admit that the liberal régime in Greece, under which we have lived for a half-century, has become worse than a scrap of paper, the term which has been used by some people to describe international treaties.

Messrs. Gounaris and Theotokis undertook then to show that the schemes of Mr. Venizelos were leading Greece to her ruin and that the *casus foederis* with Serbia was not applicable. As this was the last sitting of the Chamber and therefore gave Mr. Venizelos his last chance to defend his policy before the legally constituted representatives of the country, it is interesting to reproduce several extracts from his speech which have a historical importance and of which the dispatches from Athens gave at that time an incomplete and obscure analysis. In reply to the charge of having been willing to concede to Bulgaria at the beginning of 1915 the districts of Drama, Cavalla and Seres, he gives the following explanation:

It was a question only of the three districts of Cavalla, Drama and Sari-Chaban, that is to say, of an area of about 2,000 square kilometers. I proposed the cession of these three districts on the following conditions and presuppositions: First: that we should receive the districts of Doïran and of Guevgheli, with an area of 1,000-1,200 square kilometers,—that is, of an extent equaling about half of the territory to be ceded in eastern Macedonia. From the point of view of richness, they were certainly inferior in value, but from a strategical point of view they are of far greater value. Further, our concessions to Bulgaria were made

not in order to purchase Bulgaria's neutrality but to enlist her active help against Turkey, so that she might attack Turkey from Thrace while we would make our attack from the Asia Minor side, thus making the destruction of the Ottoman Empire more rapid.

Further, we were ceding the 2,000 square kilometers on condition that the powers of the Entente should recognize that the vast territorial concessions which they had promised us should have the extent that I outlined in my second communication to the king. . . . If you wish to know the probable area which the cession of Smyrna and the principal part of its hinterland would carry with it, you must take into account that the Hermos and Meander rivers naturally belong to this hinterland and that their valleys reach 275 kilometers into the interior of Asia Minor.

Further, I demanded the appointment of an international commission which would have proceeded to an exchange of populations as soon as the boundaries of Greece and Bulgaria had been definitely traced. Bulgaria, moreover, would have bought the property of such inhabitants of the ceded regions as might have preferred to emigrate to the New Greece, the Greater Greece, which my policy would have created, this policy that you have not followed.

Mr. Theotokis cannot rightfully say, because we were at that time disposed to cede Cavalla and Sari-Chaban, that "a man must be blind not to understand that Bulgaria, if she had received these regions as well as all the Serbian possessions in Macedonia, would have become colossally powerful and dangerous to our existence." For Bulgaria would have received from Serbia only the non-contested zone which was to have reverted to her by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty concluded before the war. This non-contested zone had an extent of about 10,000 square kilometers. This, added to the 2,000 square kilometers that we would have ceded in eastern Macedonia and the 14,000 square kilometers that she would have received in Thrace by the rectification of the Enos-Midia line, would have made an increase of about 25,000 square kilometers; she would have had then a total area of 140,000 square kilometers. How can you then maintain that this Bulgaria could have been dangerous as ever against a Greece which by her increases of territory in Asia Minor would have had an area of 250,000 square kilometers?

As to the Greco-Serbian treaty, Mr. Venizelos declared that far from having been unwilling to apply it

at the beginning of the war, as his opponents contended, he had come to an agreement with the Cabinet in Belgrade on this point in the month of August, 1914. He affirmed that it was equally inexact to say that Serbia in similar circumstances (in May, 1914) had refused her aid to Greece.* Passing on, then, to the question of the contingent of 150,000 men that Serbia was bound, by the terms of the treaty, to put in array against Bulgaria in order that the *casus foederis* should come into play, Mr. Venizelos made these two points: 1—France and England had promised to send 150,000 men to take the place of the Serbian contingent; 2—Serbia had herself put in line 120,000 men against Bulgaria, so that taking into account what Serbia alone had done, she lacked only 30,000 men of having fulfilled the stipulation of the treaty. Finally, leaving out of account the interpretation of the treaty, Mr. Venizelos undertook to prove that, treaty or no treaty, Greece ought to hasten to the aid of Serbia.

Mr. Theotokis thinks that the salvation of Greece is to come from the Central Powers. I say to him, with the deepest conviction, that Greece not only cannot grow, but that she cannot even continue to exist within her present confines, if she finds herself opposed to the powers that control the sea. . . . I am justified in telling you to-day that you do not see clearly if you maintain that in case Serbia should be destroyed and Bulgaria should occupy a large part of her territories, it will be easy, regardless of the final result of the war, to dislodge her from the territories that she will have seized. Do you believe that at the close of the European war the peoples that have taken part in this exhausting struggle will for an instant permit their governments to mark the signing of the peace by beginning a new war, a war against Bulgaria to compel her to withdraw her armies from the regions that she claims? I repeat once more that in pursuing your policy you are making sure of only one thing: the creation of a greater Bulgaria which before we shall

* Later, in his weekly journal, the *Keryx*, Mr. Venizelos told how Mr. Pachitch in May, 1914, had informed the Porte that if war broke out between her and Greece, Serbia would not remain indifferent.

have celebrated the centennial of our independence will rush upon us, weakened militarily and without friends and allies.

Next, Mr. Venizelos compared the two Greeces that were thus in conflict:

We have the former world of Greece represented by the new Cabinet and the new world of Greece, the world of the time following the revolution of 1909, represented by the liberal party. The old conception, which the present Cabinet represents, is that which believed that Greece could not produce an army of more than 60,000 men; it is that which believed that Greece could never contract an alliance that would help her to realize her national aspirations; it is the Greece whose views about our national aspirations were nebulous, and as undecided as they were indefinite; it is the Greece whose preparations were as insignificant as its aspirations were magnificent. We did not then realize how far our just and legitimate aspirations might extend. We let them reach so far oftentimes that statesmen who were content with extending them only as far as Kroussovo were accused by us of betraying the rights of Hellenism.

It is, then, natural that to-day too, when once more circumstances analogous to those of 1912 present themselves, it is natural, I say, that our political conceptions should be as far removed from each other as are the poles. Now as then, you do not wish a war which necessitates the help of allies, and when I tell you that the cup has not been finally taken from you, that it will be brought again to your lips that you may drink it to the dregs, you say, "Well, it is your fault, for having brought us as far as the Nestos." * [Applause.]

Do you not think, then, gentlemen, that the New Greece is justified in saying to the Old Greece: "In the presence of the great difficulties which are before us, you ought once more to step aside and to give place to the New Greece which has the courage necessary to meet the new situation." [Shouts of "Bravo!" and prolonged applause.]

By 147 votes against 114, with three blank ballots, the Chamber adopted the program of the liberal party, judging the declarations of the government unsatisfactory and censuring the conduct of the Minister of War.

* The river Mesta, which empties into the sea in the district of Cavalla.

The first move of the king was to appoint General Yannakitsas his aide-de-camp. Then he accepted the resignation of Mr. Zaïmis and charged with the formation of the new Cabinet a Mr. Scouloudis, an octogenarian who had served in the ministry only once, and then for but five months, when in 1897 he had been minister with the portfolio of foreign affairs in Mr. Rallis' Cabinet. Mr. Scouloudis took this portfolio once more into his own hands and retained most of the members of Mr. Zaïmis' Cabinet, including Mr. Gounaris and General Yannakitsas. The only new colleague whose co-operation he secured was Mr. Michelidakis, a Cretan, and an obstinate rival of Mr. Venizelos. This series of acts constituted a declaration of war on the Chamber, the liberal party and Mr. Venizelos. It was followed by a decree of dissolution of the Chamber. In one month Greece had reached the last stage on the road toward absolutism.

The royalists concealed the sinister aspects of this evolution as well as they could. According to their views the Constitution conferred on the king, without any limitation, the power to dismiss his ministers and to dissolve the Chamber. Consequently Constantine I kept within the limits of the Constitution in changing his ministers and dissolving the Chamber as often as he thought necessary. In fact, the Greek Constitution contained no reservations as to the exercise of the power to dismiss ministers or to dissolve the Chamber. But this is the case generally in all parliamentary governments. Custom corrects textual omissions. No text can settle in advance all the clashes that may possibly arise between the different branches of the government. If the power to change the Cabinet and to dissolve Parliament were actually unlimited, a constitutional régime would be equivalent to a government at the king's good pleasure. In the last resort, it is the people who decide; that is to say, when the sovereign makes use of his pre-

rogatives in a way that is obviously contrary to the spirit of the government the people makes known its will by effective measures. This had been done in Greece in 1863, as in France in 1830. Nothing of the sort took place at Athens in November, 1915, because the leader of the majority did not wish it and the protecting powers did not encourage it. In November the difficulty of triumphing over the king was greater than in October. The leader of the last legitimate government no longer controlled any of the elements of public power; they were all in the hands of his opponents. It was then only logical that, having yielded in October, he should yield again in November. In politics events are irresistibly linked up one with another.

The same logic compelled the three protecting powers to trust the formal protestations of friendship made by the king and his ministers. Mr. Scouloudis certainly did his duty along this line. In a note of November 9, addressed to the Entente Powers, he gave them "the most formal assurances of his firm resolve to continue a most sincerely benevolent neutrality" toward them. "The new Cabinet," he added, "adopts as its own the declarations of Mr. Zaïmis as to the attitude of the royal government in its relation to the Allied troops in Saloniki. It is too fully conscious of the true interests of the country and of what it owes to the protecting powers to depart in the slightest degree from this line of conduct." At the same time the confidential representatives of Constantine I in the capitals of the Entente were telling all who were willing to listen to them that the king had been misjudged, and that from now on all that was needed to establish the most perfect harmony between the court of Athens and the Entente was to rid him of Mr. Venizelos. It was on the basis of these fair words that the Anglo-French force that had landed at Saloniki a month earlier began operations in Macedonia.

Gloomy months followed. While our expeditionary force spent itself in vain efforts to help the Serbians, driven back by superior forces, the royal dictatorship extended its hold over all Greece. The protecting powers raised no protest. Their excuse was that they desired to avoid interfering with the internal affairs of Greece. Constantine I heaped compliments and marks of favor on such members of the French and English governments as visited Athens. M. Denys Cochin and Lord Kitchener were successively the recipients of signs of friendship. And yet, notwithstanding all this, less than fifteen days after his appointment Mr. Scouloudis announced his intention to disarm and intern Allied troops, whether Serbian or Anglo-French, who might be driven back on to Greek territory. Emboldened by unexpected complacency or even by encouraging confidential statements on the part of personages of the Entente who were opposed to the Macedonian enterprise, he pretended to apply strictly in the matter the ordinary rules of neutrality. It required "commercial restrictions" and a threatening note in order to recall him to a sense of respect for Greece's obligations and his own promises of November 9. On the 24th of November, after a painful discussion, he consented to permit the Allied troops liberty of movement and the use of the necessary ways and means of transport. One of the members of the Cabinet, however, characterized this agreement very exactly in the following words: "The matter has been happily arranged, thanks to the broad views of Germany, who has kindly consented not to place any obstacles in the way of our benevolent neutrality toward the Entente." In Greece, then, the Allies benefited no longer by the benevolence of Greece but by that of Germany! William II advised Constantine to be patient till such time as the armies of these two brothers-in-law could together fall upon ours.

There was no election campaign. Mr. Venizelos

requested his friends not to run for office and advised the electors not to vote. According to his idea, abstaining from voting was the only way for the liberal party to show its strength. As a matter of fact, half of the voters were under arms, including fifty-three Venizelist deputies. The government was ready to give furloughs to its supporters while withholding them from its opponents. This consulting of the electorate was, then, a downright farce, and those elected were not even sure of being allowed to take their seats, because this depended on authorization by the military powers. If the liberals participated in the balloting the government would not hesitate to maintain that the people had ratified its policy. It was better to leave to the old parties, illegally returned to power, the responsibility for events. At a meeting of the liberal party held at his house November 21 Mr. Venizelos had this policy adopted, and on the same day published an explanatory manifesto of which these were the closing words:

> The government wishes to play a political comedy unworthy of a free people. It is in a spirit of mockery that it has called this an expression of the national will. This political comedy is really intended to prevent the expression of the national will by means of a dishonest election, and to cause it to be believed that the Greek people could not only countenance the disgrace of the non-fulfillment of a treaty of alliance, which has made it possible for Greece to extend its frontiers as far as the Nestos, but also could approve of the degradation of our political régime and the estrangement of the natural friends of Greece. In a comedy like this, I say, the liberal party is in duty bound to take no part, in order not to lend an appearance of legality to this action which ought, in conformity with the facts of the case, to be denounced as a violation of constitutional law and morality.
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> The liberal party, in thus refusing to participate in the elections, does not abandon politics nor withdraw from the struggle. On the contrary, by this abstention, it continues to participate in political affairs. It leaves to the government, which has brought us into this situation, full and entire responsibility for

the deterioration of our political régime and for the disasters which this policy is bringing upon the nation. At the same time, our party is also trying to avoid other dangers likely to result from an internal struggle, which might quickly become acute, now that we are in the midst of an external crisis as well.

When this external crisis shall have passed, if the disasters that the policy of the government is preparing for us do not assume such proportions as to shatter our faith in the future of Hellenism, the liberal party will be ready to undertake the struggle into which the country is forced in order to defend its constitutional liberty.

No matter how acute this future struggle may be, it will be continued then under conditions less dangerous than those under which it would be carried on to-day when we are in the midst of the most dangerous national crisis that we have ever experienced.

The restoration of their liberties to the Greek people will be the one indispensable condition of the safety of the state. This alone can preserve her from wasting away and dying an inglorious death, the end toward which the definitive establishment of despotism in our country would surely lead.

On the 19th of December, the day of the election, only 200,000 citizens voted although the voters of the 13th of June had numbered 750,000. This was a little less than one-fifth of the registered voters. And yet the government had used a veritable wealth of means of compulsion: suspension of the rule that certain employees could not be removed, the discharge of men in office, the distribution of lands to the Mohammedans of Macedonia, threats to the directors and editors of the newspapers of the opposition, espionage, infringements on the right to assemble and so forth. It was this Chamber, thus elected, which served as a shield to Constantine's despotic government.

Indeed, the king delegated all his powers to his military council, presided over by General Dousmanis, to whom the Cabinet ministers served simply as tools. With the co-operation of the military attaché of Germany the staff prepared the eventual co-operation of the Greek army with the German-Bulgarians coming

from the north. German pamphlets were gratuitously and profusely distributed in the barracks, where, on the contrary, the reading of liberal journals was forbidden under heaviest penalties. Volunteers recruited in the 1st regiment of the army corps of Athens, of which the Crown Prince was colonel, formed a sort of royal body guard and served as an agency of propaganda. The army was withdrawn from its military duty in order to be employed for political purposes. In 1909 Mr. Venizelos had adopted precisely the opposite method. Though called to Greece by the Military League, he had shortly afterwards proceeded to dissolve it and had sent the army back to its professional duties. He had put an end to anarchy and had prevented civil war by sending each man back to his place and by substituting an ordered democracy for a oligarchy governed by demagogues. Constantine I brought back disorder, prepared the way for civil war, cut the country in two internally and delivered its frontiers to an enemy beyond its gates. The Cretan revolutionary acted as a statesman, while the king behaved like a revolutionary.*

* The *Keryx*, in the month of June, after the crisis was past, described the situation as it had existed. as follows:

"The attempt was made to strangle the national soul and to inspire abject terror by any means whatsoever, in order that the people might bow before the deadly results of the policy employed. Whole armies of spies and intriguers were formed, with all their elements eager to sell their very souls. Citizens who had no interest in politics were followed both openly and secretly by detectives without being able to imagine what political calumny was being hatched against them. Those who met in the public centers of the two cities did not dare to ask each other for the news of the day, in the certainty that among the strangers about them were base spies whose business it was to weave slanderous plots. Those who took places at tables in cafés and confectioners' shops looked around in a frightened way and beheld the respectable person, who was about to sit down beside them, listening to their conversation and addressing them with insolent frankness with the intention of provoking a discussion, and of crying out to these innocent citizens that they were insulting the king.

"The most respectable citizens were dragged before the courts on slanderous charges, those who dared to blame the conduct of the government received menacing letters in which they were warned to look out for their lives. Automobiles and carriages were stopped and their occupants asked who they were, where they came from and whither they were going. In front of many houses detectives were placed keeping count of those who entered or passed out, following like 'faithful' dogs every movement of the occupants. Men

The real nature of that "most sincerely benevolent" neutrality, promised by the Scouloudis Cabinet, was shown at once by the ill-treatment of the conquered Serbians, who had succeeded in escaping from the Germano-Bulgarian grip. In order to anticipate the effects of this ill-will, warships of the Allied fleet on January 10, 1916, landed some detachments at Corfu and prepared to receive there the wreck of the Serbian army which had taken refuge on the Albanian coast. By a note of that same day the representatives of the Allied powers informed Mr. Scouloudis of this measure dictated by "a feeling of pure humanity." Reluctantly, Mr. Scouloudis yielded to the inevitable, but he took his revenge by concluding with Bulgaria an arrangement, the existence of which was later revealed by the Hungarian newspaper *Az Est,* which published the following Bulgarian note:

Since the capture of Bitolia (Monastir) and of Resna the Bulgarian army has approached close to the Greek frontier. In consequence of this movement the general staff of Bulgaria is afraid that on the frontier collisions may easily arise between the outposts of the Bulgarian army and those of the Greeks.

Desirous of avoiding the possibility of such accidents the Bulgarian government invites the Greek government to consent to the creation of a neutral zone on the Greco-Serbian frontier *as has been already done on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier* and to be willing that along the Greek frontier the troops be withdrawn on both sides for the distance of a gun-shot.

Some weeks later, in April, the government of Athens flatly refused to let the Serbian troops who had been kindly received at Corfu, and who had now recovered

of all sorts and of the most peaceful character were searched for hidden weapons, while right before them passed quite openly the minions of the government. Every hangman was armed, every individual that would sell himself was bought, every man devoid of conscience was recruited for this work of espionage, calumny and perfidy. The times of Turkish despotism knew no more dangerous organizations. Janissarism lived once more in a different form."

from their trials and had been equipped afresh, to rejoin the Anglo-French expeditionary force in Macedonia by passing over Greek territory or through the Corinthian Canal. It alleged that the passage of the Serbian soldiers would endanger public health, would interfere with the passenger and freight traffic, would violate the neutrality of Greece and menace its independence. The first two objections were in fact unfounded. The third had only an apparent value. As a matter of fact, even if Greece was neutral in the European conflict, she was Serbia's ally in virtue of the treaty of 1913. The alliance was not destroyed by the refusal to give the help provided for by the treaty. The Cabinet of Belgrade had carefully avoided regarding this refusal as a rupture. It did not despair of being able to bring Greece back to the feeling that it was its duty to defend the common interests of the two countries. Now, over and above the auxiliary force of 150,000 men, the treaty of June, 1913, provided for facilitating the transportation of troops of each of the signatory states through the territories of the other. If the ministers of Constantine I had really been animated toward the Allies by the sentiments expressed in their note of the 9th of November, they would have hastened to give them this permission which would have cost Greece nothing and would have formed a poor compensation for their failure to fulfill the clause as to giving aid. As for the menace to her national independence, this was chimerical. It was evident that the Serbian troops would hasten away to Macedonia without delaying in Old Greece. Besides, the route through the Corinthian Canal obviated this pretended danger.

Mr. Scouloudis' ill-will was equaled by his bad faith. This first showed itself in the month of May. On the 23d of this month a column of Germano-Bulgarian troops appeared before Fort Rupel at the entrance of the Demir-Hissar Pass and summoned the Greek gar-

rison to surrender, declaring that they had been ordered to penetrate into Greek territory "in order to occupy certain advantageous positions." The occupants of the fort at first refused. They even fired twenty-four cannon shots against the invaders, but during the night they received the order to withdraw. In the Chamber, on June 5, Mr. Scouloudis thus explained this order: "Being aware on the one hand of the resolve of the invaders to seize the fort and seeing on the other hand that a continued armed resistance might at any moment lead to a general engagement which would result in breaking a neutrality that it had no intention of abandoning, the government issued the following order through the Minister of War: 'First to cease all resistance, and then to declare to the German commander that in view of the general invasion of the German army in the pass of Demir-Hissar, where the fort is, the garrison of the fort is obliged to retire, taking with it the war material in the fort.'"

The explanation was very pretty. In order not to depart from neutrality—always the same old excuse—the Greek government let the Bulgarians, its irreconcilable enemies, seize its territories and occupy a group of newly built fortifications, the construction of which had cost relatively large amounts of money. Mr. Scouloudis declared before the Chamber that he had protested most energetically to Germany and her allies, and he also launched out into pompous denials of the suspected understanding with the Germano-Bulgarians. And yet, this understanding actually did exist. This was proven by documents found later in the military offices of the IVth army corps and published in facsimile. Although at that time this was only a suspicion, several deputies of this shadowy chamber murmured. As a sort of relief for their irritation, Mr. Scouloudis announced that on the Saturday before, June 3, the king's fête-day, General Sarrail had proclaimed martial

law in Saloniki and that the Greek government had at once protested. Thereupon, Mr. Stratos expressed his opinion that all the stir about the occupation of the Rupel Pass was unjustified and that the proclamation of martial law at Saloniki was of far greater importance. He ended by saying that Mr. Venizelos had had in view only the aggrandizement of Bulgaria. A deputy named Mitropoulos shouted "Cannot the man guilty of such crimes be prosecuted?" Mr. Stratos demanded that a prosecuting attorney should be called on to act. That was the way this Rump Parliament made Mr. Venizelos responsible for the capture of the Rupel forts.

Public opinion did not take the thing so calmly. The Macedonians were disturbed. Patriots who were not blinded by hatred for Venizelos and abject devotion to the king were startled at the spectacle of their enemies of 1912-13 firmly established in the lands won by the victories of these two glorious years. They recalled to Constantine I that he had then won the title of Bulgar Slayer and repeated his dispatch to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent on the 25th of June, 1913:

Urgent dispatch of His Majesty, the King, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

June 25.

The sixth division reports that Bulgarian soldiers, at the command of a police officer, led into the courtyard of the local Bulgarian school the Metropolitan of Demir-Hissar, two priests and more than two hundred prominent citizens, and massacred them there. The division staff ordered the bodies exhumed and established the fact of the crime. The Bulgarians, furthermore, violated girls and killed one girl who resisted.

Protest, by my order, before the representatives of the civilized powers against these monsters with human faces. Protest before the civilized world and declare that I shall find myself forced, to my regret, to proceed to reprisals in order to inspire some fear or some reflection as to consequences before crimes like these are perpetrated.

The acts of the Bulgarians have made all the atrocities of past barbarian invasions fade into insignificance. They prove that the Bulgarians no longer have the right to be included among civilized peoples.

CONSTANTINE R.

If Constantine I showed himself perfectly reassured as to these people whom he had three years before banished from the civilized world, the Allies did not share these sentiments. The right wing of their expeditionary force was menaced. The bulk of the army could be attacked on the flank at a moment when it might be engaged in a serious operation in the northwest. Furthermore, the Bulgarians were not the only ones to inspire apprehensions. The connivance of the Scouloudis Cabinet with them furnished ground for apprehension. Toward the end of May, General Yannakitsas warned his troops that they might soon be called on to fight. But against whom, pray, since Greece was maintaining a strict neutrality? Some days later at the close of a review of troops who had taken part in the grand manœuvers, the king made an address in which he said: "Soldiers ought to be obedient to orders, not to sentiments." Further, Constantine I on the pretext of going hunting went on an excursion of six days in upper Thessaly in the vicinity of that Albano-Epirote region where the Austrian troops were operating. The tone of his speeches, his manner, and his actions themselves should have warned us to be on our guard. On the 12th of June "popular" manifestations against France and England took place in the capital. Since these powers had neglected to act at the moment when a decisive result might easily have been obtained, they were now forced by necessity to take effective precautions against an imminent danger. They at once organized a landing force under the orders of Admiral Moreau and transported it to the Bay of Salamis. Though the instructions given to the admiral and the representatives

of the Entente in Athens have never been divulged, there is reason to believe that the intention of the protecting powers was to settle the Greek affair with one stroke and to re-establish in its integrity the constitutional régime with appropriate material guarantees. Unfortunately, at the last moment, these intentions were modified. Either owing to some diplomatic intervention or because Constantine I, warned of the blow that was threatening him, took the first steps toward submission, the ministers of the three protecting powers contented themselves with sending Mr. Scouloudis on the 21st of June an ultimatum. This document was in truth unusually curt. After having called attention to the "many legitimate grounds for suspecting the Greek government," to the activities of foreigners who were trying to create on Greek territory hostile organizations contrary to the neutrality of the country and tending to compromise the security of the military and naval forces of the Allies, to the connivance of the Greek Cabinet with the Germano-Bulgarians in the Rupel affair, to the violation of the Greek constitution and the evident "collusion of the present Cabinet with their enemies," the protecting powers demanded the immediate execution, without discussion or delay, of the following measures:

1. The actual and total demobilization of the Greek army, which must be put, with the briefest delay, on a peace footing.

2. That the present ministry should be at once replaced by a business Cabinet without political color which should offer all necessary guarantees for the loyal fulfillment of that benevolent neutrality toward the Allied powers that Greece had promised to observe, and should vouch for the honesty of new elections.

3. An immediate dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, followed by new elections, after the expiration of the time-limit provided by the Constitution and after the general demobilization should have restored the electoral body to its normal state.

4. The replacing, after consultation with the Allies, of certain police functionaries whose attitude, inspired by foreign influences, had facilitated outrages committed against peaceable

citizens, as well as insults directed at the Allied legations and people under their jurisdiction.

The king submitted. Many of those who were privy to these negotiations supposed, nay hoped, that he would prefer to abdicate rather than to submit to such mortifying conditions. If he had been guided by motives originating in a feeling of wounded self-respect, he would probably have given up the struggle from this moment. But without any doubt he was advised by William II to bend the neck and to keep his throne while waiting for better times. So he dismissed the docile Mr. Scouloudis and charged Mr. Zaïmis with the duty of forming a new Cabinet. It was Mr. Zaïmis who, on June 23, signed the promise to execute in their entirety the demands formulated in the ultimatum of the 21st. On the 29th of June the general demobilization was decreed, and on the 31st of July the army was once more put on a peace footing. Many functionaries were replaced or discharged, but the Chamber was not discharged, under the pretext that it was impossible, because of circumstances, to decide at that time, as the Constitution demanded, the date of the coming elections. The Chamber was, therefore, simply adjourned. General Dousmanis and Mr. Streit, the two secret advisers of the king, continued to hold their positions. The pro-Entente newspapers were prosecuted for having "defamed and insulted the government and the army," when as a matter of fact they had at that time been indulging in the gentlest sort of criticism. The very life of Mr. Venizelos was threatened, so that he was obliged to protect himself with a bodyguard of his faithful Cretans. This did not, however, hinder him from energetically conducting his electoral campaign in view of the great national election that was approaching. The magnificent resistance at Verdun, the Franco-British success on the Somme, the victorious offensive of General Broussilof in Galicia and Bukovina

gave to his electioneering a turn that was very disquieting to the royalists.

Constantine I resolved at that time on an act that will eternally weigh heavily on his reputation. Fearing, in spite of an unbridled anti-Venizelist propaganda, and the formation of leagues of reservists who put force at the disposal of the election agents of the government, fearing, I say, that the Venizelists would be returned in large majority to the new Chamber, the king wished at any price to postpone the elections indefinitely. To achieve this end he contrived the invasion of eastern and western Macedonia by the Germano-Bulgarians. Descending the valley of the Strouma, the Bulgarians seized all the ports of the valley and the cities of Drama, Seres and Cavalla. They carried away the garrisons and had them transported to Germany. They got possession of war material consisting of 200 cannon of the latest model, 50,000 rifles, great stores of ammunition and different kinds of equipment, etc. The Greek troops had received definite orders not to resist the Bulgarians and to enter into no common action with the French. Those who did not wish to submit to the humiliation of internment were obliged to take refuge as best they could within the radius of action of the expeditionary force of the Allies. Out of 4,500 men and 200 officers of the garrison of Cavalla, 2,200 soldiers and about 120 officers with Colonels Christodoulou and Lelakis crossed over to the island of Thasos; 700 men with 40 officers set sail for the Pireus; the rest with Colonel Hadjopoulos who commanded the 6th division were directed by the Bulgarians toward Drama. In the localities that they seized the Bulgarians gave themselves up to the most savage acts of violence against the inhabitants, who, since their precipitate departure in 1913, had been described to them as hostile.*

* These events took place in the interval between the 20th of August and the beginning of September.

This time the measure had been heaped full to overflowing. It was no longer a matter of a difference of opinion about the Constitution; it was a clear case of treason. Constantine I accepted as a satisfactory guarantee on the part of the invaders the assurance from the ministers of Germany and Bulgaria in Athens that Greek sovereignty would be respected, that the German and Bulgarian troops would evacuate the Greek territory thus occupied as soon as military conditions would permit, and that the inhabitants would be indemnified for all the damage caused. A vigorous movement of protestation took place at once. On Monday, the 27th of August, an immense crowd gathered before Mr. Venizelos' house to cheer for the leader of the liberal party. Mr. Venizelos addressed these 60,000 citizens and proposed to them to elect a delegation which should submit to the king a stirring appeal of which he then and there read the text. He did not break with the monarch; he only entreated him to return to a sense of his obligations as king. On this point, the peroration of his address was particularly significant: "You will see, O King, by the meeting of to-day that the liberal party is not the enemy of the Crown any more than it is of the royal family; nor is it your personal enemy. It is only the respectful guardian of free government and admits no deviation on this point. But just here, too, lies the real interest of the Crown. Only those who exploit the latter can seek to persuade you of the contrary and they are then really your worst enemies." But Constantine I had no intention of receiving a delegation of liberals or of replying to their appeal. He announced that he was ill, and that the publication of the decree of dissolution of the Chamber and of convocation of the electors would have to be delayed for some time longer. During this illness, real or pretended, events came on thick and fast. The intrigues of the German agents assumed such proportions and the acts of the governmental functionaries

were so hostile to the Entente that on September 1 a strong Franco-British squadron, under the orders of Admiral Dartige du Fournet, commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, came to anchor in the harbor of Salamis. On the 2d the ministers of France and England demanded control of the postal, telegraph and wireless communications, the expulsion of hostile agents of corruption and espionage, and penalties for the Greek subjects who had participated in the acts of corruption and espionage above described. Mr. Zaïmis could do nothing else but yield. The disorders, nevertheless, kept on increasing. The leagues of reservists organized meetings of protest against the demands of the Entente. On the 10th of September a band of about twenty-five persons made their way into the garden of the French Legation, and discharged their pistols in the air, shouting, "Long live the king! Down with France!" Mr. Zaïmis had to present his regrets to M. Guillemin, and have them presented at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris by Mr. Romanos. He was obliged to guarantee the infliction of penalties upon the guilty men and to promise to close at once the various sections of the League of Reservists both in Athens and in the provinces.

However, the Bulgarian invasion cut the Greek army in two materially and morally. The soldiers who had escaped from eastern Macedonia and almost the entire garrison of Saloniki formed themselves into an army for national defense and put themselves at General Sarrail's disposal to resist the Bulgarians. A committee for national defense, at the head of which was Colonel Zymbracakis, addressed a proclamation to the people in order to incite them "to cease to obey the authorities who had betrayed the national honor," and another proclamation to the army to urge it to place itself under the orders of the committee with a view to the liberation of the fatherland. These appeals found numerous echoes.

Furious at what he called a defection, the king received in solemn audience the officers of the 5th division (Saloniki) who had refused to make common cause with their comrades of the national defense and he congratulated them emphatically: "You have inscribed your names in the annals of history with a pen of iron. You have shown an example of an iron discipline, of a faith and devotion toward your king and your leader that is proof against every test. By your attitude you have stigmatized as traitors those who have betrayed their oath and among whom, unfortunately, your commanding officer is counted. . . . With such an army and at the head of men like you, possessing your morale, your sentiments and your faith, I am ready to face no matter what enemy." As the officers thus congratulated had been unwilling to fight the Germano-Bulgarians, this "no matter what enemy" that the king had in mind could only be the expeditionary force of the Entente.

In spite of so many disturbing indications, Mr. Venizelos still clung to the hope of winning the king back to the national cause. Rumania had declared war on Austria-Hungary on the 28th of August, an event of great importance to Europe, but of especial importance to Greece. For more than a year General Dousmanis himself had said that the moment Rumania entered the war Greece would be obliged to do the same. Without doubt, he did not believe that King Ferdinand, a Hohenzollern, would turn against Germany, but the opinion that he expressed was a political necessity so evident that Mr. Venizelos thought that he ought to make a supreme effort. He describes the steps he took in the following terms:*

I informed Mr. Zaïmis that if the king, contrary to what his courtiers had declared, was still unwilling to side with the Entente, he would prove by this very act, before the whole world,

* Interview given March 13, 1917, to the special envoy of the Havas Agency.

that he was following a pro-German and not a Greek policy, and I added that I should in that case consider it my duty to revolt.

Mr. Zaïmis, on the basis of this declaration and appealing to the signs of impatience and even of disorder that began to show themselves in the army, obtained from the king his promise to enter upon negotiations with the nations of the Entente looking to an emergence from her neutrality. The king even authorized him to put himself in touch with me so as to keep me informed of all the negotiations as they occurred.

But meanwhile the German Emperor telegraphed to the king to assure him that within a month he would certainly have conquered all Rumania and have thrown Sarrail's army into the sea. He asked him, therefore, to resist the Venizelist policy for four weeks more. With all docility the king obeyed, yielding to the injunctions of his brother-in-law, and ten days after he had seemed to be about to side with the powers of the Entente he threw aside the mask and returned to his self-willed policy.

Mr. Zaïmis, realizing that he was being mocked, refused to play the king's game and resigned. The moment to act had come; the country had seen light; the king never would move.

Admiral Coundouriotis, disheartened by such criminality, joined me along with General Danglis, and we decided at once to raise the standard of revolt.

Mr. Zaïmis handed in his resignation as Prime Minister on the 11th of September. In spite of the solicitations of Messrs. Gounaris and Rhallis, he persisted in his refusal to serve, and it was very difficult for the king to find a successor. He did not dare to recall Mr. Gounaris, his confidential adviser, whose nomination would have constituted a violation of Article II of the ultimatum of June 21. And yet he had to have someone who, under the cloak of neutrality, should ruin the Venizelist policy within and without the country. By the mediation of Mr. Streit, his unofficial Minister of Foreign Affairs, he at once offered the position with this understanding to Mr. Dimitracopoulos. But the latter, upon ascertaining that it would be impossible for him to maintain his position owing to the refusal of the ministers of the Entente to withdraw their insistence on the execution of the conditions of the ultimatum of

June 21, resigned the office. Several days were spent in new efforts. Finally, on the 16th of September, Mr. Nicolas Calogeropoulos, former associate of Mr. George Theotokis and conspicuous member of the aristocratic Germanophile coterie, formed a ministry composed of second-rate men who were notorious anti-Venizelists. His personal sentiments were well known. In June, 1915, he had been heard to say publicly, while speaking of the leader of the liberal party: "We must have this traitor's blood."

The formation of this Cabinet was a challenge to the Entente. The ministers of the protecting powers refused to have anything to do with it. When questioned about this, Mr. Calogeropoulos replied: "According to diplomatic custom, immediately after the formation of the Cabinet, the foreign representatives visit the Prime Minister. If this takes place, in common courtesy, we shall immediately return the visit." The expected visit did not take place. Then Mr. Calogeropoulos published the following communication: "The declarations which have been made by the Prime Minister and in accordance with which the present government is not a Cabinet in the ordinary sense of the word, but has a political character, must be understood as follows: the ministry, composed of persons belonging to the Parliament, assumes before the country all responsibility for its acts, accepting, be it understood, the note of the powers of June 21 in the same spirit as did the Zaïmis Cabinet." In spite of this express acceptance of the ultimatum of June 21, the ministers of the Entente persisted in holding aloof. The tension reached its height. From all the larger islands of the Cyclades came manifestos, approved by large assemblies, urging Constantine I to recall Mr. Venizelos without delay and threatening in case of refusal to establish a revolutionary government. These demonstrations did not shake the king's resolve. Their only effect was to render him more insolent.

On the 20th of September, before the infantry barracks of Athens and in the presence of 5,000 soldiers gathered for the ceremony of administering the oath to the new recruits, the king delivered a speech breathing the purest absolutism. He declared to the young soldiers that they were from now on "soldiers of the king," that they owed a blind devotion "to the will of the king," and he warned them not to yield to suggestions intended to mislead them: "Do not listen," he cried, "to the advice of the profiteers of patriotism, since for them patriotism is only a screen behind which they hide in order to commit crimes." These were the very words of William II. "Voluntas regis suprema lex esto."

On the next day, *Patris,* the organ of Mr. Venizelos, characterized this speech as contrary to the fundamental principles of the Constitution, surpassing the very worst conceptions of absolutism. Mr. Venizelos himself declared publicly that the nation ought at once to take the defense of its interests into its own hands.

On the 22d, Colonel Zymbracakis reviewed on the parade ground of Saloniki the contingents of Macedonian volunteers who were ready to join the army of Sarrail. The same day, Mr. Calogeropoulos decided to institute lawsuits against all the officers, non-commissioned officers and private soldiers "who had adhered to the revolutionary movement." On the 24th, the Congress of Hellenic Colonies assembled in Paris pronounced the deposition of King Constantine. On the 25th, at half-past four in the morning, Mr. Venizelos, accompanied by Admiral Coundouriotis, commander-in-chief of the Greek navy and a group of friends, set sail from Phalerum for Crete. Received with enthusiasm at Canea by the people and by the troops he issued a proclamation to the Greek people. After describing the disorders resulting from the fatal policy of the king during the last year and a half, he concluded:

It is not the time now to try to find those who are responsible for our accumulated misfortunes. The duty imposed on us is to try, while there is still time, to save what can be saved. The surest way to find safety would certainly be to re-establish our broken national unity, in order that this work may be undertaken with the co-operation of all the nation's forces.

But there is only one possible means of re-forming this broken national unity. It is to return without delay to the policy which the national conscience dictates; it is to attempt at the side of our Serbian allies and of the great powers who are battling with them, three of whom are guarantors of our independence, to free our territory from the invasion of this detested enemy; it is to co-operate with these powers so that not only shall Europe be finally and forever freed from the danger of the German hegemony, but that the Balkans too may be freed from Bulgarian pretensions to supremacy.

We shall count ourselves happy if the king decides, at this supreme moment, to put himself at the head of the national forces, so that, in an indissoluble union, we may attempt the realization of this national policy. But if this cannot be obtained, there remains but one means of safety, that is, the isolated action of that part of the nation which believes that if we do not co-operate with our natural allies in the re-creation of the Orient which is bound to result from the great European war, the Greek government and the Greek nation will go down to ruin.

For this reason taking on ourselves, with a feeling of duty but also with enthusiasm, the mission entrusted to us by the people, we appeal to all Hellenism and demand its help in the work that we are undertaking. Since the government has betrayed its obligations, it is incumbent upon the nation to attempt the realization of the task imposed upon it. We invoke the support of every Greek citizen who feels that a longer tolerance of the disasters and humiliations which the policy which we have followed has caused, would be equivalent to the death of the nation.

We undertake this struggle in the full conviction that the nation, summoned, in the defection of the State, to a rising in mass, will realize once more the miracle which is necessary to bring the nation back to the way from which it has wandered for a year and a half.

Immediately, adherents flocked to the cause. In all the larger islands of the Cyclades, the royalist authori-

ties were deposed and replaced by Venizelists. From Athens itself many officers, followed by non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, set sail for Saloniki. The committee for national defense put itself entirely at the disposal of the government that was forming. The permanent bureau (in Paris) of the Congress of Greek Colonies sent a telegram of adherence to Mr. Venizelos, promising to follow him "on the path of honor and glory" to which he had committed the Greek race. From Canea, Messrs. Venizelos and Coundouriotis sent to M. Briand, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, a dispatch congratulating him on the recent success of the French troops on the Somme and containing warm wishes for the final success of the Allies. It was the first contact of the provisional government with a foreign government. M. Briand thanked the signers of the telegram through the consul of France at Canea.

The miracle, the vision of which guided Mr. Venizelos over the waters of the Archipelago, was accomplished at this moment. New Greece, becoming the guardian of the sacred fire of the fatherland, peacefully conquered the Old, and Hellas began to believe once more in her destiny.

PART III

THE departure of Mr. Venizelos for Canea gave rise to curious and diverse comments. While it was generally interpreted in France, in England and especially in New Greece and the islands as the beginning of a patriotic campaign destined to produce great results, the circles devoted to the king affected to regard it as a confession of weakness, if not as a flight. We may even question whether the government in Athens did not actually look on this move with favor, in the hope that the prestige of the leader of the liberal party would vanish with his departure from the capital. The friends of the Royal Family in Greece as well as elsewhere were inclined to compare his departure to that of General Boulanger for Brussels in 1889. . . . Did Mr. Calogeropoulos wish to pose as the Greek Constant? Certain it is that he permitted the news to spread that co-operation of Greece with the Entente was again possible. He demanded only, so it was said, a definite period of delay, so as to permit the reorganization of the military forces of the country before involving it in the war. Even the attitude of the protecting powers toward this move on the part of Mr. Venizelos was not very clearly defined. It soon appeared that their support of him, a support that was absolutely necessary if he was to succeed in his enterprise, had been subordinated to the condition that this should not take the form of an antidynastic movement.* Now, in order to produce its full effect the movement ought to have started upon the arrival of the liberal leaders at Canea, with a proclamation deposing the king, or at least with the convocation, in a city removed from

* Mr. Venizelos declared later, in 1917, that this condition had actually been imposed upon him.

royalist control, either of the Chamber that had been illegally dissolved or of an assembly of delegates from all parts of free Greece. Embarrassed by the engagement that he had been forced to make, Mr. Venizelos was obliged to restrain the demonstrations of his followers instead of encouraging them. The friends of the Royal Family profited by this false position to insinuate that the grand national movement was a failure. At the same time any allusion in the French press to the possibility of a change of reign was suppressed by the censor. French publicists were forbidden to advocate the formation of a Greek government bent on breaking down the resistance of Constantine I.

Mr. Calogeropoulos decided that the proper time had come for him to withdraw, and on the 4th of October he made known his resignation in the following remarkable communication: "The government having been unable up to the present moment to get in touch with the representatives of the Entente Powers here in Athens, and considering its existence an obstacle to the progress of national affairs, has asked the king to accept the resignation of the Cabinet." The king accepted this resignation all the more readily because he thought that by sacrificing his minister he could renew official relations with the Entente. On the 10th of October, then, Mr. Spiridon Lambros, professor and archaeologist, who had been made Prime Minister with Mr. Zalocostas as Minister of Foreign Affairs, succeeded in re-establishing normal relations between the government and the Entente. This success was all the more inexplicable since the majority of the Calogeropoulos Cabinet had been pro-Entente in spite of their being anti-Venizelist, while the Lambros Cabinet was composed entirely of court favorites. It was just at this time that Mr. Venizelos and Admiral Coundouriotis, after a triumphal tour in the islands, landed at Saloniki. They at once formed there, with General Danglis who had joined them, a

provisional government in the form of a triumvirate, assisted by a ministry of which Mr. Politis was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was on the 10th of October, also, that Admiral Dartige du Fournet sent Mr. Lambros a note demanding, as a sequel to his note of September 2, certain concessions, including disarmament, sequestration or surrender of vessels of the Greek fleet, disarmament of certain land-batteries and also the control of the police and of the railroads. On the 11th the Lambros Cabinet yielded, and on the following day the transfer of the Greek light cruisers to Keratsini was effected and their disembarked crews were quartered in different public buildings in Athens. But the pro-German intrigues were at that time so far developed, so many armed men thronged the streets, and Mr. Lambros seemed so prone to evasions, that on the 13th the admiral was forced to emphasize and make more definite his note of the 10th. He demanded in particular that all citizens should be forbidden to carry arms of any sort whatsoever and that the embargo on the exportation of wheat from Thessaly should be raised.

Anxious weeks followed. Encouraged by the success of the Germano-Bulgarians in Rumania, the royalists became more and more insolent. The director of the newspaper *Patris* was prosecuted for having published in his paper official documents relative to the surrender of the Rupel forts. The fulfillment of the conditions prescribed in the notes of the 10th and 13th was avoided by subterfuges. The king surreptitiously concentrated troops and war material in Epirus and Thessaly; at one time he was even credited with the intention of taking refuge there. On the 18th he reviewed on the parade ground the sailors who had been disembarked from the vessels sequestered by Admiral Dartige and addressed them in a passionate speech that was full of threatening allusions. During this period the triumvirate was being organized at Saloniki, intent above all on gathering

together the contingents that were not only to battle against the Bulgarians at the side of the troops of the expeditionary force but also to forward the liberating movement in Greece. As to the question of the form of government, Mr. Venizelos refused to commit himself. In a speech delivered at a great banquet given in honor of the provisional government, he only foreshadowed the convocation of a national assembly charged with the duty "of erecting an insurmountable rampart against the assault of the king on the sovereignty of the people." On the 20th of October, in a conference held at Boulogne, the leaders of the French and English governments decided not to recognize officially the provisional government, though lending to it their material aid. France and England guaranteed to share equally the expenses of the Venizelist army and consented to an advance of ten million francs in addition.

At this moment negotiations in Athens took a new turn in consequence of the arrival of M. Bénazet, deputy of the French Chamber, charged by the French staff with a mission in the Orient. Through an Italian friend, a Signor Serpieri, a director of the French Mining Company in Laurium and on intimate terms with the court, M. Bénazet obtained an audience with the king. There followed a sudden change in policy, the details of which still elude the historical critic. The only thing that we can make out with certainty is that the king was clever enough to persuade his interlocutor of the sincerity of his friendly intentions toward the Allies and of his readiness to favor an arrangement calculated to reassure them completely. He suggested the idea of a surrender of batteries and munitions to Admiral Dartige and a transfer of troops. M. Bénazet left the palace with the idea that an amicable arrangement could easily be made and that it would be the height of cleverness to reconcile Mr. Venizelos and the king. He was confirmed in this idea by the friendliness shown him by the queen. Some

days later, Admiral Dartige was himself presented to the king, and seemed to carry away from this interview a similar impression. The king and his brothers went to dine with Prince Démidof, Minister of Russia. Then Admiral Dartige ordered one of the two landing companies which had been installed at the Zappeion since the incident at the French Legation to return to its vessel again. In an account of the Bénazet mission that appeared in the *Petit Parisien* of January 10, 1917, the result of this mission is thus set forth: "The king hoped to reconcile the desire which he felt to remain neutral with his desire to restore peace and harmony to his country. He did not demand any compensation (?) but only requested that consideration for his feelings be shown by the avoidance of any exultation—*especially in the press*—over his concessions to the Entente. Our diplomatic and military representatives were charged with the execution of this agreement, as approved by the government." On the part of the Entente it was carried out to the letter. The press was rigorously censored and could not communicate its apprehensions to the public. In the House of Commons on the 31st of October, Lord Robert Cecil declared that whatever tended to unite all the Greeks would be desirable indeed.

A further diplomatic arrangement was made a little later. In consequence of a slight collision at Ecaterini between the troops of the king and those of the triumvirate (November 4-5) the protecting powers consented to establish a neutral zone between the territories of the provisional government and those of Old Greece, in such a way that the extension of the Venizelist movement was blocked. Thessaly and Epirus, which were devoted to Venizelos and were only awaiting the appearance of Saloniki contingents in order to drive out the royalist authorities, were thus prevented from rising. The creation of this neutral zone coincided with a visit of General

Roques, Minister of War of France, first to Macedonia and then to Athens. The establishment of this neutral zone was hailed as a fine solution. With negotiations at the point where they then stood, the Cabinets of the Entente believed that an acceptable arrangement was about to be consummated with the government in Athens. They permitted, without any protest, the convoking and assembling on the 13th of November of that Rump Parliament on the dissolution of which they had insisted on June 21. The Cabinet in Athens pretended that by virtue of the Constitution the Chamber ought to resume its duties on that day. The reply might have been made that the sole Chamber that legally existed and was qualified to meet was that elected June 13, 1915. To raise no objection seemed preferable, and, besides, the Chamber was dismissed almost immediately without having transacted any business. It had, however, served to break the injunction in force against it. Did Admiral Dartige think that he could then and there demand the reward for our complaisance? On the 17th of November he sent Mr. Lambros a new note demanding the surrender of eighteen field batteries, sixteen mountain batteries with a thousand rounds of projectiles per battery, as well as of 4,000 Mannlicher rifles with 200 cartridges per rifle, of 140 machine-guns and of fifty automobile trucks. On the 20th, without awaiting a reply, he notified the embassies of the hostile states in Athens of the decision of the Entente to expel their personnel from Greek territory within forty-eight hours. On the 22d he proceeded to enforce this expulsion, and this was effected without any notable incident. On the 22d Mr. Lambros replied to the note of the 17th, offering to hand over a larger number of cannon than the Germano-Bulgarians had seized in Macedonia, 191 as against 124. He refused to meet the rest of the Entente's demands. On the 24th the admiral ordered the government in Athens to give over to the Allies ten mountain batteries

on or before the 1st of December and the rest on or before the 15th. He justified this demand by the remark: "The place of the material that I demand is not in your magazines, but on the Macedonian front at Monastir, where the destinies of the Balkan States are to be decided." It was on the 24th, too, that the government at Saloniki declared war on Bulgaria and Germany. Not being able to send a direct notification to these powers, it begged the Allied governments to be so good as to take this duty upon themselves. It is as yet uncertain whether they did this.

During the last days of the month there was extreme confusion. The Military League was reconstituted. The officers stirred up the soldiers in their barracks, the reservists were armed, the disorderly elements were enrolled by the agents of General Dousmanis. Fights broke out in the streets; many Venizelists were roughly handled. On the 26th a detachment of 200 French marines came to reinforce the little contingent encamped at the Zappeion. In the capital an artificial excitement increased hour by hour. In the provinces, where none existed, the government counterfeited it. It pictured an uprising of the peasants in Thessaly, a massacre of the soldiers at Ecaterini. Now, nowhere had the Thessalian peasants stirred, and the very prefect of Larissa himself acknowledged that not a word had been heard about rebellion in his province. As for the evzones (light-armed troops in native costume), not one had been harmed. That did not, however, hinder the Gounarists from ordering a solemn requiem—forbidden at the last minute—to "celebrate the entrance into immortality of the heroes who had fallen gloriously in a battle against the traitors." By dint of these tragi-comedies an agitation was produced which threatened at any instant to be transformed into riots and massacres. During the night of the 27th very many houses in which Venizelists lived were marked with red circles. The leaders of the

reservists proclaimed that they would hinder by force the surrender of weapons even if the government permitted it. Trenches were dug in the immediate neighborhood of Athens, and emplacements for machine-guns and artillery were prepared.

On the 27th Mr. Zalocostas addressed a protest to the representatives of the neutral powers at Athens against the blockade of the straits of Salamis by the Allies, against the control exerted by them over public utilities, against the expulsion of the personnel of the legations of the Quadruple Alliance, and, finally, against the demand for the surrender of war material. He closed his note of protest with this phrase: "I have no doubt, Mr. Minister, that you will offer me, in these painful circumstances the support that I request." On the 28th a Crown Council was held, the conclusions of which were not published; but the correspondents of news agencies and of foreign newspapers telegraphed that the government persisted in its refusal.

In spite of all these unfavorable signs, the confidence of Admiral Dartige and of General Bousquier, the French military attaché, in an amicable solution appeared unshaken. On the 29th the admiral had a somewhat long interview with the king. On the 30th the general too was given an audience by Constantine I. In the course of these conversations both were convinced that the king desired only that they should force his hand and that a simple outward manifestation of force would make it possible to gain all that they had demanded. The king, it was said, had formally declared that the Greek troops would offer no resistance; he had even had this assurance given in writing by the marshal of the court. During the 30th vessels carrying French troops cast anchor in the harbor of Pireus. They had orders to disembark the next morning and, without cannon or convoy of munitions and supplies, to go and occupy certain positions and take charge of a prescribed amount of war material that

was to be handed over to them. The expedition was organized like an ordinary field manœuver in time of peace, with the conviction that it would encounter no resistance. Admiral Dartige, in fact, expressed to some newspaper correspondents "his full conviction" that the cannons would be delivered without any disturbance of the peace. He added that he "had not the slightest intention of resorting to force."

This optimism was not shared by the Athenians. Since the night of the 29th the troops of the garrison of Athens had left their barracks to take up positions in the environs of the city, especially at Goudi and Chalandri. By authority of a decree published on the 29th, authorizing voluntary engagements, an indirect mobilization was effected. More than 10,000 men "volunteered" the first day and were at once incorporated in the force. The instructions given to the military authorities prescribed that they should not hinder the disembarking of the Allied troops, but should follow them in equal numbers and oppose the execution of the orders of Admiral Dartige. The principal buildings of Athens were occupied by Greek marines. The inhabitants of the city who were witnesses of these preparations and of a multitude of little characteristic incidents, got the impression that a conflict was inevitable. The newspapers informed their readers to this effect. The *Messager d'Athènes* bearing the date of the 1st of December, but printed on the 30th of November, wrote:

Not to mince matters, the government of Athens proceeded yesterday to the first act of hostility against the Entente. It began its mobilization by the system of voluntary engagements, just as Germany had put her army on a war footing at the end of July, 1914, by the system of individual orders. A particularly well informed man in Entente circles said very truly: "We have driven out the ministers of the Central Alliance, we have driven out the Germans, but we are treating with respect the German organization in Greece."

And Athens is not calling the reserves alone to the colors. It is clothing with the regulars' uniform the raw recruits, that is to say, those factors of disorder by which it has terrorized the people, that "people" in whose name the German oligarchy has committed all its crimes against Greece. It seasons with "Attic salt" its declaration of war against the protecting powers.

The idea dominant in most Athenian circles, the idea proclaimed by the pretorian guard of the kingdom of Athens, which has lately been christened "the national army," is that the Entente will not wish to aggravate the difficult situation in which she finds herself here in the Orient in consequence of the defeat of Rumania, by creating a new front on Greek territory. It is an idea which has been kept alive by the policy which the Entente has followed in Greece and which has become deeply rooted through newspaper campaigns in which men came to forget, as Clémenceau did, that party quarrels in time of war reverberate far beyond the frontiers of a country.

If the Entente, by some appropriate act, had taught the heroic camarilla that its anger was as much to be feared as Germany's, Greece would not to-day be hurried at full speed toward the abyss. She would find herself to-day in her place near her protectors, and thousands of human lives would have been spared, thousands of lives whose loss is due solely to the regard of the Entente powers for the sacred persons of their worst enemies in Greece.

For two years they have been shrieking their hostility in the very faces of the Entente. But in spite of this, the commander-in-chief of the Allied naval force continues to talk to us of good intentions and of faithful promises.

On Thursday, the 30th of November, at half-past six in the afternoon, Admiral Dartige received the official reply of the Greek government, elaborated in several successive meetings of the Cabinet. It was a refusal. The admiral was not surprised, for he believed that Constantine I wanted to have his hand forced by a demonstration of military force. Consequently, on the morning of Friday, December 1st, several French detachments, equipped as though for a dress parade, disembarked and advanced in different directions. They soon clashed with troops entrenched along the two prin-

cipal roads that lead from the sea to Athens. The Greek soldiers blocked their way and opened fire. Immediately the royalists posted on the emplacements began to fire volleys with their machine-guns not only upon the Allied detachments but also on the French quartered at the Zappeion and on the annex of the English Legation, which served as the headquarters of the Anglo-French police. The Anglo-French defended themselves valiantly. But, caught by treachery, they endured cruel losses, for which, however, they made the enemy pay dearly. I shall not go into numbers here, nor shall I describe the vicissitudes of this deplorable day.* I shall limit myself to a few statements of fact. The Greeks, whether reservists or soldiers of the standing army took the initiative in firing without the slightest provocation, and even before the Allies had tried to take away a single cannon. They fired on troops quartered in a public building and engaged in peaceful occupations. They fired through the windows at those of the Allies who had taken refuge in buildings where, on the word of Greek officers, they had believed themselves safe, they acted exactly as though they had received definite orders. They were posted in such positions that it was almost impossible to reply to their fire without hitting some of the most celebrated monuments of Athens. They had taken the ground immediately surrounding the Acropolis as their base of operations. If the fleet, moored before Salamis with its vessels broadside toward the Acropolis, had wished to destroy with its shells the batteries or the massed troops, it would have run great risk of blowing up a part of the celebrated temple. Even if the sacred marbles had received only some slight scratches from shrapnel, the Allies would none the less have been denounced to the whole world, especially to hesitating

* See a conscientious and circumstantial account of the events of the 1st and 2nd of December in a letter written from Athens by M. Charles Frégier and published in the *Journal des Débats*, January 8, 1917.

neutrals, as barbarians that had fallen lower than Vandals or Huns.

In lack of preliminary arrangements or of orders issued in the course of the drama, the grand Allied fleet remained almost inert. Only a few shells were fired on the garden of the Royal Palace. Blockaded in the Zappeion, to which he had gone at the beginning of the day, Admiral Dartige was neither able to go out from the Zappeion so as to go directly to the palace, which was near at hand, nor to have orders sent down to the fleet. The ministers of the Entente were no whit wiser or bolder than he. We should like to be able to blot out this page of our history. While our soldiers were falling under the blows of assassins, negotiations began once more. The king proposed to hand over six batteries. From eleven o'clock in the morning until two at night there was an exchange of proposals between the king, Mr. Lambros and the ministers of the Entente. Finally, on December 2d, at two in the morning, the following agreement was signed:

The ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, having declared in the name of the admiral, commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, that they have accepted the delivery of six batteries instead of the ten that had been demanded on or before the 1st of December, and having furthermore recommended to their governments not to insist on the other demands as to cession of war material, the Greek government declares on its part that it will consent to put the six batteries at the disposal of the Allies.

This was a surrender. Count Bosdari, Minister of Italy, agreed to it only upon the insistence of his colleagues. "It made me blush for France," he said a few hours later to one of our countrymen. "Not only were our decimated detachments forced to beat a sad retreat, leaving to others the duty of burying their dead and of caring for their wounded, but our companies, encamped

at the Zappeion, and all our other posts were re-embarked. Admiral Dartige left the Zappeion about seven o'clock in the morning to return on board his vessel. The survivors of the companies who had stayed with him the entire day (December 1) endured the depth of humiliation. As they possessed no means of transport for their material, military trucks were furnished them by the Minister of War of Constantine I on the request of the admiral and the French minister. Along with the soldiers of the different branches of the Allied control, these brave men, among whom were to be seen many who had fought at Verdun or at Dixmude, regained the quay of embarkation under the escort of Greek soldiers.

The 2d of December beheld even worse horrors. According to the testimony of a witness, "the hunting out of the Venizelists was a truly horrible business to which nothing can be compared unless it be the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Eve." The prominent Venizelists of Athens and Pireus were massacred, tortured and imprisoned. Their houses were pillaged from garret to cellar. The offices and presses of the liberal newspapers were destroyed. No help was given to the pursued. They were forced to endure outrages and sufferings of all kinds without having the consolation of hearing or seeing any help coming from the powers who ought to have protected their country. The mayor of Pireus, escaping from torture, said to a Frenchman: "In the whole history of France there is not a single example of a similar abandonment."

It was true. There certainly is not in the history of France an example of a like humiliation accepted so resignedly. After the retreat of all our contingents, the evacuation of all our posts and the abandonment of the control of all public utilities, there was an exodus of our nationals. The French of Attica, the personnel of the French School of Archaeology, our merchants and our journalists fled, with the surviving Venizelists, from

that land where Constantine I ruled in blood. On the 4th of December a cortège of Venizelists in chains marched past the French School. French citizenship, which had been respected for a hundred years in all Greek lands, had become an object of derision.

The negotiations of the 1st and 2d of December had their origin in a mental blindness that was quite unpardonable. They had neither been approved nor ratified by the French government, which at once perceived the seriousness of the affront and the necessity of avenging it. It informed Admiral Dartige that it was inadmissible to settle the aggression of December 1 by the cession of a few cannon, and that any discussion as to the amount of material to be surrendered would be neither more nor less than disgraceful barter. At the same time it took measures imposing an embargo on Greek shipping and a provisional blockade of the Greek coasts until it should come to an agreement as to details with the other Allied powers. Then, on December 3, it submitted proposals to the Cabinets of London, Petrograd and Rome. These proposals have never been divulged. It is possible that some of them were just as radical as those of the preceding months were harmless. When one has been cruelly misunderstood there is a temptation to pass suddenly from one extreme to another. However this may be, for the sake of appearances or for lack of proper means of execution, the four Allied powers contented themselves with announcing a blockade of the coasts and islands of Greece "which were subject to or occupied by the royal Greek authorities" (December 7) and with presenting a series of demands to the Cabinet in Athens.

While these new negotiations were hanging fire, Constantine I and his accomplices gloried loudly in their triumph. The pursuit of the Venizelists, though less savage, continued and the pillage of their houses went

on. Taking the diplomatic offensive, the Lambros Cabinet sent to its representatives abroad a dispatch in which it claimed that it had been compelled to repress an insurrection. "The investigation which is being actively pushed," said this communication, "will show the existence of an antidynastic plot, fomented by the Venizelist party, which took advantage of the riots resulting from the skirmishes in the streets. It was only owing to the measures taken by the government that the conspirators could be arrested and the perfect order that now reigns could be restored." A repression so moderate of a rebellion so criminal certainly deserved congratulation, and the Minister of War actually did congratulate the troops of the Athens garrison and "the other combatants" in an order of the day, of which these passages are worth remembering: "It is with a heart overflowing with gratitude that, by order of his majesty the king, your commander-in-chief, I address to you my felicitations and congratulations on your exemplary conduct during those never-to-be-forgotten days, the 1st and 2d of December. Your loyalty, your spirit of self-sacrifice and your courage have saved our fatherland jeopardized by enemies who hoped to disturb public order and overthrow the dynasty. Our enemies must now realize that such valiant troops are invincible, and I can from now on view the future with confidence."

On their part the royalist newspapers celebrated in big headlines, "the retreat of the Allied forces before the irresistible attack of the Greek troops," and enumerated the prisoners taken on the 1st of December. Others were glad "that the heroes of Kilkish had had the honor of fighting the heroes of the Somme and Verdun." The newspaper *Nea Hemera* wrote: "The 1st and 2d of December have been, we are proud to say, two of the greatest, the holiest, the most splendidly glorious days in all Greek history. They may be regarded as the dawn of the real independence of Greece, delivering her

from the most hateful yoke which has ever menaced the existence of our race." The association of "radical reservists" addressed to all its members the following telegram: "Receive the kiss due to heroes. The rocks of the Acropolis have, thanks to you, regained their old-time prestige. The Greeks of to-day have won laurels worthy of the past. And now, keep watchful guard around the throne of our great king." Another royalist association sent out from the "Central Bureau of the Reservists" the following circular to all its adherents: "On the occasion of the discharge for a time of the members of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Reservists, accept the fraternal kiss of the Central Bureau for the glorious events that have occurred; announce to all our friends to whom you communicate these presents that we shall remain here obedient to the word of command and that as for them, they have now only to return to their families, full of pride in the great work accomplished. Let them wait, though, with bayonets fixed, ready to return, when the exigency arises, and place themselves under the colors in order to fulfill their supreme and sacred duty toward king and country."

The Allies, who had been represented to the Greek people as having confiscated the instruments of national defense,—in particular, the French and English allies (for care was taken not to raise disturbances in the neighborhood of the Italian and Russian embassies), —were denounced, through the machinations of the king, as enemies of the Greek people. Constantine I had cunningly persuaded us to formulate claims that were sure to wound Greek national pride and had urged us to proceed to the execution of our demands by force. He had then thrown against our unsuspecting soldiers bands of highly excited Greeks, and in short, thus killing two birds with one stone, he had suppressed those Venizelists whom he had resolved to hinder, even by fire and sword, from regaining power by legal means.

He was on the point of succeeding. For a while he had fooled the Allies by granting them in an official way concessions which he afterward abrogated in fact by the issuance of secret orders. Then he had arrayed against them the Germano-Bulgarians by opening up to these hereditary enemies of Greece territories which had been won by conquest in 1912-13. Disappointed in not seeing that formidable German offensive which was to pulverize the contemptible Anglo-French expeditionary force, he found himself forced to try to gain time. He made use of the Allies to neutralize the activity of the Venizelists. He had discredited the former by getting them to enter into agreements with him, and had held the latter in check by having their best weapons wrenched out of their hands by the protecting powers themselves. When finally driven to the wall he had broken away over the corpses of the Allied soldiers. He believed himself saved. But the armies of William II still failed to appear before Saloniki. Constantine I had to try once more to gain time. He found the governments whom he had smitten on the one cheek perfectly ready to turn to him the other.

On the 14th of December the ministers of the Quadruple Entente delivered a new note to the government in Athens. They demanded reparation and the immediate transfer to the Peloponnesus, under the effective control of officers belonging to the Allied armies, of the Greek troops stationed on the mainland of Greece. Mr. Zalocostas, interspersing a few pleasantries in his reply, promised to execute the removal of the troops in question. He begged the four powers to "reconsider" their decision to continue the blockade and offered as "the best guarantee that all misunderstandings would be avoided, the firm and most sincere desire of the royal government and of the Greek people to see confirmed as soon as possible the traditional excellent relations with

the four powers and the renewal of a close friendship based on reciprocal confidence."

Mr. Zalocostas would hardly have dared to use irony like this if he had not felt that disagreements of one sort and another were undermining the action of the Allies. He knew, far better than the public, which was systematically kept in ignorance of the negotiations between the chancelleries of the Entente, that the identity of views among them was by no means perfect. But one factor in the case was self-evident: the Italian press of all parties inveighed bitterly against Mr. Venizelos, while on the other hand it extolled Constantine I. The *Tribuna* wrote:

The disorders in Athens prove that Constantine and his country are in perfect agreement, that no dynasty was ever a more faithful interpreter of the spirit and will of a nation than his. Hence the dangerous absurdity of those sentimental and magnanimous attempts on the part of the Allies to revivify, or, worse yet, to recognize, as though again existent, another Greece, purely fantastic and imaginary, a direct heir of ancient Greece. Let us leave this "Hellas" out of account and realize that we have only Greece with which we must deal. It is greatly to be deplored, and the events of to-day are the sad results of this error, that in newspapers of a certain tendency, and even in the parliaments of the Entente, this truth has not yet come to be courageously recognized, and that they continue to speak of a Hellas that exists wholly in the person of Venizelos.

On the 22d of December the same journal wrote:

There were only two straightforward ways of dealing with Greece: alliance or war; an alliance, however, with the recognized chief of the state; with the king, and not with Venizelos, who is looked upon askance by both army and people; or else war against the army, the organized force of the state. Instead of this, what has the Entente done? It has made an alliance with one individual against the king, and has declared war on the Greek people, subjecting it to humiliations and threats. The Entente has put forth all its efforts not to the end that it may

win Greece over to itself, but that it may conquer for the benefit of Venizelos.

So, according to Rastignac (Signor Vicenzo Morello), we ought to have run after an alliance with Constantine as we had solicited that of Cobourg in Sofia, and to have carried on a campaign against Venizelism similar to the pressure we had exerted on Serbia. The *Corriere della Sera,* the most important and influential newspaper in Italy, had no hesitation, in order to damn Mr. Venizelos in the opinion of the protecting powers, to denounce him as an accomplice of Constantine's. On the 5th of December this famous Milan journal said:

> And there, in Saloniki, rubbing his hands with satisfaction, is Venizelos, Constantine's best subject and his most useful minister *in partibus.* If the Central Empires should win the victory, the king would make capital out of the injuries inflicted on his country by the Allies, their oppressors. If the Entente gets the upper hand, Venizelos will come knocking at the door of the peace congress and will show his declaration of war against Germany and Bulgaria. The trick is most astoundingly crude. There is no need even of imagining that the king and the rebel are in secret accord. It is enough to know that the double game exists in reality. But, within the last few days, a member of the English government, in the House of Commons, assured Venizelos of the protection of England; and the righteous indignation of the French press will perhaps not be sufficiently strong to cut short the comedy and to determine the Entente to take measures against those who are committing sabotage on her war in the east. The phil-hellenism of our allies is proof even against bullets. While Greece glories in her hostility to Italy, while she opposes to our rights in the Mediterranean a Pan-Hellenism that is alike grotesque and frenzied, the diplomacy of our allies, so it seems, proposes at all costs to avoid breaking with her, in order to be able, in the future, to count upon her friendship. Phil-hellenism seems an essential element in their program notwithstanding all that has happened in Greece during the last two years and more.

This language furnished an explanation of the fact that the Quadruple Entente persisted in not officially

recognizing the provisional government in Saloniki. It proved that if the protecting powers wished to take any serious action, they would have to resign themselves to acting alone and without the support of the Cabinet in Rome. They appear to have decided to take this step. At the end of December the Cabinet in London appointed Lord Granville, councilor of the British Embassy in Paris, to represent the government of his majesty in Mr. Venizelos' provisional government at Saloniki, with the title of "diplomatic agent." Some days later the Cabinet in Paris appointed M. de Billy, councilor of the French Embassy at the Quirinal, to a like position. On the 31st of December the ministers of France, Great Britain and Russia in Athens, declaring that they were acting as representatives of the guaranteeing powers of Greece, sent Mr. Zalocostas a note formulating a series of demands for guarantees and reparations. The guarantees consisted in the reduction of the Greek forces in continental Greece "to the number of men strictly necessary to the maintenance of order and to the policing of the country."; in the transfer to the Peloponnesus of all superfluous armament and munitions, as well as of all the machine-guns and of all the artillery of the Greek army with their ammunition; in the prohibiting of all meeting and assembling of reservists north of the Isthmus of Corinth; in forbidding every civilian to carry arms; in the re-establishment of the different controls by the Allies. As reparations the three powers exacted the immediate liberation of all persons detained because of political opinions or political offenses, and indemnities for the victims of the 1st and 2d of December (paragraph 4); the dismissal of the commander of the first corps of the army, apologies on the part of the Greek government to the ministers of the Allies, a public ceremony of salute rendered to the Allied colors, and finally, permission to use the Itea-Larissa route for the transportation of troops. No definite time-

limit was fixed, but the blockade was to be maintained "until satisfaction had been afforded on all the points above indicated."

The Allies persisted, then, in their arrangements for the handing over of supplies, the transfers of troops and the system of controls by representatives of the Allies. They even made their blunder worse by making it more precise. In this note in which they were supposed to be exacting punishment for the outrages of the 1st and 2d of December, they offset all that they gained by the following: "On their part, the guaranteeing powers give a formal engagement to the Greek government not to permit the armed forces of the government for the national defense, profiting by the withdrawal of the royal troops from Thessaly and Epirus, to pass over the neutral zone established in agreement with the Greek government." Though it seemed logical, this agreement was really monstrous. It placed in a clear light the fundamental viciousness of the whole arrangement. Under pretext of hindering the Venizelists from profiting by movements of troops made independently of them, the protecting powers sanctioned a provisional arrangement which cut Greece into two parts and protected the king against the national movement. This ought to have been enough to reassure Italy. But in spite of it, she refused to participate in the concerted measures. She instructed Count Bosdari to present a separate note to this purport:

Italy, by this present communication, affirms her joint responsibility with her allies in matters general. She shares in the demands and declarations contained in the aforementioned note, touching the military guarantees that the powers of the Entente deem necessary to exact of Greece in view of the present situation in the Balkans, as well as the reparations that these same powers believe to be due them in consequence of the events of the 1st of December.

As to what concerns the claims in paragraph 4 of the note

of the guaranteeing powers, in view of the fact that these have to do with questions of internal order, Italy believes that she has no right to intervene and declares that she takes no interest in the investigation into said claims.

The three protecting powers did not maintain this distinct attitude of theirs for any very long time. In the course of conferences held in Rome during the first days of January by the Prime Ministers of Italy, France, Great Britain and the representative of Russia, assisted by eminent civil and military personages, they were surprised by a dispatch from the Cabinet in Athens, dated January 6, raising various objections to the note of December 31. After a discussion, of which the public knew nothing, the four governments of the Entente on the 8th of January united in a common declaration. They established as a principle that they had as their end and aim the protection of the army in the east from any and every menace of a flank attack from the Greek side. Then they fixed a limit of fifteen days for the execution of the ultimatum of the 31st of December, specifying that if, after eventual acceptation, any obstacle whatever was willfully raised to the execution of this arrangement within the prescribed time, they would claim against their liberty to act in such a way as to assure the safety of their nationals by making use of their own resources on land and sea. Unfortunately, this desire to be energetic was spoiled by an agreement with Constantine I that was more far-reaching than that of the 31st of December. It was thus framed:

The Allied powers promise not to allow the partisans of the provisional government to take advantage either on land or sea of the withdrawal of Greek troops into the Peloponnesus, with the purpose of occupying any portion whatever of Greek territory that is thus deprived of all means of resistance.

The Allied powers in like manner promise not to let the authorities of the provisional government establish themselves in any territories now in the possession of the royal government

which they [the Allies] may feel themselves called on to occupy temporarily for military reasons.

When Baron Schenk was expelled from Athens with a pack of agents of the German propaganda, he replied, it is said, to an American journalist who asked him about the future: "The question as to whether my work in Greece will last depends entirely on the Allies, who up to now have been my best assistants." They continued to be his best assistants.

They became more and more involved in the tangle of negotiations. On January 10 Mr. Zalocostas replied to the ultimatum of the 8th by a note that was at once ironical and full of traps. He began by availing himself "with the liveliest satisfaction" of the "exact guarantees" that the powers had been so good as to give to Greece. Then he expressed his desire "in this case also" to do all that was in his power to avoid all misunderstanding. With this point once established, the rest of his letter simply bubbled over with sources of misunderstanding. He said that in order that the guarantees demanded by the powers might be as little annoying as possible, "they could be determined, in the accord that would come about, without permitting any infringement on the different departments of the administration or with the means of communication in the interior." Mr. Zalocostas deigned afterwards to withdraw an objection that had been raised to the liberation of the persons referred to in paragraph 4 of the note of the 31st of December, but he demanded in return the setting free "of persons imprisoned for not having acceded to the revolutionary government, or arrested on the occasion of the forced conscription carried on by the seditious committee." As to the indemnities to the victims of the 1st and 2d of December, he proposed to refer the matter to the Greek courts and proposed a mixed inquest. Having thus given "a supreme evidence of his sincere

intentions" he declared that "the conditions for the lifting of the blockade might be regarded as already fulfilled." "Finally," said the minister in closing, "while appreciating fully the guarantees of the Allied governments on the subject of the revolutionary movement, guarantees which will reassure the minds of the Greek people, the royal government expresses the hope that, in the spirit which inspired the promise which the Allied governments had been good enough to make in the next to the last paragraph of their note of January 8, 1917, they may be willing to apply analogous measures to the territories at present occupied by Allied troops and notably to the islands which they had occupied after the 1st of December.

Evidently, Mr. Zalocostas must have felt encouraged in his policy of subterfuge. The *Idea Nazionale,* a newspaper very much in favor at the Italian Embassy, wrote: "The Greeks now regard Italy with friendly feelings, one may almost say, with gratitude. The government of Athens seems to put all its confidence in the Italian Minister." This journal considered all appeal to the special rights of the guaranteeing powers as absurd formalism and as outworn partisanship. It characterized as a serious and unjustifiable mistake the attempt to base political action in Greece's case "on treaties of protection that were antiquated and utterly out of date." After the conference at Rome on January 10, it commented thus on the decisions reached: "This conference was convened here in order to show a respect to Italy commensurate with the increasing importance of her rôle as well as in order to recognize her special interests in the Orient." The journal *La Stampa,* Signor Giolitti's organ, said squarely: "Italy is at present the real 'protecting power' of Greece."

In spite of this protection, the three guaranteeing powers could not let the impertinence of Mr. Zalocostas

pass. On the 13th of January their representatives, with the Italian Minister acting in concert with them, addressed a new note to the government of Athens, rejecting all the suggestions of Mr. Zalocostas and insisting on the immediate and unconditional carrying out of the guarantees and reparations that had been demanded. On the 16th of January, after a Crown Council, which had been specially called, the government of Athens decided to yield. It declared "that it had no idea of procuring any limitations to the acceptance of the demands formulated by the powers and that it gave its adherence to the precise terms as announced." On the 24th of January the *Official Journal* of Athens published a decree deposing from office General Callaris, commanding the 1st corps of the army. On the 25th Mr. Zalocostas addressed the following letter to the representatives of the Quadruple Entente: "Conformably to the promise given in its reply to the ultimatum of the Allied governments dated January 8, the royal government presents formal apologies to their excellencies, the Ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia because of the regrettable incidents of the 1st of December, 1916." On the 29th, in the presence of the ministers and before detachments of the land and sea forces of the four powers, in Zappeion Square, the Greek troops commanded by a Greek general and Prince Andrew, the king's brother, marched solemnly by and saluted the Allied colors. On the same day, Mr. Zalocostas informed M. Guillemin that the dissolution of the societies of reservists had been declared and that the judiciary had been charged with the extension of this measure.

Such was the outcome of this long diplomatic duel. We obtained a nominal satisfaction, but in reality Constantine I came out of the conflict not only exonerated but with reputation enhanced. Under the inspiration of his hidden councilors who were always with him, he

continued to elude the effective execution of the guarantees accepted by his government.

This diplomatic bickering was succeeded by skirmishing between the Allies and the administration. The time-limit of fifteen days, set by the declaration of the 8th of January, elapsed, but the prescribed transfers of troops and war material had not been effected, the controls which had been provided for had not been established, and the reparation to the victims of the 1st and 2d of December had not been made. Mr. Lambros and his civil and military coadjutors employed every artifice to avoid the execution of the conditions laid down by the Entente. The soldiers transported to the Peloponnesus made their way back again in citizen's dress or on military leave of absence; or better yet, such men as were needed north of the Isthmus of Corinth were dressed up as police, if indeed they were not turned into comitadjis outright. Lies were told about the contents of cases of weapons, and arms were cached in the earth. Informed of this by the Allied controllers, General Caubone, the new military attaché of France, presented claim on claim. Messrs. Lambros and Zalocostas dissimulated, denied, protested their good-will, evaded the issue and were profuse in promises. Meanwhile, the royalist newspapers invented calumny on calumny against the Allies. Their principal argument was furnished them in the continuation of the blockade; they proclaimed that the Entente was starving the people; they organized indignation meetings, and saw that repeated entreaties and petitions were sent to the king. In order not to permit public opinion to be led astray, the ministers of the Entente, on the 19th of February, caused to be published in the newspapers a declaration to the Greek people summing up the situation as follows:

The representatives of the Allies have already called the attention of the royal government to the hostile attitude of the Greek

press and to the danger that Greece will incur if she persists in fostering public excitement and in making attacks that are as often as not founded on calumny and lies. For example, in the matter of the blockade, certain newspapers are trying to spread the impression that this is unjustly maintained since Greece has, as they say, fulfilled all her engagements. This is manifestly inexact. The military control of the Allies cannot take the responsibility of declaring that the promised guarantees have been given, while there remains in continental Greece a great quantity of arms, the existence of which is recognized by the Greek government itself since it has prescribed to the authorities the date on which they must be surrendered. The Allied control is all the less justified in consenting to leave these arms on this side of the Peloponnesus, since they might be employed by the hostile organizations which continue to exist in all parts of Greece and especially in Thessaly, where they constitute a perpetual menace to the oriental army. Other important facts have been brought directly to the knowledge of the Greek government by the chief of the Allied control,—for example, the laying of mines on the banks of the Corinth canal. In these circumstances the Greek people ought not to be surprised that the Allies in default of that correct attitude which they have a right to expect on the part of Greece, cannot regard the guarantees stipulated in the note of January 8 as having yet been yielded. Nevertheless, far from being indifferent to the sufferings of an innocent people, the Allied powers have already looked into the question of what measures they will take to furnish Greece with food supplies just as soon as circumstances will permit. In consequence, the Allied ministers call the attention of the Greek government once more to the grave responsibility that it would incur if it tolerated any longer the excesses of the anti-Venizelist press, which seems to have no other design than to delude public opinion and thus hinder the re-establishment of friendly relations between Greece and the Allied powers.

This appeal to common sense provoked in Greece a redoubling of recriminations and calumnies. New journals were even created specially charged with vilifying the Allies. Ever since the 2d of December the Venizelist newspapers had ceased to appear. The public could only look for information to the organs of King Constantine. It was thus kept in an utterly abnormal

state of ferment. The Lambros Cabinet took advantage of this to oppose to the demands of the Allies exceptions or contestations that were increasingly irritating. Time went by without the threatening clause of the declaration of the 8th of January being put into effect. In the second fortnight of March, Sir Francis Elliot, the English minister, and M. Guillemin, the French minister, left the warships in which they had lived since the events of December in order to reopen their embassies. Emboldened by impunity, Greeks, disguised as comitadjis, gave themselves up to insulting provocations and even to crimes. A band of these irregulars massacred a patrol of Senegalese in the vicinity of Serbia. By way of reprisal General Sarrail gave the order to shoot all armed individuals belonging to the irregular bands. The order was executed. A troop of cavalry of the Saloniki army, sent into the valley of Vistritsa, discovered in the monastery of Zidani (Zidavrion) concealed weapons and armed comitadjis; he confiscated the arms and shot the comitadjis, among whom was a Greek officer. There arose at once a chorus of maledictions in the royalist press. This extract from *Scrip* of the 5th of April gives an idea of what these were like:

> Ajax in his madness butchered sheep, thinking that he was butchering his enemies. General Sarrail butchers abbots, notaries and police, thinking that he is butchering comitadjis. And for fear that this massacre may give rise to the idea that there are no longer any comitadjis and that he, Sarrail, is from now on useless, he announces that his orders will continue to be executed and that the irregulars will be shot. Is every peasant who does not abandon his wife and his daughter to the "needs of the army," or who manifests fidelity to his country and devotion to his king, regarded as an irregular? . . . The Greek government would commit the worst of errors in making any reply to the general's communication. There is only one reply to make: "The general lied!"

The question of indemnities to the Venizelists who had been injured or had been subjected to damages raised

interminable controversies. After the arrival of the two French and English representatives in the commission instituted for this purpose, Mr. Lambros put forth various unacceptable claims. The pretense was made that they could find no appropriate place for the sessions of the commission. Then they proceeded to stumble around in the tangles of procedure. Finally, the ministerial journals suggested the idea of reconventional counter-claims against the Entente; so, for instance, the *Neon Asty* proposed to demand a sum of six million francs to defray the cost of the transport of troops and war material into the Peloponnesus. Passing frankly to the offensive, the royalists called upon Mr. Lambros to purify the personnel of the university which had been contaminated by Venizelism. They expressed the regret that the cleaning up had not been more complete on the 2d of December. Openly banishing from now on the idea which, with the object of misleading the Entente, had been for a long time lauded, that idea, namely, of a possible reconciliation between the king and Mr. Venizelos, they rejected with horror the possibility of such a rapprochement: "Constantine," cried the *Acropolis*, "has the innocence of a sacrificial lamb."

These actions did not, at the end of the winter of 1917, meet in France and England with the same indulgence as previously. In spite of the tender regard for the susceptibilities of Constantine I which was felt by the Cabinets of Paris and London, public opinion in the two countries expressed itself more and more strongly against the policy of inactivity in Greece. It found a powerful echo in the two parliaments. At the Palais Bourbon the Greek situation was the subject of very lively discussion in secret committee. In the meanwhile, in the second fortnight of March, the Briand Cabinet resigned. Although it had not lost its majority, and the immediate cause of its withdrawal was the difficulty of replacing the Minister of War, who had been forced out,

it is certain that its authority had been weakened by its way of handling the Greek question. The Ribot Cabinet which succeeded it felt that it ought, in this connection, to defer to public opinion. It showed very soon that it intended to settle the question for once and all. At that very time revolution broke out in Russia. After a week or two of uncertainty, it became clear that the forced abdication of Nicolas II was in reality a deposition and that Czarism itself had been overthrown. Constantine I lost in the Petrograd court a valuable support. Some days later, at the beginning of April, the United States intervened in the European conflagration. President Wilson declared war on Germany and proclaimed the right of peoples to dispose of themselves freely. He thundered against absolutism and autocracy. This anathema re-echoed widely throughout all Hellas. The ground began to fail beneath the feet of the "slayer of Venizelists," the constitutional king who had been transformed by the grace of William II into the Lord's Anointed, accountable to God alone.

On the 28th of March two Venizelist newspapers, the *Hestia* and the *Ethnos,* appeared again in Athens. On the 13th of April came the turn of the *Kairi* and on the 22d that of the *Patris.* The others followed after an interval of a few days. At about the same time those of the Ionian Islands in which the Allies were not established gave adherence one after another to the provisional government in Saloniki. On the 7th of April, the anniversary of Greek independence, the ministers of the Entente did not appear at the celebration of the national holiday and the Allied vessels, warships as well as the vessels of the merchant marine, were not decorated with flags in honor of the day. To stimulate the enthusiasm of the crowd, the royalists had spread the rumor that the Venizelists would seize the opportunity of the national holiday to make an attempt on the life of the king and to stir up riots. But all passed off very

calmly. This did not hinder the organs of Constantine on the next day from assuring the "idol adored of the people" that he would be defended against all attempts. The journal *Scrip* in a lyrical outburst put in the mouth of the people this hymn "to the martyr king":

I am there, Sire, at thy side! Guard in thy powerful hands the strength of the state and the honor of the fatherland. I, yes I, will support thy glorious throne. No power in the world shall tear me away from thy feet. Even in chains, with hands in irons, and feet in fetters, even under the tyranny of starvation and the threat of death, I will continue to shout "Long live the king!"

This exaltation of spirit, generously rewarded by the treasury of the German propaganda, succeeded in deluding the neutrals and even some of those on the side of the Entente. It did not deceive observers that were well advised. One of them, M. Charles Frégier, on the 15th of April (*Journal des Débats,* April 28) wrote from Athens:

In the course of the difficult negotiations of these latter times the Entente has surrounded the throne of Constantine with guarantees, destined to uphold it even against the will of his subjects; these guarantees are perhaps, at this moment, his surest support. On the day when the logical course of events shall for once and all abolish them, when the Entente shall decide to support its friends, wherever they may be, in old Greece as well as in the new, we shall perhaps be amazed to see this much vaunted prestige of Constantine sink out of sight in an instant, crushed under the too heavy burden imposed on it.

At the Quai d'Orsay in Paris and at the Foreign Office in London the same opinion began to prevail. The realization dawned on them that, instead of administering in small doses, drop by drop, as it were, their moral and material support to the provisional government, heavily burdened with anxiety, it would have been more profit-

able as well as more clever freely and frankly to facilitate its task. What results might the Allied powers not have obtained, as M. Frégier said in the letter cited above, "if they had devoted as earnest efforts to strengthening New Greece, considered as the eleventh of the Allied states, as they had spent in order to keep the crown on Constantine's head?"

Considerations of this nature found more and more acceptance among serious thinkers. On the 19th of April, in a meeting at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, Messrs. Ribot, Lloyd George, Boselli and Sonnino discussed, among other subjects, the Greek question. Their decision was not divulged, but a few days later the court at Athens showed symptoms of uneasiness. The rumor of Mr. Lambros' resignation was current. Mr. Lambros, a mere tool of the king, had no special reason for withdrawing nor even any desire to do so. If the power left his hands, it was because the monarch judged it advantageous to sacrifice this minister to the supposed rancor of the Entente. There was some talk of Mr. Zaïmis, who had become once more the governor of the National Bank, as future Prime Minister. These tentative moves had a somewhat cool reception in the French press. The change of person, as proposed, would have brought us no satisfaction. For some time, there was no further mention of it. But another rumor spread. An intention to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince was attributed to Constantine I. The French press observed that neither Greece nor the Entente would gain anything by the change. Since, after the appointment of the Ribot ministry, the censor had allowed greater freedom to the press, it demanded the definitive and radical settlement of the Greek question. It demanded of the powers that had signed the declaration of the 8th of January to reclaim their liberty of action in accordance with the formal clause that had provided for this even-

tuality, and to act vigorously in Attica, or at least to permit the provisional government to act by its own agencies in Thessaly and the rest of the kingdom. These articles in the French journals were much commented on in Athens. People believed that they saw in them signs that were the precursors of grave measures. On the 1st of May the Congress of Hellenic Colonies, assembled at Paris, declared Constantine I and all his dynasty deposed from the throne and from all royal prerogatives. At the same time it "appealed to the benevolence of the Allied powers no longer to hinder any province from giving its adherence freely to the national government at Saloniki" and begged them "to recognize the Greek Republic just as soon as the assembly called to constitute it should have proclaimed it." Then the Zaïmis clique appeared once more, and was accepted on the 3d of May. After long parleys Mr. Zaïmis consented to leave his position at the National Bank to take upon himself once more the prime ministry with the portfolio of foreign affairs. Almost all his colleagues were professed anti-Venizelists.

Mr. Zaïmis had very little support in the press. Treated as a suspect by the royalist editors who had been besought to conceal their sentiments so as not to bring discredit on the new royal cabinet, he was described by most of the Venizelists as a man of straw. The *Makedonia* characterized him as "the Pilate of crucified Greece." In France a marked distrust of him was evinced. Although he declared that his entire program consisted in the re-establishment of friendly relations with the Entente, he was suspected of holding to these friendly relations only in order to permit the king to gain more time and to corner the grain-harvest of Thessaly for the exclusive advantage of the royalists. Besides, General Dousmanis, Colonel Metaxas, Messrs. Streit, Mercouris and Co. kept hold of the power both public and secret, and with it remained in the confidence

of Constantine I. Mr. Zaïmis did, to be sure, immediately put at the disposal of the commission on indemnities a meeting place for which they had up to that time looked in vain. He did, to be sure, announce that measures had been taken against the armed bands that were overrunning Thessaly, and he also let it be known that he was going to send away from Athens seven colonels who were known to be hostile to the Entente. Very small guarantees these to the Entente!

As a matter of fact, during the entire month of May, the agents of control under General Cauboue kept discovering arms and ammunition concealed in the capital itself, or in the suburbs or the provinces. The police continued to dress themselves up as comitadjis, and the comitadjis to disguise themselves as police. The officers of Constantine's staff elaborated as assiduously as ever the plans for co-operating with the Germano-Bulgarians against the day so eagerly longed for, the day when the soldiers of William II would descend on Saloniki. Though to all appearance dissolved, the League of Reservists was reconstituted under the direction of a nephew of Mr. Gounaris by the name of Sayas. In reply to objections on the part of the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Sayas threatened the government "with an explosion of popular anger." As a substitute for the League of Reservists or as a superstructure on it, there was formed, under the auspices of Mr. Livieratos, a retired magistrate, a so-called "Federation" of the syndicates of the different trades and professions and of popular societies. The royalists gave out that this was a union of labor organizations, but the real labor organizations entered a protest. Messrs. Sayas and Livieratos, however, negotiated with Mr. Zaïmis none the less freely, because of this fact, on an absolutely equal footing. They issued a manifesto against the dismissal of the seven colonels.

These were not the only indications of a dangerous

situation. The authorities themselves assumed a provocative attitude. On the 21st of May a decree of arrest issued by the grand jury brought before the assizes the director and manager of the newspaper *Patris* on the score of having published in 1916 some letters that established the part taken by Deputy Callimassiotis, a friend of Mr. Gounaris, in supplying the German submarines. On the 29th of May the navy war-council sent forth an order for the arrest of Admiral Coundouriotis for the crime of high treason. At the end of the same month some Venizelists were beaten and imprisoned on the island of Aegina by the police. During the night of the 30th-31st an attempt was made to assassinate two English officers. A few days later some French officers of the military control, on a tour of search, were obliged to turn back before a party of reservists. The newspaper *Scrip* accused the Senegalese of the expeditionary force of kidnapping little children, killing and eating them.

At the same time the Constantine cult became a sort of idolatry. On the 27th of May the second anniversary of the miraculous cure of the king by the wonder-working picture of the Panagia of Tenos, a thanksgiving service was held at the Metropolitan Church, which the *Embros* reported in the following words: "When the reverend orator, incomparable in the force of his logic and the brilliance of his rhetoric, had affirmed in thundering words that King Constantine was not destined to be dethroned but to be crowned with the imperial diadem in Constantinople, when he had finished chanting the hymn: 'Be victor, thou emperor and king,' the throng rushed forward to kiss the hands of the prelate, while on all sides re-echoed these cries: 'Down with the tyrants! Long live our adored king!'" On the 3d of June, the king's fête, the followers of Constantine were carried away by another ourburst of devotion to their sovereign. The Federation of Workingmen presented

the monarch with an iron cross, begging him to wear it whenever he appeared before the troops with the bâton of a German field-marshal in his hand. After the *Te Deum* at the cathedral Constantine I betook himself to the University to take part in the dedication of his own bust. Two other busts of him were to be dedicated in the course of the month, one at the barracks of the 7th regiment of infantry and the other at the Chamber of Deputies. Fate, however, was reserving for Constantine a ceremony of quite a different nature.

During the month of May the Cabinets of Paris and London had come to an agreement. Their chiefs had held additional conferences in Paris and in London. Assured of the agreement of Russia and the consent of Italy, they had resolved on radical measures. Their decisions, the outcome of secret deliberations, became known only after they had been put in execution, and even then not fully. We may quite certainly say that they had a double object: the sequestration of the harvests in Thessaly so that they would profit all Greece, and the re-establishment of the constitutional régime. Suspecting what was to happen as to the first part of the program, Mr. Zaïmis proposed to yield to the Allies a portion of the Thessalian harvest. As to the second part, the government in Athens did not know exactly in what this re-establisment of the constitutional régime consisted. But it flattered itself that it could bring it to naught. The time has not come to tell what supreme efforts were put forth in order to make the Allies' enterprise miscarry as it had done in the month of June, 1916. This time these efforts failed.

On Wednesday, June 6, the Athenians suddenly learned of the arrival in Greek waters of M. Jonnart, a French senator, invested with the rank of High Commissioner of the protecting powers. Then they noticed a great movement of warships in the bay of Salamis, the Saronic Gulf and the Gulf of Corinth.

The royalists insinuated that it was going to be just the same with the Jonnart mission as with the earlier demonstrations of the Allies. Then they saw the vessel that carried the High Commissioner, after a short stop at Salamis, sail off to Saloniki. What passed between M. Jonnart, Mr. Venizelos and General Sarrail is not known. On the 10th M. Jonnart returned to Salamis. On the 11th, in the morning, the lightning struck. In an interview with Mr. Zaïmis, the High Commissioner of the three protecting powers demanded in their name the abdication of King Constantine and the designation of his successor, to the exclusion of the Crown Prince. What then became of the tens of thousands of heroes who had sworn to defend the king, their idol, to the very last drop of their blood. They raised a hue and cry, turbulent throngs filled the streets, but there was no breach of the peace. What were the thoughts that passed through the mind of Constantine I? After bitter reflections on the vicissitudes of mundane affairs, he decided to submit. On Tuesday between 9 and 10 in the morning Mr. Zaïmis informed M. Jonnart that "His Majesty the King, solicitous as ever of the interests of Greece alone, has decided to leave the country along with the Crown Prince and has designated as his successor Prince Alexander," his second son.

Constantine I did not officially abdicate nor did his eldest son resign his claim to the throne. They hoped without doubt to be restored to Greece by William II, the Conqueror. They left the throne in the meantime to a complacent prince who would keep the crown for them, and they left the political power to a minister who would care for their interests. But they went away without daring to defend themselves or to have any defense made for them. They fled before the storm, carrying with them the curse of Hellas. Embarked for Italy, they had not yet reached the residence of their choice when their hopes were dashed. While they

slipped out of Lugano amid manifestations of public scorn, Mr. Venizelos was starting for Athens. After a brief consultation, the High Commissioner decided, with Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Zaïmis agreeing, that half-way measures would do no good and that the best thing was to restore the power to Mr. Venizelos, who would reassemble the Chamber elected June 13, 1915. No sooner said than done. In consequence of the publication of a proclamation in which he boasted of his desire to follow in the footsteps of his illustrious father, Alexander I was required to apologize and to declare his willingness to respect the Constitution. He is now only the shadow of a king, obliged to content himself with signing the papers that his Prime Minister puts before him. The latter, acclaimed by the crowd, which, according to the statement of the paid agents of the German propaganda, hated him and was sure to tear him in pieces, has taken up with a firmer hand than ever, and with an increased prestige, the direction of national affairs. The people of Thessaly are saluting the soldiers of Sarrail's army as their liberators. The Morea is yielding submission. The army in its entirety is rallying in support of the new régime. General Dousmanis, Colonel Metaxas, the two Mercouris and their acolytes meekly embarked for Corsica. All the thunders of war which for two years had intimidated the Entente with their rumbling died away entirely.

A few days had sufficed to bring about this great change. The decision of two governments, the energy and ability of one man, the mere presence of an armed force capable of breaking down all resistance got the better at once of the extravagant showy boasting of a clique of fanatics. The errors of 1915 and 1916 have not been repaired, for political mistakes always leave behind them something irreparable. But the humiliation of the 1st of December has been avenged and the prestige of the Entente re-established. Greece has been restored

to her natural destiny and respect for treaties has been confirmed. It has been proved to the world that the protecting powers, when they co-operated with the chief of the liberal party in restoring the constitutional régime did not, as the Germans and some neutrals claimed, commit a violation of international law comparable to the invasion of Belgium in August, 1914, but that they acted as guardians of the liberties of a people bound to them by solemn treaties. What could be done in Greece in the spring of 1917 was done, but there is still much to do in the East.

THE END

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THIRD: To promote the establishment of exchange professorships in the Universities of Greece and America; the objects being the diffusion of a knowledge of the literature and political institutions of this country throughout Hellas, and the encouragement of the study of the ancient and modern Hellenic language and literature in America.

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PERSECUTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN TURKEY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

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BY
CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph. D.
AND
THEODORE P. ION, D.C.L.

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INTRODUCTION

THE persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey, since the declaration of the European war, are nothing but the continuation of the program put into operation by the Young Turks in the year 1913, with the object of annihilating Hellenism.

In order that those who are ignorant of conditions in Turkey may understand the objects and the mainsprings of these persecutions, as well as the methods by which the uprooting of Hellenism in the territories subject to Turkey was sought, it is necessary, before narrating the persecutions that began with the last months of 1914, to review briefly the occurrences of the preceding period. There will thus be no room for doubt that we have here to do with an intensive continuation of a program which had as its object the annihilation of Hellenism in Turkey.

Anyone who looks into the events that followed the restoration of constitutional government in Turkey becomes convinced that the natural course of history was not at that time to be changed simply by the banishing of a tyrant and the appearance of a supposedly parliamentary government.

A study of the first years of the new government shows that the Young Turks had not the slightest intention of modifying the Turkish system of government, but really entered upon this peaceful revolution in order

* This account of Turkish outrages in Asia Minor, to which it has seemed proper to add two other documents giving confirmatory facts and details, has been translated from a publication of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The barbarous treatment of the subject Greeks which has been cold-bloodedly encouraged if not directly instigated by German officials in Turkey, can only be compared with that accorded the Armenians. The tale of the sufferings of these innocent and helpless men, women and children should certainly arouse the civilized nations of the world to take the power to commit such atrocities out of the hands of the Turks irrevocably and forever.

—*The Translators.*

that they might forestall the intervention of the Great Powers, and might thus be able to accomplish their program, in accordance with which Turkey was to be changed from an Empire of several nations into a single National Empire, unified and compact. It is in this scheme of the Young Turks, by which a Turkey politically and economically independent and nationally united was to be created, that we must seek to account for the dangers to which, from the establishment of the constitution, the nationalities living under Turkey were subjected.

In order to bring about the realization of the schemes of the Young Turks it was necessary that free institutions should be adopted so that the sympathy of the Christian nationalities and of the Great Powers might be secured for the new government, and this in spite of the fact that the great majority of the Turkish people was not ripe for the reception of such institutions.

Naturally, therefore, and without any difficulty those young Turks who were directing affairs almost immediately returned to the Turkish custom of managing things through the use of force, the only available means by which they could maintain their supremacy over the subject peoples.

This tendency, which showed itself at once in active operation, is clearly set forth by Mr. René Pinon in his treatise "Europe and the Young Turks."

"The theories with regard to equality," he says (p. 123), "serve now only as a veil for European eyes and as a fair pretext for depriving the Christians of those old 'privileges' which heretofore had compensated them for their position of inequality with the Turks; as a pretext, that is, for doing away with their courts of special jurisdiction, for destroying their national organizations, for closing their schools and for hindering the cultural development of the non-Turkish populations." This active policy of the Young Turks of the Mussulman

majority which strove to bring about their more complete domination was immediately perceptible in its effects upon the Christian elements of the population and in particular upon the Greek element, which, as being numerically larger and more advanced in culture than the others was at once subjected to the most serious blows. Furthermore, it was against the Greeks that the Young Turks first turned. The immediate result of this movement was that the various Christian nationalities in Turkey combined in order to defend their lives and property.

The war that followed in 1912 encouraged the belief for a time that through the defeat of the Turks the danger that threatened the existence of the Christian nationalities in Turkey had been dispelled. Unfortunately this turned out to be a vain hope.

The results of the Balkan war were a serious blow to the Central Empires and destroyed for once and all the dream of Austrian possession of Saloniki. The traditional anti-Hellenic policy of this power from now on left no stone unturned in order to neutralize the effects of the victorious war by which Greece had been enlarged, and rendered competent through the prestige of her victory, to defend vigorously and effectively those of her sons that were still left beneath the yoke of Turkey. Austria, aided by Germany, the constant enemy of all Greek progress which had the slightest tendency to interfere with her prospects in Asia Minor, succeeded in dissolving the Balkan alliance with the results that are now known to all.

A consequence of this was the predominance once more of the Young Turk régime, which now, under the lead of Enver Bey, who became the blind tool of the Germans, was fully subjected to Germany. In this new manifestation the Young Turk party, encouraged by its success in having so easily recovered the city of Adrianople, considered the time propitious for a return to

its old ideas. With a view to this it decided upon the complete annihilation of the Greek element in Turkey, so as first to make Thrace a purely Mohammedan province, under the pretext of thus securing the safety of Constantinople, and second to establish a united and independent Mohammedan Empire.

If we reflect that the Young Turks, at the time when they had been at the zenith of their power, though then free from all European intervention, had not dared to enter upon a sudden application of their nationalistic policy but had only done this with a certain measure of self-restraint, the question arises how they came to enter upon such a decisive course on the very morrow of a war that had proved destructive for them. This fact is explained, however, when we take into account that at that time they had been held in check by the fear of the destruction of their whole work through the possible intervention of Europe, to which they did not wish to offer any excuse for interference in their internal affairs, while at this later time they had as co-operators and co-adjutors, first the Bulgarians, who were endeavoring even in their defeat to inflict through this activity a fatal blow to Greece, and secondly, what was even more important, the Germans whose obvious interest consisted in smiting Hellenism, for the Greeks have always constituted and to-day constitute a serious impediment to Germany's commercial and cultural predominance in the East. All this is confirmed by the whole course of the persecutions, as narrated below.

Just at the time when the life of the subject Greeks bade fair to be endurable, under the pretext of establishing Mussulman immigrants in Asia Minor and of securing the Asiatic littoral, over opposite the disputed islands of Chios and Mitylene, but actually in order to apply the Turks' scheme of a nationalization of Turkey that should make it purely and simply Mohammedan, a cruel and systematic persecution was begun which de-

prived about 400,000 Greeks of their homes and property, and compelled them, naked and stripped of their all, to seek refuge in Greece. This inhuman persecution, even the recollection of which inspires horror in all, proceeded without interruption up to the declaration of the European War.

The accession of Turkey to the alliance of the Central Empires and her participation in the war marked the beginning of the second period of the persecutions of Hellenism in Turkey, persecutions that were incomparably fiercer and more effective than the first. This period definitively reveals those who were morally guilty of the persecution. Not for a moment did these instigators relax their evil and powerful influence upon the executors of the crimes against the Greeks.

The difference between these two periods is great.

During the first there was a general persecution which might perhaps destroy whole Greek communities, but which did not bring with it the complete and irretrievable ruin of the Greek race, since it, at any rate, permitted those persecuted to save themselves by flight. In the period dating from the participation of Turkey in the war, the persecution assailed the very existence of Hellenism in Turkey.

It is however necessary to call attention to another difference between these two periods, a difference unfortunately that reflects upon the attitude of official Greece. During the first period the official Greek government appears everywhere and always defending the Greeks persecuted in Turkey and acting with all its strength in order to regulate the question of the refugees so as to save Hellenism in Turkey. During the second period, however, those directing things in Greece, basing their much extolled policy of neutrality, in ironical disregard of the facts, on the fantastic and chimerical hope of saving Hellenism in Turkey by this policy, stood by, regarded by those who were ignorant of what was going

on as merely passive spectators, while in the eyes of those who closely followed affairs in Turkey and were cognizant of the wire-pulling behind the scenes in Germany, they were neither more nor less than abettors of the murderers and assassins of our kinsmen in Asia.

One who investigates with some attention the second period of the persecutions, from its very start discovers in its every manifestation German participation and activity. The Turk is a connoisseur in crime; he can kill, he can debauch, but he is incapable of formulating a really scientific system by which the foundations of a nation may be undermined, and under which justificatory reasons for his acts may be found. His cunning does not reach such a point of inventiveness as that exhibited during this period.

Even in the persecutions of 1913-14, the methods of which evidenced the guilt of the Ottoman Government, German activity appears timidly operative behind the scenes, and although Germany was apparently at that time acting in order to forward the Young Turk schemes, which it thus flattered and adopted, it was, as a matter of fact, working in its own behalf. There are very many proofs of this German guilt.

As to the persecutions that took place before the war, German guilt is revealed by the interview which took place in April, 1914, between the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, J. Dragoumis, and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Jagow (Report of the 7th of April, 1914, No. 643, Ministerial Archives, No. 10907). According to this report the latter admits the persecutions and the Turkish outrages, but, forgetting himself, for the moment, and his position, he becomes the advocate of the Turks and attempts to justify the persecutions by using the arguments advanced by the Young Turks with the object of concealing their crimes; first that every Greek in Turkey is an apostle of Pan-Hellenism, as though forsooth, the attempt on the part of the Greeks

to preserve their nationality was a cause that justified their persecution, and secondly, that the question of the islands, the final settlement of which the Young Turks sought, was most serious for the safety of the coasts of Asia Minor.

This pro-Turkish German policy went even further. It forbade the publication in the German press of events which were taking place in Thrace to the disadvantage of Hellenism. A telegram of the 10th of April, 1914, from Mr. J. Dragoumis to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says: "It is impossible to have accepted for publication in the newspapers news relative to matters in Thrace. A general order has been issued that we must not displease the Turks." Even Von Jagow himself, furthermore, confessing to the Greek Ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Theotokis, the critical state of affairs, regarded this as a consequence of Mussulman fanaticism which had been aroused on account of what had happened to its disadvantage, and he maintained further that this fanaticism was fostered by Russia from a Pan-Slav motive with the object of weakening the Œcumenical Patriarchate, so that it would necessarily later become a subservient tool of the Russian policy. (Telegram of the Greek Minister in Berlin, Mr. Theotokis, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Streit, of May 26, 1914. Ministerial Archives, No. 998.)

Even the German Emperor, in order to conceal the truth, did not hesitate to say to the same Minister that only subordinate officials of the Turkish government were responsible for the state of affairs, and not the government itself, which was on the contrary, so he declares, really endeavoring to put an end to the situation which had arisen. But unfortunately for the Kaiser and his Minister Von Jagow, the second persecution came on apace, in the course of which the guilty ones were discovered. (Telegram of the 29th of May, 1914, from Mr. Theotokis, the Greek Minister in Berlin, to Mr.

Streit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ministerial Archives, No. 1050.)

The actual occurrences leave no doubt as to the guilt of Germany, since it is known that throughout the whole East there were distributed in April, 1915, and even earlier, through the agency of the Deutsche Palestina Bank circular notices in Turkish, through which the fanaticism of the Mussulmans was aroused, and hatred of the Christians and breaking of all business relations with them was encouraged. A French translation of this circular fell into the hands of the Greek consul in Beirut, who describes the indignation against the Germans which its distribution produced in the Christian populations of the place. It is entitled "Manifeste général à tous les adeptes de l' Islamisme, publié par le Comité de la Défense Nationale au siège du Califat, en l' année 1333."

The Germans in June, 1915, were aware of the decisions of the Young Turk committee, adopted in the presence of the Governor of Adrianople and the Bulgarians Kaltsef and Toufexief, and looking toward the formation of closer relations with the Bulgarians as well as toward the persecution of the Greek element. These were as follows:

1). Establishment of a Turko-Bulgarian commercial alliance, complementary to the Turko-Bulgarian Committee.

2). Taking the commerce of the East out of Greek hands.

3). Establishment in the East of Turkish commercial agencies for the importation and exportation of goods exclusively through Mussulman hands, the Turks being expected to stop all dealings with Greeks.

4). Limitation of the privileges of the Patriarchate and of his ecclesiastic jurisdiction; weddings, baptisms, etc., were to be recorded with the Iman (Mohammedan priest).

5). Restriction of instruction in the Greek language and its total abandonment in the future.

6). The Turkification of the Greek element by force, through the establishment of mixed communities, so constituted as always to have a preponderance of Mussulman men and of Greek women, with a view to compelling mixed marriages.

Certainly it is utterly incredible that the Central Powers were unable to impose upon the Turks a different policy toward the Greeks, though this, in an attempt to conceal the truth, is maintained by the German Lepsius, who was sent to Constantinople in July, 1915, on a special mission. Even he, however, acknowledges most cold-bloodedly that the anti-Hellenic and anti-Armenian persecutions were two phases of one and the same program, the annihilation of the Christian element in Turkey, which would thus be transformed into a purely Mussulman Empire. (Report of the Greek Embassy in Constantinople, No. 4415 of the 31st of July, 1915. Ministerial Archives, No. 8477.)

The Minister of Austria in Constantinople, in June, 1915, tried to persuade the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in that city that the intervention of the Central Powers in the matter was very difficult, inasmuch as Turkey regarded the persecutions as a purely internal affair.

The value of these attempts at self-justification is adequately characterized by the following extract of an official report of Mr. Gryparis, Minister of Greece in Vienna, dated September 13th, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 1599), on the occasion of taking steps before Baron Burian to put a stop to the persecutions: "What is the use, anyway, of formal remonstrances to the Sublime Porte, or of appeals to the two empires to intervene with her? Is it not perfectly evident that, as things are now in Turkey, the Grand Vizier is only nominally Grand Vizier, the government being really in the hands of Enver and Talaat, whose ideas and opinions

about Hellenism in Turkey are only too well known, and that, further, the decisions about banishing to the interior the Greek populations of the seacoast, were taken only after coming to an understanding with the German staff in Constantinople."

The truth of this conception is confirmed by a telegram of Mr. Kallerges, the Greek Minister in Constantinople, to Mr. Zalocostas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated March 28, 1917 (Ministerial Archives, No. 2338). According to this the Minister of Germany, Count von Metternich, was recalled as a result of the direct intervention with the Kaiser of Enver Pasha and the German military circles in Constantinople, because of his interceding in behalf of the Christians, thus touching the pride of the Turks, as well as failing to subserve German interests.

No doubt remained as to the guilt of Germany after the evacuation of Cydonia (Aivali). The Grand Vizier acknowledged to the Greek Minister in Constantinople that the transfer of the Greek population was due to the action of the commander of the 5th Corps, Commander-in-Chief Liman von Sanders. The Ottoman government originally objected to this and only yielded to the threat of the Commander-in-Chief, who declared that only on this basis could he assume responsibility for the safety of the army. Even the Ambassador of Germany tried to persuade the said Commander-in-Chief, for reasons of political necessity, not to insist on his decision but the latter was unwilling to yield, claiming that in time of war military necessity takes precedence over political, and that the great German Council of War, before which he had set forth in detail the state of affairs, had already given its consent.

What were these military necessities? Pretexts of the danger of espionage by the people of Cydonia, who had for a year and more been subjected to the strictest blockade, were advanced as sufficient to justify the de-

struction of this bulwark of Hellenism and its supplanting in this fertile country, in commerce and other activities, by Germans and Austrians.

The scheme of the Young Turks, completed and perfected, was adopted by the Germans and so the blind passion of the Turks and the egotistical aims of the Germans were satisfied.

Thus those morally guilty and those actually guilty were united in their common struggle to deal a deadly blow to Hellenism in Turkey, the annihilation of which they had vowed to complete.

And, in truth, the diabolical nature of the scheme through which they sought the destruction of the Greek element in Turkey and its total uprooting, at this period in particular, is astounding.

In order to understand the vastness of the destruction so satanically conceived, we must investigate as closely as possible all the means that were used. They are the following: First, abolishment of the special privileges; second, drafting Christians into the army; third, taxation and commandeering of Greek property; fourth, Turkification; fifth, assassination and violence against individuals.

In all these ways the preparatory work for the extermination of Hellenism on a broad scale was undertaken.

The examination of these various methods will be the object of the first part of the present study. In the second part there will be treated a sixth means of totally exterminating Hellenism, i.e., the extensive deportations of the Greek population on the feigned ground of military necessity.

PART I

WORK PREPARATORY TO THE EXTERMINATION OF THE GREEK POPULATIONS IN TURKEY

CHAPTER I

THE ABOLITION OF ECCLESIASTICAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGES OF THE GREEKS IN TURKEY

The Turco-Germans attempted first to shake the very foundations of enslaved Hellenism. They knew that Hellenism had been saved in its days of dark and harsh slavery, owing to the existence of these ecclesiastical and other privileges granted to it, by virtue of which alone the Greek language and the sacred traditions of the race had been preserved. They decided therefore immediately to attack these privileges which they mistakenly regarded as a complement to the Turkish capitulations. The privileges which the Christians enjoyed differ in this particular from the capitulations, inasmuch as they constitute a sacred obligation on the part of the conqueror towards the conquered on account of the difference of religion, an obligation which all the civilized Christian nations recognize toward the Mussulmans in those countries under their control in which the Mussulman element exists in large numbers, such as Algeria, Tunis, India, Caucasus, etc. Germans and Turks attempted to abolish this privilege gradually because they

knew that only thus could they realize an assimilation of the Greek element to the Mussulman element, thus making the country completely Turkish.

I. Education

In carrying out their program, they first assailed the educational system of the Greeks.

On the basis of the privileges, the education of the Greeks in Turkey was in the hands of the Œcumenical Patriarchate and was directed by it, a fact formally recognized by the Circular of the Turkish Prime Minister of January 22nd, 1891.

The Circular, in treating of education, reads as follows:

"The programs of the schools shall be drawn up or confirmed by the Patriarchate and the Metropoles,* likewise the diplomas and certificates of the teachers, both male and female, shall be confirmed by the same. Since these must also be known to the Government, when the inspector or the director of public education, while investigating instruction in the schools, shall observe some lesson improperly taught, or shall find some teacher that is not duly provided with a certificate, the Ministry of Education in Constantinople, and the Local Government in the provinces, respectively, acting in concert with the Metropoles, shall come to an agreement, and thus through their agency such lessons shall be stopped and such teachers, unprovided with certificates, shall be replaced."

Through a temporary law which was applied in July, 1915, this privilege was abolished, since by Article VII of this law the schools established and supported by communities and associations were regarded as 'state institutions.' Thus all the schools of the Greek communities in Turkey were put on an equality with the peculiarly Turkish schools and were made subject to the control of

* A kind of superior bishop.

the Turkish Government and rendered immediately dependent upon the Ministry of Education.

A consequence of this law was that the following demands were made upon the Metropoles and the Patriarchate: First, that the teaching of the Turkish language in the Greek schools should be imposed in equal measure with the teaching of Greek, and that it should be introduced into the girls' schools as well. Second, that geography and history should be taught in Turkish. Third, that copies of the schedules and programs of the Greek schools should be submitted to the Turkish inspectors and that statistical tables of the schools should be formed on the basis of the government programs. Fourth, that the teaching of the names of places, cities, mountains, etc., in Turkey should be in the forms officially accepted by the Government, i.e., that Constantinople should be called Stamboul, that the Dardanelles should be called Tsanakale, etc. Fifth, that in future the proper authorities to whom the teachers shall appeal on questions of teaching or other subjects connected therewith, should no longer be the Patriarchate and the Metropoles but the directors of the communal and private schools.

II. Wills and Testaments

Not satisfied with this fatal blow to Greek education, the violation of other privileges of the Patriarchate was aimed at as well. According to the above mentioned Circular of 1891 every difference between heirs or between the guardian of minors and his wards, as well as every dispute as to the legitimacy and authenticity of a will was to be decided by the mixed Counsel of the Patriarchate or of the Metropoles. This right was now abolished even as regards secret wills. As a result of this, after the death of a Mr. Rizou, a Greek, the Sheikhoulislamate * assumed jurisdiction of his will and rendered a decision

* The highest Mohammedan religious court and expounder of Mohammedan law.

which was published in the Official Journal although the will in question, duly drawn up by an official act of a notary public, bore the ratification of the Patriarchate and was prepared in strict accord with legal forms. This fact undoubtedly indicates the prevailing tendency to take away from the ecclesiastical authorities the right to draw up wills.

III. Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction

Apart from this, in the question of proceedings against the Clergy, there was abolished the privilege which they had long enjoyed with regard to being summoned before the Turkish court, imprisoned, etc., and their direct arrest and imprisonment, in the common jails, without the knowledge of the proper ecclesiastical authorities was now legitimized. There are very many cases where this was done. Among them, the imprisonment for nine months of the Archivist of the Patriarchate, the Archimandrite Alexander; that of the Abbot of the Sacred Monastery of St. George in Princes Island; that of the priests of the depopulated villages of Callicratia, Tsando, Phanaraki, in the region of Metra, etc. Besides this, there was taken away from the ecclesiastic courts the right of issuing decisions for temporary alimony on the ground that the ecclesiastic courts were on a par with the Mohammedan religious courts.

Furthermore, with the intention of lessening the authority and influence of the Patriarchate, the Turks paid no attention to the Patriarch's intervention in behalf of the Christians who were compelled to become Mohammedans. Contrary to the recognized rights of the Patriarchate they began, from 1915 on, to deny all right of intervention in the case of these questions, as is proven by an official note dated the 28th of July, 1915. According to this note, which was sent because the Patriarchate had intervened in behalf of the thirteen-year-old girl Sultana Nicolaou of Chrysopolis in Chalcedon, who

had been forcibly abducted by a Turk from the house of her father, the Ministry through the appropriate bureau superintendent declared to the Patriarchate: "The affair concerns exclusively the parents involved, who ought to appeal directly to the Turkish authorities; consequently the mediation of the Patriarchate is superfluous." The same course was followed with regard to the abduction of the sixteen-year-old Helen Photiou Catuma, who lived in the Tatavla quarter of Constantinople. A similar thing happened when the Patriarchate complained of the expatriation of the Greeks of Coutali and Marmora; Talaat Pasha himself * in his reply declared: "The religious authorities are not permitted to intervene in questions foreign to their jurisdiction but must limit themselves solely to their religious duties." A similar communication of the Patriarchate touching on the persecutions was returned in June, 1915, by the Ministry of Justice with the declaration "The Patriarchate has no business to transmit communications about such questions."

IV. Greek Communities in Turkish Cities

Along with the privileges of the Patriarchate there were abolished also the rights of the Christian communities. The election of the Councilors (a board of Selectmen) had always been their inalienable right. Beginning with the year 1915 the government in Constantinople began to select these councilors as, for example, in the parishes of Evangelistria, Vlanga, Xerokrene, etc. At the same time under various pretexts the confiscation of the property of the Greek communities, the Holy Monasteries and other national establishments began. This is confirmed by an official report of the Greek Ministry in Constantinople dated the 14th of April, 1916 (Ministerial Archives, No. 1188), which runs as follows:

* The present Turkish Prime Minister.

"The Ministerial Council on the occasion of a dispute about a piece of property of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the Island of Chalke has decided to declare public property all the monastic possessions on the Island of Chalke which lie outside of the enclosure of the Monasteries, and in accordance with this decision the proper economical ephor has taken possession of these."

In addition to this, the tendency of the Germano-Turks to confiscate the national property of the Greeks is shown by the forced sale of the orphan asylum on Princes Island for £3,000 instead of £30,000, its actual value; the forcible seizure of the trade school in Chalke, and in particular the decision of the Ministerial Council taken in March, 1916, according to which the rights of ownership of the Monasteries are recognized only as covering the ground comprised within the walls surrounding them, while all the property outside of the walls which is claimed by them, whether this be forest land or land of other nature, is regarded as public property owned by the State. The application of such a decision completely stripping the Patriarchate, the Greek communities and the monasteries of their property, which reached a total value of many million pounds, could only have been stopped if the Greek Government had threatened, as a retaliatory measure, to confiscate the property belonging to the Turkish religious institutions in Greece. Unfortunately, it was the epoch at which, far from appreciating the importance of such a loss of wealth, Greece seemed rather to be seeking to make amends, as for instance in that famous decision about the surrender of some disputed Turkish possessions, of a value of twenty million drachmas and more.

CHAPTER II

COMPULSORY ENLISTMENT OF CHRISTIANS

In connection with these measures which shook to its foundations the very existence of enslaved Hellenism, its annihilation was further attempted through military conscription. Such diabolical inventiveness was used to this end that conscription served as a safe means first, to ruin the Greeks as individuals from the point of view of material wealth and, secondly (and this may be called its real object), to reduce their numbers to the lowest possible terms. In order that this may be understood we must know all the historical developments of Greek conscription in Turkey.

Under the absolutist régime, as is well known, the Christians in Turkey had been exempted from military obligations but instead of this they had been obliged to pay a yearly war tax. At the time of the restitution of the Constitution, they were by law regarded as obliged to render military service up to the age of thirty-one, men over thirty-one being regarded as exempt, since they had already paid their exemption fee.

After the participation of Turkey in the war, these men were, however, through legal enactment, regarded as obliged to render military service, and this included even those up to forty-eight years of age, but with the difference that those who were in the reserve were released upon payment of £45 as an exemption fee. The object of this was clear. Men that were not accustomed to military life would surely prefer to obtain a release by the payment of this fee. There was therefore through this conscription an attempt made to bleed

financially even those over whom the Turkish government had legally no right.

But most of those thus conscripted were not in a position to pay the military exemption fee. The Turks bethought themselves, therefore, of subjecting the Greeks who came into the ranks of the army to such deprivations and hardships as to compel them to dispose of their small properties in order to pay the exemption fee and obtain their release, or else not to enter the service at all, in which case they were proclaimed deserters. In this way, the actual object of the conscription, i.e., the destruction of Hellenism, was attained.

In order to succeed more fully in this, they established by law the system of the so-called battalions of laborers into which the Christians were drafted on the ground that they could not be trusted to serve under arms. These divisions of laborers were for the most part sent into the interior of Asia Minor in order to build public roads, to construct Mussulman houses, to work in quarries and to cultivate the fields of the Turkish immigrants and they were, in general, subjected to enforced labor of various kinds. What the situation of these unfortunate men was like is confirmed by various official reports, some extracts of which are here presented by way of proof.

Thus a report from the consular office in Bryoulla of August 15, 1915, Number 319 (Ministerial Archives No. 11536) describes their condition as follows: "One of the causes of the wretchedness of the Greeks in Turkey is, as is well known, the drafting of Christians into the army. For those serving in the army are subjected to such privation and hardship, and their condition, differing not a whit from that of those condemned to hard labor in the galleys, is so miserable, that in spite of all the drastic efforts of the authorities no one of the Greeks here has come forward to enlist voluntarily."

Another report of the Greek Legation in Constanti-

nople, dated July 13, 1915, Number 4099 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7981) is as follows: "The condition of the Christian soldiers is frightful. They are in danger of dying of starvation, since only a modicum of food is given them. Because, forsooth, of lack of confidence in the Christians, orders have been issued for the formation of labor battalions to be used in the construction of roads, etc. To the 3,000 Christians in Tyroloe is given half a sea-biscuit daily. The Greek soldiers of Malgara, working in a quarry, lived for four days on vegetables alone. They are often used by the Turks for private work."

Another report of the Greek consul in Iconium dated March 7, 1917, which reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 18th of September, 1917 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7027) states: "That which seriously injures and gradually but certainly exterminates the Greeks in Turkey is the law establishing labor battalions composed exclusively of Christians. As a result of this law these unfortunate men, on being drafted into these battalions are distributed throughout the interior of the empire, from the coasts of Asia Minor and the Black Sea to Bagdad, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia and Egypt, some to construct military roads, others to make tunnels for the Bagdad railroad, and others to cultivate the fields. Receiving absolutely no pay, badly nourished and clothed, exposed to changes in the weather, to the blazing sun of Bagdad and the intolerable cold of the Caucasus, assailed by sickness, fever, eruptive typhoid and cholera, they are perishing by thousands. For awhile those able to pay the exemption fees were released from service, and thus those who were relatively well off were rescued from ruin and sure death, but for the last five months these, too, have been compelled to serve in these labor battalions. While visiting the hospitals of the city of Iconium, I have seen these unfortunates stretched out on their beds or on the ground like living skeletons, waiting

in agony for death as their deliverer from this life of misery and privation. There is a total lack of drugs and food, and the only attention the sick receive is a visit from the doctor twice a day. Those who are able to stand go about the streets of the city begging a piece of bread. In order to give a faithful picture of this grievous situation it is enough to state that the cemetery of Iconium, as a result of the great mortality of the Greeks working in these labor battalions, has been filled to overflowing with graves in which not one corpse, as is the usual custom, is buried, but into which are cast, like dogs, as many as four, five or even six dead."

As a result of this state of affairs it was perfectly natural that the Christians should not come forward to enter the army but should prefer to leave the country secretly in order to escape these dread sufferings. But this is exactly what the Germano-Turks wanted, since they thus obtained a reasonable pretext for all kinds of persecution and for the adoption of Draconian measures which were extended so as to include the families and kinsmen of those who ran away in order to escape military service.

The official decision for the taking of these measures is dated October 21, 1915, and it was issued by the Enlistment Bureau in Constantinople. We use the term "official" since even before its issuance the measures that were announced at this time had long been carried out in actual practice in the provinces. By this decision the heaviest penalties were imposed on deserters and men who avoided service, unless they surrendered within a given time, their families being at the same time sent to the interior of Anatolia; what was worse, no distinction was made between those who were banished by the authorities and those who had for many years been living abroad.

One can easily imagine how certain the complete

destruction of Hellenism was made by this measure, especially if the fanaticism with which it was carried out be taken into account, for naturally these measures were not extended to include the Mussulman deserters. In order to understand this, it is enough to glance at the following extracts of official reports.

Thus the report of the vice-consul of Greece in Cydonia dated December 12, 1914, No. 672 (Ministerial Archives, No. 47298) makes the following statement: "About 5 A.M. soldiers closely invested Cydonia and guards with fixed bayonets beset the Greek houses and even the consulate itself, stopping all traffic in the streets. At the same time the Military Governor, through a proclamation, summoned the deserters to present themselves, and ordered the citizens to hand over all hidden weapons. About midday a house to house search began, executed by officers who did not spare even the churches themselves. During this search many unheard of excesses were committed and upward of two hundred Greeks were seized. In Genitsarochori, in particular, the gendarmes went so far as to outrage women. But what surpasses all description is what took place in Moschonesia, where churches were looted, and men and women were beaten and tortured. Thus a man named Copanos was thrown into a pit and pricked with needles to compel him to betray the whereabouts of weapons and deserters supposedly concealed in Moschonesia. The bishop Photios, various priests and prominent men were seized, beaten and imprisoned in a mill, to be released only after some days had passed. The object of this search for deserters and arms was to diminish the male population, to disarm the inhabitants and to dishearten the Greek element through various oppressive means. During this cruel search crowds of Bashibouzouks surrounded the city awaiting the signal to come in and loot and destroy the place. The Military Governor was heard to say: "One or two more such

searches and the city will be emptied of its men. Then we will kick the women into the sea."

In the above mentioned report from Bryoulla dated August 15, 1915, and numbered 319, appear among other facts the following: "In the afternoon of the 8th of the current month, the clerk of police, who is the scourge and terror of the Greeks here, going out as usual through the various quarters of the city in his search for deserters in hiding, wished to enter into a house in the Bazeli quarter, to make the regular search. One of the gendarmes accompanying him, hurled a good-sized stone at the house-dog, who had attacked them as they came in. The stone, however, missed its mark and struck the police secretary a serious blow on the head, and he was carried off half-conscious to his home. The authorities learning of this accident and thinking that it was a case of revenge on the part of some Christian, the man who had done it failing to acknowledge the deed, issued orders that all the inhabitants of that quarter should be arrested. In fact, shortly afterward, men, women, the aged, the sick, women that had just given birth to babes and the babes themselves, were taken to the police station. The incident spread panic throughout the whole city. That very hour the shops were closed and all, in an agony of fear, took refuge in their houses and awaited the outcome. On the 10th of August a deserter, caught in his house by a soldier, refused to follow. Other soldiers that ran up at the time set upon him with their bayonets, wounding him in various parts of his body. Finally, last night, the authorities, who were intending to draft the Christians who had reached the age of twenty-one, proceeded, without issuing any call, to their immediate arrest."

No doubt remains as to the object aimed at by the Turks in thus drafting Christians into military service, for this is clearly proven by a report from Amissos dated May 19, 1916, in which, among other facts that

inspire horror, is the following, which utterly invalidates the Turkish plea that they had proceeded to take these measures because repeated amnesties had not succeeded in persuading the deserters to join the ranks: "Those of the deserters who gave themselves up were thrown into prison here by hundreds and were left for a month and a half without bread and without any care being taken of them. I asked repeatedly that bread be given them but the Moutesarif refused: Senator ——— visited him, but he paid no heed, so that we have been obliged to feed these prisoners in order to prevent their dying from starvation. Finally, after torturing them in this way, he handcuffed hundreds of them and sent them thus bound, to Sebasteia, a fifteen days' journey, during which they suffered terribly."

The gloominess of the picture presented by the facts above reported is matched by what happened in Kerasounda. From this city it is officially and authoritatively reported, under date of the 21st of April, 1917, that on account of three hundred deserters, eighty-eight Greek villages were evacuated and burned from December, 1916, to February, 1917. The inhabitants of these villages, numbering about 30,000, mostly women, children and old men, were taken by force to the district of Ancyra (Angora), in the harshest winter weather, and at a time when epidemics were rife, without their being permitted to take even their clothing with them. Of this population one-fourth perished on the road in consequence of the hardships, starvation and exposure.

CHAPTER III

REQUISITIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Requisitions

We may regard as complementary to the forced enlistment by which the destruction of the Greek element in Turkey was sought, the measures by which, first, under the form of 'requisitions,' the Greek commercial establishments were literally looted; second, illegal taxes were levied and, third, the property of the ejected populations was confiscated.

It is well known that from the time of the adoption of the Constitution in Turkey the ruin of the material prosperity of the Greeks was assailed through attempts to isolate them commercially. These measures had previously been adopted against the Austrians in connection with the Bosnia-Herzegovina question, and they were later rendered more effective by the distribution of the circulars of the Deutsche Palestina Bank, mentioned above. But this commercial isolation could not bring about the immediate destruction, from a material point of view, of the Greeks, because they had even among themselves a vigorous commercial life; they possessed property to an extent not to be despised, and they controlled a wealth of laborers to work with.

In order to compass the Turkish aims there was adopted therefore in the first place the system of so-called 'requisitioning,' with which was closely connected, to be sure, in a more systematic way than before, the plan of commercial isolation (boycott). Thus the Turks were forbidden to have any commercial dealings with the Greeks, whom they even deprived of the right to import merchandise, and everywhere in the East there were established Turkish trade agencies for the import

and export of merchandise exclusively through Mussulman hands.

The way these requisitions were carried out is sufficiently described in a report from Constantinople dated November 13, 1915, No. 6353 (Ministerial Documents, No. 39904) in which the manner of the destruction of Greek commerce is made evident. The requisitions practically amounted to the confiscation of Greek property and the plundering thereof. For how else can such procedure be characterized, when it is well known that this requisitioning was so widely extended that even common soldiers, without any warrant had the right to enter into houses, as happened in Bryoulla in June, 1915, and by threats to take possession of hay, beans, etc., stored in them, and, taking advantage of the circumstances, to steal whatever they could lay hands on. When military officers and civil officials were permitted to enter Greek shops and take for their private use anything that they happened upon without paying for it or giving any receipt, can such action rightly be called "requisitioning"? Certainly a course of general procedure, according to which the very food in the houses of the Greeks was seized, thus condemning the owners to sure starvation, cannot rightly be thus entitled.

Contributions

These requisitions, thus executed, were followed by imposing, day by day, obligatory assessments, in the name of the Committee for the Relief of the Refugees, or in behalf of the Turkish fleet, or for purchasing military uniforms and other things.

These assessments at first were levied in the form of tickets for compulsory attendance at theatrical performances and voluntary (!) contributions. Yet, in both of these cases, the Greek was not free to give what he was able and desired to give, but there was imposed upon him an amount arbitrarily fixed by the first committee

that approached him. There was also applied the system of the imposition by threats upon every city or village of a given tax for the payment of which the inhabitants were held responsible, the objects being, now, the erection of barracks, and, again, the installation of telephones, and so on, to the point where these violent exactions were levied in order to erect Mussulman schools or to buy threshing machines for the Mussulman villages.

Thus in April, 1915, the village Imbrik-Tepe of the Kessane district was obliged to pay 1,000 Turkish pounds to buy threshing machines. In June, 1915, the larger villages in the district of Proussa were compelled to pay the following sums in Turkish pounds in behalf of the committee for the support of the refugees, Medzetie 800 pounds, Sige 150 pounds, Triglia 700 pounds (Report of the Vice-Consul of Proussa, January 10, 1915, to the Legation at Constantinople, No. 84, Ministerial Archives, No. 3396). The same happened to the inhabitants of Cydonia and Moschonesia, who, through floggings and imprisonment were compelled to pay 2,500 Turkish pounds for the uniforms of the Turkish army and 2,000 Turkish pounds for the construction of barracks; to pay a wheat-tax for the upkeep of the navy, and to buy, at no cheap price, post-cards with pictures of the sovereigns of the Triple Alliance.

The Germano-Turk inventiveness, however, did not reach its limit at this point in the proposed destruction of the Greeks. It went even farther. Through impressment, all those who were able to work were seized, regardless of age, and the duty of cultivating the fields of Mussulman immigrants was imposed on them. Even their very seed-grain was taken away from them, so that they might be unable to use their own fields and to get some profit from their cultivation.

In conjunction with this, all contrivances were resorted to so that the Greek populations might not control any

part whatever of their crops, a fact that is proven by a report as to this from Cydonia of the 18th of August, 1915, No. 257 (Ministerial Archives, No. 1333): "The time for the gathering of the olives has come, but the authorities are endeavoring, in every way, to prevent the harvesting of the crop. Those who dare to go out in the open country are beaten, robbed and arrested as being subject to military service, or are wounded and killed by Turkish bandits, beneath the very eyes of the authorities. All this is done that the Cydonians may abandon the getting in of their crop of olives, and that the Turks may harvest it on their own account."

Furthermore, through special catechising the Mussulmans were urged not to pay any of their debts to the Greeks. The economical results of this measure on the Greeks, who were thus commercially boycotted by this establishment of a Turkish trade-monopoly, are described in a report of 1917 from Kerasounda, transmitted in a communication of the Legation in Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 4901) in which the following characteristic incidents are narrated: "The Committee sent to all the Mussulman villages special delegates who proclaimed that the Sultan had ordered a release of the Turks from all debts owed to Christians, and had ordered the Turks, on penalty of hanging, not only not to pay anything to their Christian creditors, but also that Turkish tenants of the farms should not pay the customary rents to the Christian owners of farm property. In fact they brought it about that from the time of the outbreak of the European War up to to-day hardly a single Turk has paid to the Greeks anything toward his debt or his rent. But since the economical system of the country consisted in distributing to the peasants, up to July, all the available money and in beginning their collection of the debt in the middle of August, the Greeks as a result of this prohibitive propaganda of the Turks were in a critical financial situation and this all the more

since the banks not only held up their credit but even on the other hand insistently demanded back their loans, and, on account of the mobilizations these men were furthermore under an urgent necessity to find money to pay their fees in order to exempt them from military service."

These ways of destroying the material prosperity of the Greeks which were thus directly and secretly pursued, were supplemented by the sale for the benefit of the government of all the property in the villages whose inhabitants had been expelled, as is proven, in addition to other evidence, by what happened in the district of Proussa, from a few villages of which the government received from oil alone 1,500,000 Turkish pounds, as well as by the following which is given in a report dated February 25, 1917, from Amissos (Samsoun): "During these last days the tobacco storehouses of our merchants were released from Government control and the owners, acting through proxies, were allowed to sell the tobacco. Meanwhile the tobacco of the villages which had been evacuated but not burned, as Eliazkioi, Andrianta, Tekekioi, Cadikioi, etc., were put up at auction by the Government and after a few days their final sale will take place and the Government will take over the money, while in the interior of the country the peasant owners of this tobacco are dying of starvation."

CHAPTER IV

CONVERSIONS TO MOHAMMEDANISM

HAVING thus aimed at and achieved the financial ruin of the Greek people, they sought to decrease their numbers by forced and crafty conversions to Mohammedanism. One who recalls the first years of the government under the Young Turk constitution immediately remembers the turmoil which this question provoked even in the Turkish parliament. Consequently, an age limit for such conversions was fixed and the necessary formalities were decided on.

During the period of the persecutions, as the conversions to Mohammedanism formed part of the system which was planned, it was thought proper quietly to lay aside the laws and regulations and to pursue by every means and in a systematic manner the Islamization of the Christians. One of the most diabolical methods adopted was the creation of the so-called Orphan Institutions at Panormo, the founder of which was General Liman Von Sanders himself, who had the impudence to demand from the Greeks 10,000 Turkish pounds for the maintenance of these institutions. (Telegram from Constantinople of March 17, 1917. Ministerial Archives, No. 3272.) These Orphan Institutions have in appearance a charitable object, but if one considers that their inmates are Greek boys, who became orphans because their parents were murdered, or who were snatched away from their mothers, or left in the streets for want of nourishment (of which they were deprived by the Turks), and that these Greek children receive there a purely Turkish education, it will be at once seen that under the cloak of charity there lurks the 'child collecting' system insti-

tuted in the past by the Turkish conquerors and a new effort to revive the janissary system. The Greek boys were treated in this manner. What happens to the Greek girls? If we review the consular reports about the persecutions from the year 1915 to 1917 we shall hardly find one of them which does not speak of forcible abductions and conversions to Mohammedanism. And it could not have been otherwise, since it is well known that this action, as has been stated above, was decided upon in June, 1915, in order to effect the Turkification of the Hellenic element. This plan was carried out methodically and in a diabolical manner, through the 'mixed settlements' of Greeks and Turks, always with a predominance of Mohammedan males and of Greek females in order to compel mixed marriages. This is evident from a report from Constantinople dated January 14, 1916, in which it is stated that the Turkish Government instructed the Governor of Broussa to place the Greek refugees by groups of ten to thirty families in Mussulman villages with a proportion always of ten per cent. to the Mohammedan population.

Who can give a different meaning to these instructions when one considers the daily conversions in different parts of the country, in which the starvation to which the Greek populations have been condemned plays a prominent part?

The above reasoning is further strengthened by a report dated June 14, 1915, transmitted with the petition No. 4409 of the Greek Legation at Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 8670), according to which the conversions to Mohammedanism are usually due to force exercised by the authorities, who, as soon as the Greek refugees are established in Turkish villages, consider it their prime duty to give the Greeks to understand that food will be given to them only if they become Mohammedans.

In another report from Baloukeser dated April 16,

1915, and transmitted with the above mentioned communication of the Legation of Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 8760), it is stated: "By order of the Government, groups of five to ten Greek families are sent to Turkish villages with strict orders to the local Turkish Mouktars (an official representing the Government in the villages) not to allow the refugees, under any circumstances, to leave the villages to which they are sent. What is the result of this? They will either die of starvation from lack of employment or they will embrace the Mohammedan faith. The first has already begun, the second is impending. Besides that, the aim of the Government is the Islamization of the Greek refugees, as is proved both from the pressure which is exerted in every way against them and the strict orders issued to the Mouktars to give to the 'infidel refugees' twenty centimes a day." From these reports it is evident that the conversions to Mohammedanism are considered as an important means toward succeeding in annihilating the Greek element, which is the cardinal policy both of the Turkish Government and of the people.

CHAPTER V

CRIMES AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE GREEKS

BESIDES the above mentioned means employed, during this period, for the annihilation of the Greek people, other measures have also been adopted, which vary according to the circumstances and the persons involved, but which are all based on the same fixed and premeditated program, and tend to the attainment of the same end. These are as follows:

First, the system was inaugurated of committing scattered murders here and there, instead of the massacres *en masse* which characterized the first period of the persecutions. The object of this system was either to terrorize the Greek population, so that it would be compelled to confine itself to the cities and villages, and would not go out to look after its properties in the open country and to attend to its other labors, being therefore thus condemned to economic ruin, or to bring about the disappearance of prominent persons, who on account of their standing might keep up the courage of the oppressed people, or aid them financially. Both these means of relief were contrary to the program which was being carried out, one of the aims of which was to compel the Greeks by frightfulness to voluntary expatriation. For how else can these isolated but successive crimes which are being committed with impunity before the very eyes of the authorities be explained? Can they be considered as ordinary crimes committed for the purpose of robbery? In that case why should these victims be arrested openly in the villages, and why should they be taken away afterwards to be tortured and slain? How can one explain the incident mentioned

in the report of the Consul General of Smyrna dated December 12, 1914, No. 9157 (Ministerial Archives, No. 890), to mention a single example out of many. According to this report a Greek who was arrested in the Appa railway station of Denizli, was only released after promising under oath that he would leave the country. Undoubtedly murders form a part of the plan of persecution of the Greek populations. This is evident from the report of the Consulate General of Smyrna, No. 60, dated December 22, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5960), according to which, in the District of Mendessa alone, exclusive of the Sanjak of Mougla, over 200 Greeks were murdered from July, 1914, to the end of December, 1915. Also, a report from Kirk-Kilisse, dated January 5, 1916, No. 16 (Ministerial Archives, No. 2931) verifies the above, from which the following extract is taken:

"At the time of the departure of the unfortunate Greeks from Skopos, a thoroughly Hellenic virile community of Thrace, who were abandoning their homes and properties, with lamentations and wailing, under the funeral peals of the bells of their churches, which the barbarians were ringing to the accompaniment of wild cheers as an indication of the funeral of the village of Skopos, some of their notables and educated persons, such as Papakyriacos, the Constantopoulo brothers, Pelopidas Davajanidi, Zaphirios Zaphiriades and Theodore Kokalas, were seized and after being led a short distance out of the village were beheaded like sheep and their bodies were left there to become the prey of dogs and vultures. Two days before the Turks had arrested another of the most prominent and educated citizens, namely, Simos Simopoulos, whom they beheaded outside of the town, after subjecting him to unheard of tortures.

Flogging and imprisonment formed a second effective means of annihilation. Many of those beaten were com-

pelled to make incriminating statements in regard to other persons, which were entirely false, and in that manner various pretexts were found for the justification of the crimes committed against the Greeks. Others, being imprisoned and condemned by the military court without any cause whatever, were left to rot in jail or to die from various contagious diseases and bad food.

Thirdly, through assaults on Greek women, the destruction of Hellenic homes, and the moral degradation of Hellenism was sought, free play being thus given to the well-known lascivious nature of the Turks and their criminal instincts; for where in the world do policemen when taking innocent women and girls to prison attack and rape them on the way?

The Vice-Consul of Aivali, in his report No. 2905, dated September 16, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 10831), says that a Greek is treated as an outcast and his honor is the prey of the first Bashibouzouk, who has been taught by the Turkish officials to commit the most abominable orgies against him. In another report the same Vice-Consul says that a gendarme had abducted from the village of Ghioumetsi a girl by the name of Despina Stephani and that the latter after having been first assaulted by Nouri Bey, the Chief of the Gendarmes, was then in turn assaulted by other gendarmes and Government employees; that military and civil officials, establishing themselves in houses seized from Greeks, made them centers of debauchery and abomination; that to these dens Greek girls are forcibly taken and assaulted and that already 200 of them are pregnant. Identical orgies are confirmed in a report dated April 1, 1915, from Ganochori, which, after giving an account of the arrest of the wives of the deserters (Greeks) and the beating to which these women were subjected, adds that all the imprisoned women were assaulted at night, and that the gendarmes even assaulted a deserter who was caught. But the true picture of these assaults on

Greek women is given in the report from Panormo, dated June 10, 1915, and transmitted by a communication from the Legation of Constantinople under No. 4406 (Ministerial Archives, No. 8670) which mentions the following incidents in regard to the deported Greek populations: "Women and girls are wandering about the coffee-houses in the villages, being forced by the Turks to dance indecent dances of a kind that I cannot describe."

In the fourth place, various devices are used in order to reduce the Greeks to poverty and want, such as thefts, plunderings, refusal to give them wheat and flour, and forbidding the deported population to carry away with them even the smallest article. Many victims of this kind of persecution have been noted. Thus, according to a telegram from Constantinople, dated July 15, 1915, No. 4116 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7744), "Among the refugees from Madytos, numbering about 1,730, two or three deaths occur daily from starvation; in the railway station next to Panormo, since June 23, six or seven thousand refugees have been living in want of everything, thirty or forty of them dying every day from hunger and thirst, because the Turks do not allow them to procure for themselves bread and water."

According to another report, dated May 26, 1916, transmitted through a communication of the Legation of Constantinople under No. 548 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5079): "All the leading and respectable men of our villages have been and are being pitilessly flogged by the gendarmes, who are wasting the scanty flour which was left for the poor inhabitants; they are killing and eating the sheep and cows belonging to the villages by hundreds and are compelling the villagers, under the lash, to provide them with raki (Turkish brandy), sugar, and things which are very scarce, which are bought by the unfortunate people at unheard of prices, and furthermore, in order to deprive the villagers even of bread, they pre-

vent them from working in their fields, and threaten to kill anyone who shall be caught cultivating his land."

Fifth, expulsion and deportation were legalized. This measure had as its consequence the expulsion from cities and villages of all the leading men and of those who might have been able to assist the suffering Greek population. Thus, according to the report of the Legation of Constantinople, numbered 1246, dated March, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 2866): "Up to the 8th of the current month over two hundred leading men of Constantinople had been expelled to Biledjik, Yeni-shehir and other parts of the interior of Asia Minor."

According to another report from Attalia (No. 67, dated April 6), since the participation of Turkey in the war there have been expelled six hundred prominent men of Iconium and its vicinity, thirty-one of Sparta, and nineteen of Phenix, who were sent to Bazir of the Province of Iconium, which is sixty hours distant from their homes. But we must note that the number of persons expelled from the open country is unknown. Similar expulsions of leading men took place in various parts of Samsoun and elsewhere.

Sixth, gangs of Turks were going about the open country, whose principal business was to prevent the Greeks, by force, from leaving the cities and villages in order to cultivate their lands, so that, being exhausted from hunger and terrorized they might of their own accord leave the country and their homes.

These gangs were led by officers of the gendarmes, and were composed of prisoners undergoing a long sentence, who were released from jail in order to carry out this work, and, generally, of persons of bad character. About the doings of these gangs, which during the persecutions of 1913-1914 made their appearance as irregular bands without any organization whatever, a report from Adrianople, dated March 30, 1915, No. 19 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7278), treats but details as to these

matters were made known by a report from Smyrna, dated January 10, and another dated March 30, 1915, under No. 72 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7278) which shows their entire organization. Thus, for the Province of Aidin, the center of the organization of the gangs was Magnesia, where it was decided that a gang of fifteen members should have its headquarters in the district of Salihli, of ten in that of Demirji, of fifteen in that of Koula and of an equal number in that of Philadelphia (Alashehir).

The first activity of these gangs was noticed in the district of Ghiordes, where, after having attained their end, which was to prevent the Greeks from leaving their homes for the open country, the gangs entered right into the town and plundered the shop of Hadji Emmanuel Athanasoglou.

The work assigned to the gangs of Demirji and Salihli was to act against the Christians who were engaged in business in Mussulman villages. These through taxation, threats, beatings and plunderings of their shops were compelled to close up.

The activity of these gangs was extended to such a point that under the cloak of the military uniform, they harassed the very environs of Smyrna itself where before the very gates of the city, within a period of two months, five attacks were made on Christians who were living on their farms.

The guilty co-operation of the authorities with these gangs is proved by the fact that when the chief brigand Hadji Moustafa imposed a tax of five thousand Turkish pounds on the village of Moursouli of the Province of Aidin and the villagers denounced this act to the Moudir of Demirdji to whom they even gave the letter in which the demand had been made, the Moudir had some of the Christians arrested and imprisoned, accusing them of having actually forged the letter.

As a proof of the havoc wrought on the Greek popu-

lations by these gangs it is enough to say that it was through their agency that the murders of the Greeks were committed and that their members formed, so to speak, the Executive Committee of the whole organization which has been and is still active in the persecution of the Greeks.

In order to prove specifically the Greek persecutions mentioned in this chapter, according to their different categories, a statistical table is given below, based on the reports of our consular authorities in Turkey. This only comprises a very small part of the Turkish outrages which were committed during that time. It is impossible to give a complete list of the names of the Greek victims, because it was exceedingly difficult and often impossible for our consular officials to get information about things happening out in the country. Consequently there came to their knowledge only the names of those victims whose death, either by reason of their prominence or by force of circumstances, could not be concealed by the Turkish authorities, who showed a special zeal in the concealment of crimes committed against the Greeks. It is quite certain, furthermore, that many reports of our consular officials, particularly those of the year 1916, were never received either by our Legation at Constantinople or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Athens.

STATISTICAL TABLE OF THE CRIMES WHICH HAVE BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE GREEKS

SMYRNA

July	1914.	G. Paxinos, C. Paxinos, Skyrianos, Ph. Kambiris, A. Loutraris, Lalas, five brothers Tsichla, were killed at Kiosteni.
"	1914.	A. Papaioannou, G. Georgiadis, A. Christodoulou Chalkias, were killed in the village of Askioi; C. Orphanos, G. Tseravellis, were butchered on the road to Vourla.

Aug. 1914. Two Stamatiou brothers and their servant were killed near Ghioulhissar. Mrs. Triantaphylli and Mrs. Zacharoula Aspromati were assaulted by soldiers.

Sept. 1914. The two brothers A. and Z. Kavakioti were killed near Gali-Tekeli. G. Kagritsoglou and his son Elias were killed at Aghiasolouk. The brothers I. and E. Kontoyanni were killed at Develikioi. I. Michalios, I. Tsiniroglou, were killed at Kouroutseshme. Karayannis and Spanoudis were killed at Ouskioi.

Dec. 1914. I. Procopiou, G. Charalambides, G. Mylonas, were butchered in the village of Karaoulani. Constantelli brothers, S. Samios, Karapanaghiotis and his son, Tsemeli, were murdered near Sevdikioi. P. Tsomlotsoglou, P. Kehayioglou, D. Tsilonoglou, were murdered near Salihli; Kirkintsolis, Kaphilis, N. Krassassounis and a certain Demetrios, natives of Macedonia, were butchered.

Jan. 17, 1915. N. Kypriotis, was murdered near Mezikli. The prominent citizen C. Metaxas, was severely wounded at Mylassa. The three brothers Manoussoglou and Karpouzas were butchered in their mills at Hotetou. Constantine Gregoriou was killed at Agatsikioi.

" 19, " P. Sklavounos, A. Karlaghinis, were killed near the village of Gheronta. Th. Corphiatis and his servant were killed at Gheronta.

" 22, " Ch. Tourtsekoushoglou and Ch. Tsomlektsoglou were murdered near the village of Gheronta. Neophotistos Georgiou was killed at Meressi.

" 27, " C. Nikolaou and his wife at Mylassa.

" 30, " Th. Kariotis was severely wounded, also Maria Psalti and her daughter, near Kirtsali.

" 31, " Th. Xenos, V. Salatso, were killed at Bournabat. The priest Mamakis and Chasidakis were murdered at Halicarnassos.

Feb. 1, 1915. N. Balis at Menemen.

Feb. 5, 1915. Marigo Protopsalti was assaulted and severely wounded in the village of Kirtsali. N. Tiliakos, Th. Tomios, were murdered near Nazilli.

" 11, " C. Voudouris, D. Nidraios, I. Melios, at Vayakassi near the village of Sokia. P. Zachariou at Mourtzali.

" 12, " St. Strategos at Mezarlik.

" 13, " Lieutenant Nouri with two other officers assaulted and severely wounded Mrs. A. Koussaki at St. George, a suburb of Smyrna.

" 16, " V. Moustakias was found beheaded in his house at Koukloutsa.

March 8, " E. Saghior was murdered in the village of Mitochori.

" 10, " G. Yiannitakis was killed at Tsapaki. I. Yioules, L. Tsemalis, were murdered at Menemen.

April 10, " V. Kavakiotis, E. Kavakiotis and his son, 12 years of age, were butchered at Yabeni. In the same village the two minor sons of Delimanoli were severely wounded.

May 1915. I. Lagos was murdered at Ephesus. E. Phoutounoglou was murdered near Koula. Karakalpakis and two millers, one named Costas and another of unknown name, were found dead, perforated by bullets, near Nazilli.

" 16, " A. Carmeropoulos was murdered near Yeni-Pazar. Ch. Christodoulou was severely wounded by a bullet.

June 5, " Ph. Namatianos was murdered at Karapounar.

" 15, " After the bombardment at Halicarnassos eighteen (18) inhabitants and one girl, 16 years old, were slaughtered by Mohammedan Cretans.

" 16, " D. Roumeliotis, D. Tagheas, were murdered at Bouyoukli. I. Milonas and his son George Kirkintse.

July " D. Arghyrakis was murdered.

August " A. Spyroglou was murdered at Kirkintse.

Sept. " Ch. Savvopoulos, I. Hadjipetros, D. Broussalis, I. Phetsopoulos were murdered at Aktse.

Oct. 1915. C. Baindirlis, E. Karinas, D. Pathos and I. Baxevanis were murdered at Sokia. V. Karvelas was imprisoned and subjected to terrible tortures from which he died after a few days. G. Gouvelas was imprisoned.

Dec. " Five corpses which had been mutilated horribly were taken from a river near the village of Gheronta.

CYDONIA (AIVALI)

Nov. 23, 1914. D. Ioannou, M. Hadjiyannis and D. Lachanas were murdered. S. Hadjiantoniou, I. Rouvalas, P. Michalios and I. Liscos were murdered near Pagamli.

" 26, " A band of Mohammedan refugees attacked in the suburbs many laborers, both men and women. They committed rape upon many girls.

Jan. 25, 1915. D. Sessypis was murdered at Moschonesia, and his brother was severely wounded.

Feb. 10, " G. Koukoutos and A. Delioglanis while on an excursion outside the city disappeared together with their carriage. D. Maliaros, P. Sideris, I. Tessivassis, P. Hadjicosmas, were arrested and beaten by Bashibouzouks (marauders); they were found naked and half-dead in the suburbs of the city.

" 13, " P. Psaroukis and his son were murdered, and their bodies were thrown into a well by a gendarme.

" 16, " St. Arghyrou was severely wounded, and his brother Panaghis was beaten.

" 17, " Five corpses were found burned near the city; it seems that the victims were burned alive.

" 23, " P. Makris, E. Anestis, I. Chamalis, were slaughtered by soldiers.

March 5, " Forty-two (42) Greek peasants were seized by Bashibouzouks, their fate being unknown.

March 7, 1915. Palaeologos, Apsathas, N. Vloros and the 15-year-old boy, B. Klaromenos, were found beheaded. Their bodies bore signs of torture.

" 31, " The body of a young boy, with a rope round his neck, was found in the water-closet of a Turkish house.

May 11, " Fifty (50) men and women were seized and sent to Smyrna. The women were assaulted on the way by the gendarmes. Despoina Stephanou was taken to the village of Yioumetsi and assaulted by all the gendarmes of the station.

June 12, 1915. A. Maroudis has disappeared.

July 8, " C. Apsatos, I. Comnenos and the 14-year-old Malemchiari were murdered by soldiers.

" 10, " P. Pseftarakos was severely wounded.

" 14, " Papademetriou was murdered.

Aug. 1, " The body of Photios Dala was found horribly mutilated.

" 15, " A. Koulakanis and G. Zariphis were murdered at Moschonesia. Ap. Doudoukas, I. Agelaras, D. Vaphiadis, P. Timakos, D. Orphanos, P. Angelidis from Moschonesia, were thrown into prison and tortured.

Jan. 1916. The fishermen G. Vonelis, G. Tsitsonis and P. Dedoulos were murdered

" 25, " The two brothers Ch. and E. Volivos, I. Koutroumbilas, P. and A. Tages, E. Papoutsis, S. Saltas, D. Roumeliotis, E. Yannios and P. Tsarlimbaris were slaughtered.

Feb. 12, " The body of P. Koukournara was found slashed with sword-cuts.

" 18, " I. Valmos was murdered.

BRYOULLA (VOURLA)

Feb. 1915. E. Hadjiconstantinou and Manatas were imprisoned without any reason.

May " Two shepherds, N. Chloros and I. Paraparis, were murdered. E. Vretos was severely wounded. S. Dimakis, M. Karakyriakos and M. Karanikolis were murdered. Many were

arrested, imprisoned and expelled to Van and Mosul, amongst them being the brothers Vati and G. Bogdanos.

June 1915. G. Niaos, V. Germanopoulos and I. Mitaghis were murdered near Tsirlidere. Twenty-six other Greeks were imprisoned, amongst them being G. Tzanetis, I. Koumassonis and the priests Ioannis Panteleimon and Varlaam.

July " Eighteen (18) Greeks were butchered at Kiosteniou, amongst them being P. Xydias, S. Kapiris, A. Goutaris, N. Valachis, P. Sterghianou and the seventeen-year-old G. Valahis. Seventeen (17) other Greeks were arrested and eleven (11) Greek subjects were expelled.

Dec. " The body of N. Tarnani was found near Kalambaka (of Vourla) horribly mutilated.

ATTALIA

Jan. 1915. A band of Bashibouzouks plundered the house of a prominent Greek near Kemeri, who was afterwards slaughtered with his wife and children. The following were deported to the interior (of Asia Minor): D. Eleutheriou, Timoleon and Charal. V. Lazaridis, Theod. Kolioglou, Ephraim Danielis, I. Arapoglou, M. Kastakoglou, M. Anezoulakis, I. Kadezlis and I. Kolioglou.

March 2, " Ph. Arghyropoulos, K. Kehayioglou, Th. Yiouspazoglou, Eustr. Tousdjoglou, P. Rapitis, N. Hadjianastasiou, Alex. Malaleksoglou, Eustrat. Kotsoglou, P. Hadjisemer, S. Ioannidis, Theod. Skiagoglou, M. Georgiadis, S. Santorides, P. Petrides, N. Kouyiandjoglou, A. Hadjiebeoglou, Theod. Hadjipares, George Michaelis, A. Paloglou and P. Paschalis.

" 4, " Papa-Iakobos, Papa Christos, Papa Nikolaos Apdjoglou, Ieremias Maroulogiou, Artemis Tjanoglou, I. Papazoglou, Sp. Papazoglou, Cosmas Hadjigeorgandjoglou, K. Aslano-

glou, P. Aslanoglou, A. Aslanoglou, Phil. Aslanoglou, Char. Sinanidis, Dem. Styloglou, D. Kahrimanoglou, Ph. Kahrimanoglou, Char. Hadjiavramaglou, Sot. Evremoglou. Char. Christides, Dem. Artemiades, Haadjicharalambos, Hadjithanasoglou, Cosmas Hadjithanasaylou, L. Dervishoglou, A. Dervishoglou, I. Kapa-Kioglou, Hadjisavas, Hadjiarslan, G. Yiodanoglou, Eustr. Arslanoglou, P. Hadjioglou, S. Seraphimoglou, Cyrillos Ayiakloglou, L. Seretaroglou, and P. Hadjipandjoglou.

March 28, 1915. Eleven Greeks were expelled to the interior (of the country).

April 6, " Five more Greeks were expelled to the interior.

Aug. 8, " Nineteen more Greeks were expelled to the interior. It is worthy of notice that up to to-day, from the city of Attalia alone, 138 Greeks have been expelled, and on the other hand, that the Greeks who were expelled from the village of Smano were robbed by the gendarmes, who took from them about 1,200 Turkish pounds.

CONSTANTINOPLE

March 1915. D. Koulekli was murdered at Baloukli. The number of the Greeks from Constantinople who have been arrested and expelled to Asia Minor amounts to 200. Among them are the following persons: C. Theodorou, G. Vassiliou, Th. Vassiliou, G. Demosthenes, V. Athanassiou, Th. Karamitsos, T. Vassiliou, Ch. Stylianos, P. Symeon, C. Ioannou, G. Panaghiotou, L. Nikolaou, A. Karakos, P. Vitalis, M. Apostolou, V. Ioseph, E. Anastasiadis, A. Deskosmidis, L. Georgiou, N. Zographidis, E. Manouelidis, I. Papoulis, P. Constantinou, P. Samamas, N. Athanassiou, N. Demou, Ch. Vassiliou, Th. Prodromou, N. Demetriou, V. Saphaidaris, S. Okoumoush, D.

Saphir, Th. Demetriou, S. Gregoriou, G. Photiou, D. Roumounos and Z. Ignatiou. It should be noted that according to the communication No. 1246 of March 2 of the Legation of Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 2866), the total number of the Greeks deported to the interior of Asia Minor is 10,000.

June 1915. Sixty Greeks from the districts of Bouyoukdere, Tyroloi, Tsatadjsa and Selyvria were brought to Constantinople and imprisoned.

July 1915. Archmandrite A. Papadopoulos, the Archivist of the Patriarchate, was imprisoned, and after a few months deported. The abbot of the Monastery of St. George at Prinkipo, the priests Ioannis Oekonomou and Cyrillos, of Bouyoukdere, as well as the Archmandrite Gennadios were also imprisoned.

THRACE

Jan. 1915. Two Greeks were killed in the village of Kerdeli. Seventeen Greeks from Kirk-Kilisse and Vizyi were arrested as suspects for the murder of the son of the Governor. They were buried alive in graves which they were compelled to dig. The teachers and priests of the city of Kessani were thrown into jail.

March " The Rev. Apostolos, a priest of the village of Varnitza, was strangled in the prison of Kessani. Numerous families were imprisoned at Chora. The women are thrown on the ground and beaten by gendarmes with whips on the soles of their feet, in order that they might disclose the hiding places of their husbands. During the evacuation of the village of Skopos the following persons were slain by gendarmes; Papakyriakos, Arist Constantopoulos, P. Valantsanidis, Z. Phloros, Zariphiadis, Th. Kokkalas and Simos Simopoulos. The

greater part of the inhabitants of Malgara are in jail, where they endure great sufferings. The representative of the Bishop and 23 prominent men were taken to Adrianople, and on their way beaten by the gendarmes.

April 1915. Two Greeks were hung in Adrianople wtihout any reason.

PART II

DEPORTATIONS *EN MASSE*

THE abolition of the privileges of the Greek Church, the drafting of Christians into the army, the conversions to Mohammedanism, the commandeerings and the murders of the Greeks in Turkey, constituted, so to speak, the work preparatory to their annihilation, and this was completed by the sixth measure which was applied, namely, the deportations *en masse*.

This was designed in order to bring about the complete annihilation of the Greek nation by the devastation of the flourishing Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire.

This measure which was first applied in the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Hellespont, on the pretext of military necessity, was quickly extended to all the settlements along the coast and to the islands in the sea of Marmora, which are inhabited by Greeks. The towns of Cydonia (Aivali) and Amissos (Samsoun) and, generally, the settlements along the coasts, except the two great centers, Constantinople and Smyrna, where there is a compact Greek population, were reduced to ruins.

This measure was taken in consequence of a decision of the Young Turk Committee, and was put into execution in the year 1915. The Greek Legation at Constantinople, by a communication dated June 15, 1915, No. 3501 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7065), informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the decisions which had been taken at Constantinople for the forcible conversion of Greeks to the Mohammedan faith by mixed marriages between Turks and Greek women who had

been brought into these Turkish villages for settlement there.

The same Legation, by another report, under the same date, No. 3500 (Ministerial Archives, No. 6557), announces the beginning of the execution of this decision in the following manner:

"Among the decisions taken by the Turkish Committee is the conversion to Islam of the Greek populations, which is difficult as long as there exist compact Greek settlements. Military necessity affords a most suitable pretext to have the Christians scattered, thus making their Turkification easy. The deportations *en masse* of the inhabitants of the islands of Marmora (Koutali, Kalolimnos, Marmora, etc.), have the same object, because those that are deported are not settled in Christian villages; as for the men, they either imprison or put them to forced labor, while the women and children they send to Turkish villages."

The law about the deportation of the Greek populations was therefore passed, because otherwise the Turkification of the Greek element, as shown by the actual results, would have been difficult, especially where there were compact Greek populations.

From this one can easily conclude what the pretexts repeatedly advanced by the Germano-Turks for these deportations were worth, for they alleged at one time the so-called supplying of enemy submarines by the Greeks, and again that they were in communication with the enemy by signals, and at other times that the Greeks in Turkey were not loyal.

The German Government itself on June, 1915, assured the Greek Minister at Berlin (telegram of the Greek Legation at Berlin of June 18, 1915, No. 2384, Ministerial Archives, No. 6524), that in order to "please the Government of the King it will take steps to put an end to these deportations."

The pretexts of the Turks as to Greek treason were

intended to mislead public opinion and to justify their monstrosities. The human heart is torn in the face of the tragical scenes of these deportations. In order to understand the magnitude of this tragedy it is sufficient to note that the deported persons, after being expelled from their villages, had no right to take with them even things of absolute necessity. Naked and barefooted, without food or water, beaten and insulted by the gangs that escorted them, they were, provided they were not murdered, led by their executioners to the mountains. But most of them died on their way as a result of their sufferings, or were left in the road half dead; women gave birth to children as they marched along and abandoning their newly born babes at once, continued the journey as well as they could, because those that marched slowly were beaten by the escorting gendarmes. The end of the journey of these unfortunate persons did not terminate their sufferings, because the wild inhabitants of the Turkish villages admitted them to their villages only to deal them the final blow.

The deportations from the coast of the Black Sea and the city of Cydonia (Aivali) which were carried out toward the end of the year 1916 and during the year 1917, were of the most cruel and inhuman character. Besides other cruelties, they resorted also to arson and burned all the evacuated villages so that no traces of their existence might be left and that the ethnological character of these most Hellenic regions might be entirely altered.

The crimes there committed are of such a nature that nothing like them is recorded in the pages of history.

In place of any further description of these occurrences the following extracts from the reports of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, show, district by district, the savagery of the persecutions and the annihilation of the Greek population which was brought about by these means.

CHAPTER I

DARDANELLES, GALLIPOLI, MARMORA, KIRK-KILISSE

THE following extracts have been taken from a report of the Greek Legation of Constantinople, No. 4099, dated June 26, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7981):

"The first deportations which took place are those of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli (March-April, 1915) under the pretext of military necessity and the safety of the inhabitants. The Greeks of the Dardanelles were sent to Artaki, where no care was taken by the Turkish Government for the maintenance of the poor whom the well-to-do Greeks supported, but this could not continue for a long time because the number of the poor amounted to 3,300."

"After the evacuation of the Dardanelles, that of Gallipoli, Madytos, Krithia, and the other villages of Gallipoli followed (April 26). The Christian populations were compelled to embark on steamships, and were forbidden to take anything with them or even to secure the safety of their property. The goods in the shops belonging to the Christians were plundered and sold by the Turkish authorities to two Ottoman companies."

"The deported people, having been scattered in various villages, such as those of Kipsit, Vigadetos, Sintirghi, Soussourlouk, of the district of Baloukesser are in danger of dying of starvation, apart from the fact that the settling of Greek women amongst the Turks carries with it other dangers, such as assaults, conversions to Mohammedanism, etc., etc."

"On April 15, the population of Amygdalia and Maistros, of the district of Enos, was ordered to evacu-

ate these villages within three days, and they were all transported to the Turkish villages of Beyendi and Passait, while the Turks of the nearby villages plundered their properties, churches and monasteries."

"From the 1st to the 15th of May the inhabitants of the villages of Bouyoukdere, Kephalikioi, Kirits, and Yeni-Machala were ordered to abandon their villages within three days."

"Although the Turkish Government maintained that the deportations formed a general measure and were due to military necessity, as both the Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) and the German Ambassador told me when I protested in person about the deportations—still, after the departure of the Greeks, their houses and properties were seized by the Turks."

"The evacuation of Bouyoukdere was preceded by that of Phanaraki, Cavak and of Doumoushdere, of Bazekioi (16 April) and Avaskioi of the District of Derkos. The inhabitants of these villages too were unable to take any of their belongings with them and in some villages, as in Domoushdere, they were compelled to sign a declaration that they abandoned their villages of their own accord and from fear."

"On the first of June the inhabitants of Pyrgos (of the District of Derkos), consisting of 3,000 persons, were ordered at night to abandon their villages and men, women with their babies, children, and old people, in want of everything, after trudging for three hours on foot, reached Bouyoukdere, whence they were taken to the interior of the country and compelled to settle in the Turkish villages of Ik-Kiol and Soulio, of the District of Nicaea, and forbidden to go to Constantinople, where many of them had relatives and friends. The deportations took place exactly at the time of their cabbage harvest, which product was afterwards seized by the Turkish refugees along with all their properties."

"On June 4, the evacuation of Koutali,—an island

in the sea of Marmora,—was ordered and its inhabitants, consisting of 1,800 persons, were deported to the interior of Anatolia. The old men and children were settled in the Turkish village of Soussouglou, but being without any shelter, and, deprived of everything, they endure the worst of sufferings; the rest were sent to the village of Michalitsi of the district of Nicaea, undergoing all the consequences of weather changes. Their properties and houses were seized by the freebooters of the neighboring community of Arapis, who established themselves in their homes."

The inhabitants of Kalolimnos, another island in the sea of Marmora, were compelled, within a few hours, to abandon their island, without being able to take anything with them, and were sent to the villages of Michalitsi and Terbekioi near Broussa, suffering terribly from hunger. The number of the Greeks thus deported was about 1,440.

On June 15, the evacuation of Prokonnesos (an island also in the sea of Marmora) was ordered, its inhabitants being deported to Panormo and Ouktsoukiol (the railway station of Panormo) and from there to different parts of the interior, and exposed to various climatic changes. I have been informed to-day (June 26) that the villages of Peramos, Sighi, Triglia, Eligmoi and Peristasis were evacuated and their inhabitants taken to the Asiatic coast of the sea of Marmora. According to other information the evacuation of Moudania is imminent, as well as that of the villages of Myriophyto. In a word, we have here to do with the evacuation of the whole coast of the sea of Marmora.

According to another report of the Legation at Constantinople, No. 5171, dated September 8, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 10938), all the villages of the District of Kirk-Kilisse have been emptied of their Greek inhabitants. The following is a detailed statement:

"Skepastos, a village of the District of Kirk-Kilisse,

the inhabitants of which, consisting of 3,000 persons, were taken, on September 6, toward Redosto. Sophides, a village of the district of Vizye, which is inhabited by 4,000 persons, was evacuated likewise on the 8th of the same month in the usual cruel manner."

"Samacovo, also of the district of Vizye, and the seat of the Metropolitan, had its inhabitants, consisting of 5,000 persons, deported on the same day."

"Tourlia and St. Stephano of the district of Vizye, which villages had a population of 3,150 persons, were surrounded by Turkish gangs and no inhabitant is now left there."

"Skopos, of the District of Kirk-Kilisse, was surrounded by the Turks, and its inhabitants, consisting of 6,000 persons, were sent to various places, after being compelled to pay to the Turkish Comitadjis 80 Turkish pounds. The Government officials imposed a fine of from 20 to 30 Turkish pounds on Jewish merchants on the ground that they had violated the blockade of the village."

These brief and dry extracts from reports, supplemented from other more recent sources, prove that the Greeks, almost without exception, have been deported. The regions, such as Thrace, the coast of the sea of Marmora, that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus, and the littoral of the Black Sea, which have been completely denuded of their Greek population, were noted for their flourishing condition in commerce, education, civilization and wealth. Having been smitten so heavily by the Germano-Turks, they have been to-day transformed into smoking ruins, upon which Turkish immigrants dance, an element entirely foreign to these Hellenic sites. A mere glance on the map will show the magnitude of the catastrophe.

To sum up, there were destroyed eleven towns and villages in the district of Gallipoli, having a Greek population of 24,636 inhabitants; seven towns in that of

Broussa with a Greek population of 14,632; eight villages in that of Bosphorus with a Greek population of 5,500; three villages in that of Myriophyto with a Greek population of 2,210; the town of Dardanelles with a Greek population of 3,300; the town of Kemelik, and lastly thirteen towns and villages of the coast of the sea of Marmora with a Greek population of 23,450.

The Germano-Turks have not omitted any form of cruelty in order to crush the Greek populations, whose houses they have plundered and burned in order to leave no trace of their existence.

Official consular reports also prove the crimes which have been committed against the Greek populations of Trebizond, Kerasounda, Amissos (Samsoun) and Cydonia (Aivali), and extracts from these reports appear below.

CHAPTER II

TREBIZOND

A REPORT transmitted through the Greek Legation at Petrograd, No. 1570, dated August 30, 1916 (Ministerial Archives, No. 9067), runs as follows:

"On April 15 the Greek inhabitants of the sixteen villages of the district of Vazelon and Trebizond, were ordered by the Turkish authorities to proceed to the interior of Argyropolis (Ghioumoushane), but fearing that they might be slain on the way, like the Armenians, they abandoned their homes and took refuge in the woods, hoping that they would be saved by a quick advance of the Russian army. Of these refugees, consisting of 6,000 persons, six hundred and fifty took refuge in the Monastery of Vazelon, where they found one hundred and thirty refugees from Trebizond; twelve hundred hid in a big cave near the village of Kounaka, and the remainder dispersed in the woods and various hiding places. All their property was looted and their houses plundered by the Turkish army. Those who had taken refuge in the cave of the village of Kounaka, surrendered themselves because they were starving; but twenty-six women and girls in order to escape dishonor threw themselves into a river near the village of Gephyra, and notwithstanding the efforts of their companions to save them, they were all drowned. From April 5 to July 5, Turkish brutality burst out in all its savagery."

The number of those who were tortured and murdered by the Turks can be counted by the hundreds. "After the advance of the Russian army," says an eye-witness, "I was the first to reach Argyropolis (Ghioumoushane).

The sight that presented itself before my eyes was horrible. Everything had been destroyed, both in the Monastery and in the villages, except that the Turks did not set fire to the place. Five decomposed bodies of Greeks were lying unburied in the court-yard of the Monastery, one of them being that of the priest Constantine of the village of Thersa. Five other corpses were found in the interior of the Monastery. In one of the rooms there was lying the body of the twenty-year-old girl Kyriaki from the village of Thersa, naked and beheaded, with a wound on the chest, there being every indication that rape was committed upon her. According to the admission of two Christians that have escaped, the unfortunate girl had been seized in the forest along with others by nine Turks and had been carried into the Monastery. After she had been outraged she had been killed by them."

CHAPTER III

KERASOUNDA

A REPORT of the Greek Legation at Constantinople dated February 7, 1917, No. 119 (Ministerial Archives, No. 4901), concerning the district of Kerasounda, where the Greek element surpassed the other nationalities, both in commerce and wealth, states as follows:

"According to reliable information received from Kerasounda the condition of the Greeks of that district is very lamentable. After the occupation of Trebizond by the Russians, tens of thousands of Turkish immigrants swept down into the district of Kerasounda, where they plundered the Greek villages and departed, leaving behind them cholera and typhus fever. By order of the Governor of Trebizond, a new persecution of the Greeks began, the wealthiest of them being arrested and expelled."

"When the deportation of the Greeks from the littoral of the Black Sea was decided upon by the Turkish General Staff, it was carried out by the Governor of Trebizond and his agents in the most cruel manner. In spite of the assurances given by the Commander of the Third Military Corps, the evacuation of the villages was completed within twenty-four hours, and the deported Greeks, accompanied by a strong escort of gendarmes, were not permitted to take with them either food, clothes or baggage, and spent the night in the open air under a pelting rain."

"The deported peoples of the sea villages were not allowed to communicate with their Bishop. After their departure the Turkish officials and private individuals pillaged their properties. The evacuated villages numbered thirty-eight and the population was 23,000."

CHAPTER IV

AMISSOS (SAMSOUN)

VARIOUS reports, transmitted with a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 548 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5079), dated January 14 and 29, and February 7 and 29, 1917, describe the ruin of Samsoun and of the Greek villages of the littoral of the Black Sea. The following are some extracts from these reports:

"Eighty of the wealthiest Greeks of Samsoun, having been arrested without any reason whatever, were imprisoned on December 27, 1916; they were not allowed to communicate with their families in order to secure clothing, and were taken next morning very early to the interior of the country as if they were the worst of criminals. The foremost Greeks shared the same fate. Being deprived of everything, they will not be able to stand such privations and calamities. On the same day the city was encircled by the Turkish army, and all the population was called to the square of Upper Samsoun (Cadikioi) in order that, as was said, they might listen to the Governor who was to speak to the public. In that manner they were all seized and imprisoned in the barracks. The same thing also happened in the village of Eliazkioi. The men were thus without money and both men and women without extra clothing. The old and sick were taken along, being assisted by their relatives. The Turks did not spare even women who had just given birth to children nor the babies themselves. In such a condition they followed their executioners on foot, all night long, through the snow-covered mountains. This tragic scene had the aspect of a herd of cattle being

led to the slaughter-house. The children were in vain crying for bread and water. We do not know where they rested that day after a journey lasting twelve hours, nor where so many thousand people found bread. Undoubtedly they slept in the open air and had nothing to eat next day."

"In the meantime horrible things happened. As soon as Basil Arnaoutoglou, a merchant of Samsoun, was arrested, his 19-year-old daughter, Ourania, fell dead. The 17-year-old Euphrosini Garouphalidou, whose brother works in the labor battalion in the evacuated section of Cadikioi (Samsoun), having gone back to her home and not finding there her widowed mother,—who had just before been deported with the others,—became insane. As communication with the evacuated part of the city was not possible, the sick who could not be transported, died of starvation in a few days. We buried a woman who had died two days before, and we found babies dead in their cradles. After the deportations, the Turks gave themselves up to plundering. Thus jewelry, furniture, clothing, cooking utensils, and everything that was found in the homes was pillaged and sold in the streets."

"On January 1st Turkish policemen having gone into the church hunted out the rich and prominent Greeks, who had remained there. These they seized during the day, and on the following day sent them to the interior together with others who had been seized in other villages. Unfortunately we cannot fix the exact number of the deported persons, but it is certain that more than forty leading Greeks were arrested. The city now looks like a cemetery, since all the shops in the business part of it are closed. We are unable to find out where these persons were taken to and where they now are, but we are positively informed that those who had been deported from Upper Samsoun reached Kavak the first night in a bad condition; there they buried their dead; from that place

they were taken to Kaphzan, in the Province of Sebastia, a distance of 80 kilometers from Samsoun, having made the journey in four days, without food. During this journey many died from hunger, cold and hardships. I have just been informed that there are many dead in the church at Kaphzan. Notwithstanding the promises which had been given that the authorities would settle those deported in the Christian villages near Kaphzan, all of them have been sent to Tsoroum, in the Province of Angora. On the way the girls of Cadikioi, being sure of the fate which awaited them, sang the song, "Farewell, poor world; farewell, sweet life." What will happen at Tsoroum? How will so many thousands of people live in the midst of a severe winter, deprived of everything? This is a riddle which past experience can only solve."

"On January 10, 11 and 13, other arrests were also made, the arrested persons being likewise sent to the interior and thus the Greek community was completely disorganized; its schools were transformed into barracks, its shops were closed, property was plundered, and the richest villages of the district were burned. Thus the Greeks, whose misfortunes are beyond all description, are now in a most wretched condition."

Another report contains the following details:

"From the day that Rafet Pasha came to Samsoun, the whole place has been turned into a hell. He is 36 years old, fanatic, passionate, and, to a high degree, a hater of Greeks. To him alone are due the various cases of arson and of deportation, which I have described in many of my reports. Having left Bitlis three months ago where he had been promoted to the grade of Pasha, he came here, with full powers. In a short time he has become the scourge of the country and the tyrant of the Christians."

"On January 17 and 18, the arrests and the deportations to the interior were resumed; therefore, Samsoun

is in danger of losing all its male population. About fifty Greeks have been deported up to now from the town of Tsarshamba; the day before yesterday the Greek merchants of Paphra were deported."

"By order of the Government the shops of the Greek merchants deported from Samsoun have been plundered; from the store of Soukiouroglou alone merchandise to the value of 5,000 Turkish pounds has been pillaged. Out in the open country the Christians undergo sufferings the like of which one cannot find even in the darkest pages of history. The army and the Turks of the neighboring country enter the Christian villages, take away the cattle and beasts of burden, clothing, furniture, cooking utensils, flour, coverlets and all the other movable property in the Christian villages, and afterwards they set fire to the houses of the Christians and send them into the interior of the country, half naked, without food, without money, and on foot, over snow-covered mountains."

"Twenty-eight other villages have been burnt within a week from January 15th up to the present time, excluding those that were burnt during the month of December. The women and children have been sent and continue to be sent on foot in the midst of rain and snow to the Provinces of Sebastia and Angora. Babies, girls, women, in child-birth or pregnant, sick people and old men are pushed from place to place; they spend their nights in Khans (Turkish inns) without bread or any other food; they sleep naked on the manure piles or on the floor, and although many of them contract pneumonia or other diseases, on the following day, in the same manner, they are driven on under the lash. Many children having lost their parents are scattered in the mountains or in the Turkish villages; others die on the way of starvation, cold and hardships, and are buried in the mountains or are left a prey to the wild beasts. Those that survive their sufferings, after a journey last-

ing many days, are scattered throughout the Turkish villages of the Province of Angora, where, in the course of time, they will perish."

"Already dreadful news is reaching us about the fate of the deported people; the rich men of Paphra have been sent to the Province of Castamone, while the merchants of Samsoun and Tsarshamba have been distributed among the villages of Tsoroum, Sounghourlou, Medjitouzou and Inglibi."

"Those first deported from Cadikioi and Eliazkioi reached the top of Mount Tsoumbouz without food on the first night; the next day they arrived in Kavak, the third day at Kara-Dag and on the fourth they came to Kaphzan. During these four days they were without food. On their arrival at Tsoroum, they were scattered in various Turkish villages, where they are dying from cold and hunger by hundreds. We do not know exactly the number of the persons who have been deported, but on a rough estimate they exceed 20,000, and the number is increasing every day. Arson, plunderings and crimes continue in a savage manner, and the deprivations and hardships add new victims daily."

A third report states as follows:

"Vehaedin, a special official of the Ministry of the Interior, came recently from Constantinople. He is in harshness emulating Rafet Pasha, the special emissary of the Ministry of War, for he prepares the lists of the persons to be deported, and the latter carries out the decisions which are reached. Thus, this week, another group of Greeks has been deported to the interior and Samsoun is in danger of being left without men."

"The whole male population of Paphra also, where Vehaedin had gone, has been sent to Voivat, and the Turkish Government has ordered the closing of the tobacco warehouses and prohibited any sale of tobacco. The said Vehaedin, after having finished his sinister mission in Paphra, went the day before yesterday to

Oinoi, Tsarshamba and Phatza in order to supervise the execution of his program."

"In the meantime, Rafet Pasha continues his work of annihilation. The villages which had escaped the previous destruction have been burned and their inhabitants sent to the interior. Eight villages of Paphra, which produced the choicest tobacco in Turkey, were burned and their Greek inhabitants sent to the Province of Angora, while the Greek inhabitants of eight other villages of Samsoun have been sent to the interior and Turkish refugees have been settled in their houses. To these the Turks have promised to give title deeds for the houses and lands."

"At this moment smoke and flames are seen in the mountains; undoubtedly fire has been set to other villages. According to positive information, all the Greek population outside of Kerasunda has been also sent to the interior towards Kol-Hissar and Hamidie. If one considers the high and rugged mountains through which the deported women and children of the above villages are compelled to pass in the midst of a very heavy winter, one's mind is appalled and his heart is wrung."

The fourth report is as follows:

"We awaited anxiously the return from Constantinople of the American Vice-Consul of Samsoun, from whom a generous and substantial contribution of money was expected. Unfortunately, these hopes were disappointed, the excuse being given that America cannot send money to Constantinople, the Turkish Government having prohibited the sending of any money to Turkey. One can picture to himself the tragical situation of this unfortunate population, which is deprived both of money and food."

"Recently, the tobacco warehouses of the Greek merchants which had been seized were freed and the sale of tobacco by representatives has been permitted. Still, the tobacco of the villages, which have been evacuated

without being burnt, such as that of Eliazkioi, Adreanta, Tekekioi, Cadikioi, etc., has been put to auction by the Government, and in a few days, it will be sold to the highest bidder; the proceeds of this sale will be retained by the Government, while the owners of the tobacco are dying in the interior from hunger."

"The deportations of men from Samsoun continue. Not a single man is left in Paphra, while the women and children who have been left there are suffering dreadfully for lack of everything. The patriarchal family of Haji-Ioannou Gelkentzoglou, who is the founder and the pillar of the Greek community there, has been exterminated; his three sons, his grandchildren and his nephews have been sent to Castamoni, while he, a man of ninety years of age, who for forty years was a member both of the Municipal Council and the Court, and who has served the Government in various ways, has been deported, poor unfortunate, and is now temporarily living in Samsoun, though he is destined to die in the interior of the country. The Gelkentzoglou family was one of the most prominent of our district."

"The same things happened in the districts of Neo-Caesarea, of Phatza and of Tsarshamba. Consequently, if one takes into consideration that recently even those who have paid the exemption fee have been taken into the army, one can conclude that no male person has been left in the place."

"In the meantime, the destruction continues. The evacuated villages of Ada-Tepe, Yelidje, Karaghiol, have been burned."

"Near Kourouk-Koktje, where the military camp of the Pasha has been established, the villages have suffered severely; many women and children have been killed, the village of Erikli, among other villages, has been burned, and the population has been sent to the interior of the country in very bad condition."

"Worse things have happened at Paphra, where dur-

ing the last few weeks twenty other villages with their churches and schools have been set on fire and after their movable property was plundered and their immovable property burned, the whole population was sent to the interior of the country."

"The damage caused by the burning of these villages, which produced the choicest tobacco of Turkey, may be valued at many million Turkish pounds, and the Ottoman Government will not be long in feeling the injury done to the interests of the State."

"But at all events the damage has already been done and its results continue; the villages have been burned, and in the Province of Angora the inhabitants are dying by the thousands. I am sure not one will survive."

"The prominent men of Samsoun are already dying from diseases in the town of Tsoroum, Aletsa, Sounghourlou, and Medjit-Ouzou. The Greek peasants have been distributed by thousands among the surrounding Turkish villages, where they are living in the stables and barns of the Turks. Deprived of bread, clothing and coverlets, in the midst of a severe winter, with everything at an excessive price, in the total lack of medicines against contagious diseases, they are dying in crowds."

"All this horrible treatment has one object, namely, the annihilation of the Greeks in Turkey, who must disappear as have the Armenians. Already one-fourth of the deported population has died, and the same fate is awaiting the thirty thousand persons who have been deported from our District (Sanjak)."

CHAPTER V

CYDONIA (AIVALI)

THE reports submitted with the communications of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, dated April 24 and May 1, 1917, No. 662 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5219), describe the destruction of the city as follows:

"Before giving an account of the contents of these reports it is necessary to state briefly what sort of city Cydonia was up to that time. It was a city containing over 30,000 inhabitants who, with the exception of a hundred Turks, were all Greeks; it had a gymnasium (college)—whose diplomas had been recognized by the University of Athens since the year 1884;—three grammar schools for boys, three for girls, and a higher institution for girls, numbering in all 2,275 pupils, and a school budget of 4,000 Turkish pounds. The city contained 5,500 houses and 800 shops, the country property consisted of 60,000 (Greek) acres of olive trees, of farms, etc. The inhabitants owned besides 24 oil factories using steam power and 50 using horse power, 80 tanneries, 15 soap factories, three windmills and many quarries of ochre."

"Besides, there were in the city 11 churches, 5 chapels, 72 country chapels, 4 cemeteries, 2 monasteries owning large estates, and an excellent hospital. In all, the value of both the private property and that belonging to the Greek community, amounted to ten million Turkish pounds. The annual oil production was 6,500,000 okas. The Turkish Government collected from the oil tithe alone 52,000 Turkish pounds annually. The shipping activity was proportionate. About 600 steamboats and

2,000 vessels entered the harbor of Cydonia (Aivali) every year."

One of the above mentioned reports describes the passage, through Broussa, of the unfortunate inhabitants of Cydonia, who had been deported, as follows:

"I will not attempt to depict the pitiful spectacle presented by these unfortunate persons. I can only say it was a jumble of large and small skeletons begging for pity. This group has been marching for forty-five days and is to march a good many days to come, inasmuch as it is destined to settle in Yeni-Chehir and Biledjik. They in vain implored to be allowed to stay here, if not permanently, at least for a few days in order to rest, because many of them cannot walk as a result of fatigue and hardships. Their sufferings on the way are truly incredible. Over 180 of them died on the way, their bodies being thrown into ditches; others, half-dead, were left in the middle of the road, and women, after giving birth to children, abandoned their babies and followed the other wayfarers. I had the misfortune to follow closely from the beginning all the phases of this accursed persecution, but in no case have I seen a harsher attitude on the part of the persecutors who were indeed utterly insensate. The number already here consists of 500 to 600 families, and others are coming every day; according to the information given by the latter, those that are to follow are more numerous than those who have already arrived, consisting of from ten to thirteen thousand persons. In the village of Tahtali and Yailadjik of the district of Broussa, 200 families have been already settled."

Another report states as follows:

"For some days the rumor spread that the Greeks of Cydonia, who have been deported, as have been many others from other places, are to make their homes here, while, according to another report, they are simply going through here in order that they may be settled in the

villages of Yeni-Chehir and Biledjik. The place where they are to settle is not known exactly, because the authorities take great care that the displacements of the Greeks be carried out as quietly as possible, but I was informed to-day by a Greek soldier (serving in the Turkish Army) that a good many families from Cydonia are encamped in a plain about an hour's distance from Broussa and that they begged him to notify me that those families which are on their way to Biledjik are dying from hunger and in need of speedy assistance."

"About twenty-five inhabitants of Cydonia came to me in a pitiful condition and told me their unheard of sufferings with sobs and tears. According to their narrative, the persecutions began the week before Palm Sunday; they continued the entire Holy Week and were finally intensified on Good Friday; they had been expelled in small groups and were only allowed to carry with them some clothing which they were selling on their way in order to buy bread; furthermore the gendarmes on the way had been demanding money from them. I asked them to give me information about the Bishop of Cydonia, and a woman who was a neighbor of the Bishop told me that she saw him for the last time on Good Friday in front of the Bishop's home selling his brasier to some Turks, and that he told her that he was intending to go to Magnesia, the city of his birth; I infer from this that he has been left free to select his place of residence. According to their story, the number of the deported inhabitants of Cydonia and its suburbs is from thirty-five to forty thousand; that from the time of their deportation up to to-day 120 persons of the group that has come here, have died, particularly of hunger and hardships. My informants belong to a section composed of 100 families settled in the villages of Yailadjik and Tahtali which are situated two hours distant from Broussa; they came here to ask my aid in their distress both in their own behalf and in that of the others, and

in particular to ask me for bread because many of them had not eaten for 24 hours. I immediately procured, to the best of my ability, the bread which was needed, and I took steps with the proper authorities so that they might be provided with bread cards which are absolutely necessary in order to receive bread. It seems that they will be settled in various parts of the country and many of them will be established in the surrounding villages."

CHAPTER VI

CONDITION OF THE DEPORTED PEOPLE

THE picture of the tragedy which has just been described would be imperfect, if one did not glance at the condition of those unfortunate Greeks, who, having been deported, are wandering about the mountains and plains of the interior of Anatolia, this country which is so inhospitable to them. The misfortunes which these victims of Teutonic Kultur and Turkish savagery are undergoing cannot be paralleled even in the darkest epochs. Deported, insulted, ill-treated, they are compelled to abjure their faith. Each becomes the spectator of the destruction of his neighbor and all of them together witness daily outrages committed upon their wives and daughters. They are dying of starvation every day. Who is going to give them medicine? Who will bury their dead?

This situation is pictured in a report dated July 28th and transmitted through a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 5832 (Ministerial Archives, No. 12092) which is as follows:

"In the station of Ak-Sakal we found 200 refugees from Madytos and 150 from Krithia, who, after the evacuation of Mehanion, were scattered in the grounds of the above-mentioned station without food or water. In the station of Oktsi-Ghiol we found 250 other inhabitants of Krithia and Madytos who for fifty days have lived under a burning sun and in the humidity of the night, in a desperate condition. As to the refugees of the district of Prokonnesos who have been scattered in the district of Sousourlouk and Baloukeser, neither is their number known nor the names of the villages in which

they have been settled. A large number of refugees are scattered in Baloukeser, Sousourlouk, Kepsout, Sindirli and in other Turkish villages. Many starving and half-naked women are begging for bread and money; their ragged clothing, which they are compelled to hold tightly together to prevent its slipping off from their shoulders, barely covers their skeleton bodies. I seem to see a picture of Dante's Inferno, for he, while traversing the Inferno, saw ghosts with only skin and bones. What he saw in imagination, one can actually see here. A few days ago a woman outside the station of Baloukeser died of starvation. Her little hungry children who thought that their mother was asleep, were trying to wake her up and crying and begging for bread.

"The condition of the refugees of Prokonnesos is becoming, from day to day, more horrible. Being turned out of the stables of the Turks where they store away their straw, they are now living in the open air. With tears they beg for shelter and bread, and instead of it conversion to Mohammedanism and dishonor are held out before them.

"Hunger, the heat of the sun and the dampness of the night take daily toll of these unfortunate refugees. Within the last few days 50 refugees have died at Ivrik and every day more are dying, some being buried without religious rites."

Another report from Artaki transmitted in a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 884, dated March 4, 1916 (Ministerial Archives, No. 14205) states as follows:

"The condition of the unfortunate refugees is indescribably desperate. Not having anything to sell in order to buy bread, women, old people and children, naked and barefooted, wander about the fields in order to gather grass for food. Others from morning until evening, braving the cold and damp, search along the whole shore, not excluding even the mouths of the sewers,

in order to find shellfish, mussels, clams, limpets, etc., so as to appease their hunger with them. Others less venturesome wander about the different shops, coffee-houses, saloons, and private houses, from morning until midnight, trying by their heart-rending entreaties, which would melt even a heart of stone, to procure something from some charitable person. In fact, whoever goes around in the Christian quarter after sunset can hear the pitiful and tearful voices of the orphans and others begging for charity. But notwithstanding the entreaties of the unfortunate refugees, it is doubtful if they will all succeed in thus appeasing the hunger of their unfortunate families.

"I was an eye-witness to the following incident. George Kourbetis from Gallipoli, with his wife Katherine and his 16-year-old son, not having tasted food for a week, were lying on their backs, looking up to the sky, hardly able to move even their lips and waiting, moment by moment, the most cruel of deaths, that by starvation. All means were employed to bring them to life but it did not succeed for all of them, for Katherine died on the 16th of January. The same day a woman from Madytos came and informed us in an excited manner of the death by starvation of John and Athena Hadgi-Anathasiou Dagdeleni, who left a 17-year-old daughter naked and ill.

"On January 19th, Olga Apostolou from Gallipoli, sick and weakened by starvation, having placed her unbaptized baby to her breast to suck, fainted from complete exhaustion. A woman from the vicinity, no one knows how long after, found the woman unconscious and her baby dead.

"On January 25th, Apostolos Pheidaros from Madytos, aged 60 years, died from starvation. Sofia Athanasiou, Sivri-Kiolafe, 7 years old, and Serafim Evangelou Datsos, 14 months old, met with the same fate. All this happened in Panormo where refugees are considered as

being much better off than those in the interior. If in Panormo three or four die of hunger how many, I wonder, die in the interior?"

A last report from Artaki which was transmitted in a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 884 (Ministerial Archives, No. 14205), confirmed these sad events in the following terms:

"The Greek refugees are only shadows of human beings. The strong feeling of homesickness which possesses them and which is daily expressed by the words: 'Let us go home and die there,' the hardships which they endure during the deportations, the fatigues which they undergo from long walks in their search for food and, generally, the various privations, have taken away from them every drop of vitality and has withered them completely. Recently, the consequences of the winter and the rains, the lying on the ice-cold ground where they had to sleep, for they had sold even necessary clothing, mattresses and coverlets, the excessive prices and the lack of bread, all contributed to the frightful increase in mortality through which the cemeteries were filled. The priests were tired of burying people, and the Christians refused to transport the dead any more. Therefore, the large communities have been compelled to hire four men for the transportation of the dead . . ."

CHAPTER VII

STATISTICS OF DEPORTATIONS

It has been under such harsh and cruel conditions that thousands of Greeks have been transferred from one end of the Ottoman Empire to the other. According to a rough calculation the number of those deported amounts to 240,000, as is indicated by the table of statistics shown below to which should be added those who have been deported from the interior of Asia Minor to other places, but whose deportation did not come under the controlling observation of the Greek Consular authorities. It should be noted furthermore that the crimes and persecutions continue, increasing day by day the number of victims of the Germano-Turkish savagery.

STATISTICAL TABLE OF THE DEPORTED GREEK POPULATIONS *

DISTRICT OF GALLIPOLI		DISTRICT OF BROUSSA	
Gallipoli	3,360	Sighi	1,823
Angelochori	1,885	Triglia	7,000
Kavakli	236	Eligmi	1,370
Taiphir	1,540	Arnoutkioi	210
Plaghiarion	1,900	Yenikioi	633
Pergaz	810	Mesepolis	1,265
Yenikioi	2,370	Paladari	2,333
Bahir	1,600		
Madytos	7,345		14,634
Krithia	2,320	DISTRICT OF PROPONTIS (MARMORA)	
Galatas	1,270	Prokonnesos	4,000
	24,636	Proastia	2,000

* The numbers indicate the total of the deported Greek inhabitants of each town or village.

Klazaki	250
Aphthoni	1,800
Palatia	3,000
Gallimis	1,800
Koutalis	1,800
Pasalimani	2,000
Haloni	2,100
Skoupia	2,100
Kouklia	1,300
Vorreion	1,300
	23,450

DISTRICT OF BOUYOUKDERE

Pyrgos	1,212
Bouyoukdere	1,341
Yeni-Machala	1,325
Doumoushdere	606
Avaskioi	310
Hagiasmati	482
Steni	
Nymphai	73
Saphras	412
Haghioi Pantes	95
Kephilikioi	312
Kirits-Bournou	180
Kalpha	748
	7,096

DISTRICT OF THE DARDANELLES

Dardanelles	3,300

DISTRICT OF ISMID (NICOMEDIA)

Armoutli	920
Yali-Tsiflik	1,496
Arnaoutkioi	950
Tseshair	810
	4,176

DISTRICT OF CYZIKOS

Mousadja	188
Havouzi	262
Koursouli	405
Castelli	860
Michanion	1,745
Peramos	3,500
	6,960

DISTRICT OF MYRIOPHYTOS

Yenikioi	485
Loupida	1,250
Yioldjiki	475
	2,210

DISTRICT OF KADIKIOI (CHALCEDON)

Arvanitochori	1,104

DISTRICT OF KIRKKILISSE

Skopos	6,000
Samakovon	5,000
Skepastos	3,000
Sophides	4,000
Tourlia	3,000
St. Stephano	150
	21,150

DISTRICT OF HERAKLIA

Examillion	1,260
Heraklitsa	1,250
Kesani	1,100
Ivrik-Tepe	2,256
Soultankioi	1,315
Ouzounkioprou	540
Kavadjik	445
Hidirkioi	157
Karadjali	26
Salakioi	236
Kirkioi	455
Varnitsa	159
Hadji-Yeri	1,250
Megarisi	287
Pazardere	475
Saklidere	310
Kouroudjouk	450
Beyendik	1,366
Malkotsi	500
Pharasli	502
Karabounar	450
Kasipasha	341
	15,130

DISTRICT OF DIDYMOTICHO

Lili	520
Dogandji	660
Tsiphlikioi	269
Karali	286
Yiaoup	533
Kavakli	714
Kourtikas	622
Karahamza	281
Tsali	389
Yenikioi	592
Eskikioi	700
	5,566

DISTRICT OF SMYRNA

Ano and Kato Demirdjili	6,000
Transa and Tsesner	5,000
Sevdikioi	3,500
Demirdjik	570
	15,070

DISTRICT OF CYDONIA (AIVALI)

Cydonia (with the refugees from Moschonisi, Yenitsarochori, etc.)	40,000

DISTRICT OF TREBIZOND

Sixteen villages from the District of Vazelon	6,000

DISTRICT OF KERASOUNDA

The number of the deported Greeks up to January, 1917, is 22,356. The following is the list of the villages evacuated up to that time:

SUB-DISTRICT OF TRIPOLI

Tripoli	3,000
Aslanik	179
Agalik-Maden	279
Gozokai	460
Erseil-Maden	660
Kara-Erik	472
Kara-Kaya	157
Kepeklisa	1,035
Kizil-Kaya	274
Kirlik-Maden	255
Kara-Kiounei	227
Monastiri	273
Lahana-Maden	810
Livadia	290
Liamlatino	160
Neochori	620
Nial	340
Armenochori	253
Omalochori	550
Palhan	180
Papakli	650
Peledjik	205
Rakan	292
Sak-Halva	270
Soukouk-Dama	270
Tienem-Roum	174
Tsakaras	1,650
Tselali (Mexen)	450
Tsimahanton	180
Koure-Peli	301

SUB-DISTRICT OF KERASOUNDA

Tsal	2,000
Yolagaz	850
Kassiopi	330
Koush-Kaya	790
Saraidjouk	340

SUB-DISTRICT OF KIORELE

Elevi	800
Satou-Maden	580

SUB-DISTRICT OF KIOVELE

Eseli-Maden	1,750
	22,356

DISTRICT OF SAMSOUN

The number of the deported Greeks up to February, 1917, was 30,000. All the Greek villages on the seacoast up to Aladjan have been evacuated. These villages are as follows:

Assar-Agatz
Kelkaya
Devkeris
Oxie
Tsirahman
Toighar
Kovtse-Bounar
Korkenliyatak
Alankioi
Kertme
Karakioi
Peklik
Kavadouz
Enghiz
Yiagpasha
Phoundoudjak
Phouroundzoglou
Ghiaglakeris
Tekne-Bounar
Karapetsin
Tsimeli
Kavadjik
Tsinaragli
Andreaton
Kato-Tsinik
Kiziloglan
Kapa-Tsokour
Sokou-Tsokour
Kitsilar
Yiagla
Sihlim
Outz-Bounar
Kapou-Kayia
Kizil-Ot
Ano-Tsinik
Ziganton
Kohtse
Trapezanli
Tsiflik
Kouloutsa-Poylan
Taphlankioi
Kodjadag
Kishla
Sari-Yourt
Kesili
Kizil-Ghiol
Kerpisli
Kestene-Aivan
Tsal
Tankarlou
Siamlaton
Tsamalan
Tsimeli
Yel-Kirigni
Kazandjaton
Seitanaton
Kaman
Bayirkioi
Karatouzla
Touzeren
Ot-Kaya
Alexi-Demirdji
Agtsalan
Yiar-Alti
Kirezli
Asmadjan

Ot-Massia
Aladjan
Tsartak-Keris
Kourtalan
Avloudja
Kodjalan
Taptivek
Kourouk-Kodje
Deirmen-Kiounei
Kestene-Saivan
Kaya-Kiounei
Tsevis-Tepe
Touzkioi
Sougouk-Bounar
Kelogloulari
Kelousaghi
Ali-Bey
Tsinaraglou
Tekekioi
Yielitse
Ada-Tepe
Karatoulou
Bagadjak
Dar-Bogaz
Karadja-Kishla
Kal-Pelen
Tsourlar
Pire-Yourt
Oldjekler
Karabounar
Kouzalan
Constanti-Oushaghi
Kosetik
Yirmen-Oushaghi

Yilan-Oren

APPENDIX A

A confidential letter of the Turkish Government to the Governor of Smyrna.*

May 14th, 1914.

To the Governor of Smyrna:

The subject Greeks who constitute the majority of the inhabitants of your district, are taking advantage of the present circumstances to provoke a revolutionary movement, conducive to an intervention of the Great Powers.

The Ottoman Greeks who live along the coast of the Vilayet of Smyrna are working day and night in order to succeed in the attainment of their "Grand Idea." There can therefore be no doubt that the existence of Ottoman Greeks in the Turkish Empire thus imbued with revolutionary ideas is fatal to the state, from the political and administrative point of view.

It is imperative for political reasons that the Greeks dwelling along the coast of Asia Minor be compelled to evacuate their villages in order to settle in the Vilayet of Erzerum and Chaldea. If they refuse to emigrate to the places assigned to them, you should issue verbal instructions to our Mussulman brothers so that they may, by all kinds of excesses, compel the Greeks to leave their homes of their own accord.

Do not in this case forget to obtain from these emigrants declarations to the effect that they are leaving their hearths and homes of their own free will, so that no political complications may later result therefrom.

The Chief of the Bureau of Correspondence,
Ali Riza.

The Minister of the Interior,
Talaat Bey.†

The Director of the Ministry of the Interior,
Ibrahim Hilmi.

* From *Le Temps*, July 20, 1916.
† The present Prime Minister of Turkey.

APPENDIX B

The following cablegram has been received by the Greek Legation at Washington from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece.

Athens, May 13th, 1918.

Many officers and soldiers of the Turkish army who have been captured by the Allies and have arrived at Saloniki, upon being questioned, have told of the destruction of Hellenism in Turkey, begging that their names be not revealed for fear of reprisals on the part of the Turks against their families. They declare in particular that Hellenism in Turkey has been dealt the most terrific blow that it has ever received since 1453. Three means have been used, general mobilization, requisitions and deportations.

Up to the end of 1917 more than 200,000 Greeks between 15 and 48 years of age were mobilized. Large numbers of these have succumbed to maltreatment, famine, exposure and epidemics.

The Hellenic populations that have been compelled to leave their homes in Thrace and Asia Minor number more than 1,500,000. With the exception of the Greek populations of Constantinople, Smyrna and some other cities, all the Greeks of Turkey are suffering martyrdom through deportations, outrages on women and starvation.

Half of the deported populations have perished in consequence of ill-treatment, disease and famine. Many have committed suicide or have been massacred in the interior of Asia Minor. Those that remain are subjected to continual martyrdom as slaves or are forced to become Mohammedans. Turkish functionaries and officers declare that no Christian shall be left alive in Turkey unless he embraces Mohammedanism.

A Greek doctor has been compelled, under threat of death, to circumcise 40 Greek soldiers who had turned Mohammedans in order to save their families. The confiscated fortunes of the deported Greeks surpass in value five billion francs.

Officers have met in the provinces of Romia and Mosul prominent Greeks from Aivali that were formerly millionaires working

in rags on the roads and begging for food. "Smyrna," so an officer says, "is melting like a candle." Forty or fifty deaths occur every day among the Greeks in consequence of exhaustion and disease. The Turks have deported 200 families from Tatavla in Constantinople. The streets of the large cities are lined with Greek orphans begging a living, in spite of the fact that the authorities are gathering them in Turkish schools in order to make them Mohammedans. Under these circumstances, the enslaved Greeks look toward the Allies and Venizelos as their only hope. The officers mentioned above affirm that up to the 17th of March, 1915, Turkey, busied by her operations in the Caucasus, had left the protection of the Dardanelles to the 158th regiment alone. One battalion of this was stationed at Koum-Kale, another at Erenkioi and a third at Dardanelles. It was only on the 17th of March that a third division, hastily formed from troops of the garrisons of Constantinople and Adrianople, arrived.

The return of Venizelos to power in August, 1915, disturbed the Turks so much that on the 10th of September the Turkish Government ordered the Vali of Broussa to put a stop to the deportation of the Greek populations of Ghemlek and the country around it. The second retirement of Venizelos from office and the condemnation of Greece to a policy of inaction emboldened the Germano-Turks anew and they gave themselves up with fervor to the extermination of the enslaved Greeks. The national movement for union in Greece under the leadership of Venizelos has filled the martyred slaves with joy and hope, while it has inspired terror in the Turks who, realizing the disintegration of their army, feared the intervention of Greece.

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The American-Hellenic Society is organized for the general purpose of extending and encouraging among the citizens of the United States of America an interest in the cultural and political relations between the United States and Greece; and in particular to promote educational relationships, including the establishment of exchange professorships in the Universities of the United States and Greece, as a means to diffuse knowledge of the literature and political institutions of the United States throughout Greece, and to encourage in America the study of the ancient and modern Hellenic language and literature; and further to defend the just claims of Greece in particular and of Hellenism in general.

HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR

BY

DR. KARL DIETERICH

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph.D.
The College of the City of New York

With an introductory preface by Theodore P. Ion, D.C.L., and a brief article on Hellenic Pontus by D. H. Oeconomides, Ph.D.

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A SURVEY OF HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR

Asia Minor is the country which, more than all others, recalls the highest development of Hellenic civilization. Its deeply indented coast formed a chaplet of Hellenic democracies which reached out into the interior and actually attacked the Persian civilization, upon which they imposed their own stamp. These democracies constituted the first rampart of the civilized world of that time, holding back Persian barbarism. Their history is one of continual struggle between these two civilizations, a struggle that was terminated at Salamis and at Platæa, where the Persian ambitions were definitively buried and Greek civilization saved.

The wise men, the thinkers, the philosophers, that these democracies produced, were numerous, and the influence of their teachings was very great. These even today are radiant with a sublimity that has never been excelled.

It was in this Greek element and among the populations Hellenized by them that Christianity first germinated. It was the Greeks of Asia Minor who first offered their blood for the triumph of the new faith. The foremost Church Fathers, John Chrysostom, Saint Basil and very many others, were born there or taught there.

Throughout the Middle Ages the Byzantine-Greek civilization flourished in these lands. It formed the most powerful barrier against the wave of barbarism which threatened to inundate the civilized world. The desperate resistance offered by Hellenism permitted the West, by its contact with Byzantine Hellenism, to acquire those requisite elements which have formed the basis of Western civilization.

When the powerful tide of Turkish invasion, coming after so many other barbarian inroads, completely submerged Greek culture there, the Hellenic idea which this element represented was so strong that it survived everything. It was in vain that the fierce conquerors, as the tradition states, cut out the tongues of the inhabitants in order to cause this people to unlearn its language; it was in vain that they carried away their children to make of them fierce and cruel janissaries, who became exterminators of their own people. The Hellenic idea, the attachment to national traditions, was never submerged.

As soon as the fury of the conqueror was somewhat appeased, and at a time when that part of the Balkan Peninsula where Hellenism first arose and from which later it radiated over the then known world all the brilliance of its beauty was no longer showing any sign of life, the Greeks of Asia Minor founded the first Greek school of modern times, that of Cydonia (Aïvali). This school produced the first real ecclesiastics, the first genuinely educated men. Smyrna, called by the Turk himself "the infidel city," because of its preponderant Greek element, followed her example. The graduates of these schools formed the nucleus from which the idea of the Greek renaissance sprang forth. From this source have come the men that have sacrificed their lives and their fortunes in order that Hellenic culture, which seemed forever to have disappeared, might again be revived.

It is this country of which we are going to study the ethnological composition.

Its boundaries are, on the north, the Black Sea; on the east, the Russian frontier traversing the snow-covered mountain range of the Taurus and Antitaurus and continuing to the Gulf of Alexandretta; on the south, west and northwest, the Mediterranean, the Ægean Sea and the Sea of Marmora.

Its area is 534,550 square kilometers; it is traversed

by numerous watercourses and is one of the richest countries in the world. If well administered, it could support tens of millions of inhabitants.

It is divided for purposes of administration into eight provinces, Sebastia, Trebizond, Kastamuni, Konia, Angora, Aïdin, Broussa, Adana and four independent provinces, Chryssioupolis, Nicomedia, Balukiser, Vizi or Dardanelles.

To determine the importance of the Greek element in the population let us examine each archbishopric from the ecclesiastic as well as secular point of view.

The following table presents statistics as to the numbers of churches, priests, schools, etc., supported by the Greeks of Asia Minor:

Metropolis	Churches	Priests	Boys' Schools	Teachers	Pupils	Girls' Schools	Women Teachers	Pupils
1. Smyrna	40	114	35	241	11,055	27	202	7,651
2. Crine	46	75	34	65	3,965	14	32	2,055
3. Heliopolis	53	77	41	100	4,360	19	49	2,120
4. Pisidia	46	54	18	53	2,685	10	31	1,235
5. Philadelphia	20	22	15	26	1,060	8	16	723
6. Ephesus / Magnesia / 7. Cydonia	126	177	100	286	15,940	65	150	10,150
8. Broussa	24	27	13	40	2,975	7	20	1,045
9. Nicæa	29	41	23	63	3,155	8	25	1,210
10. Chalcedon	43	100	28	99	6,970	25	70	4,230
11. Nicomedia	76	75	77	83	3,479	6	20	1,120
12. Cyzicus	81	128	72	195	8,115	25	67	2,630
13. Proconnesos	26	33	13	48	2,280	8	19	790
14. Amassia	330	441	286	586	17,000	69	87	3,910
15. Ancyra	8	13	5	20	840	2	7	260
16. Iconium	50	102	42	159	6,915	23	50	2,070
17. Cæsarea	44	98	58	133	5,075	16	49	1,778
18. Rhodopolis	65	86	57	120	3,300			
19. Chaldia	211	259	189	380	9,705	2	5	160
20. Trapezus	250	161	95	203	8,535	11	35	1,679
21. Colonia	120	140	93	182	3,840			
22. Neocæsarea	300	400	150	300	11,300	15	36	2,100
	1,988	2,523	1,444	3,382	132,549	360	970	46,916

The administration of the Greek Orthodox Church is in the hands of twenty-two Metropolitans, or Arch-

bishops, having under them a proportionate number of bishops and priests. The Metropoles, or Archbishoprics, are the following: Smyrna, Crine, Heliopolis, Pisidia, Philadelphia, Ephesus and Magnesia, Cydonia, Broussa, Nicæa, Chalcedon, Nicomedia, Cyzicus, Proconnesos, Amassia, Ancyra, Iconium, Cæsarea, Rhodopolis, Chaldia, Trapezus, Colonia and Neocæsarea, under the authority of the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.*

The number of Greek inhabitants is probably above 2,000,000. The Hellenic populations are chiefly concentrated in the provinces of Aïdin and Broussa, where out of a population of approximately 3,000,000 the Greek element is about 1,300,000, the coast regions, however, being inhabited almost purely by Greeks. The non-Greek inhabitants are largely Catholics, Armenians, Turks and Jews. On the coasts of the Black Sea, too, the Greeks are largely in the majority. It is to be noticed that in many villages of this region the inhabitants speak a language closely approaching the ancient Greek, from the point of view of syntax as well as of verb-formation.

For their religious needs they have 1,988 churches and 2,523 priests, and for the instruction of their children they maintain 1,444 schools for boys with 3,382 teachers and 132,549 pupils, and 360 schools for girls with 970 women teachers and 46,916 pupils.

We must remember that the churches and schools are maintained at the expense of the Greeks themselves, since the Turkish Government only intervenes in order to impede and destroy. Reckoning at $500 a year the pay of a priest or teacher, man or woman, we arrive at the sum of $5,000,000 a year, which must be multiplied by three in order to cover the expenses of the construction of churches and schools, their repair and

* The Metropolis of Tarsus and Adana, although it is, geographically, in Asia Minor, falls under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch and is therefore omitted here.

upkeep, and the salaries of the inferior employees of all these establishments.

The number of pupils of both sexes constitutes nearly nine per cent of the whole Greek population (179,465 boys and girls). This is due to the fact that many of the Greeks, not included in the preceding enumeration, who live mingled with other populations, whether Armenian or Turk, and who do not possess the means of supporting schools of their own, send their children from great distances, in spite of the difficult communications, in order to attend these schools. Often the parents, who have lived for generations among the Turks, have lost the knowledge of their national language, but their national consciousness is nevertheless so strong that they expose their children to countless dangers in order to permit them to learn the language of their ancestors. These Turkish-speaking Greeks live chiefly in the interior of the country, even as far as the Persian frontier, and the greater part of these, lost among other more numerous peoples, are not included in the above statistics.

These numbers show that the people are loyally devoted to their language, their traditions and their religion, for the tremendous sacrifices to which they subject themselves for the sake of the maintenance of Hellenic culture evidence the tenacity with which they cling to their national sentiments.

They show equally that this people is eager for progress in civilization, for the number of educational establishments that it maintains and the large number of children that attend them, show that it wishes to acquire a higher civilization and thus become an agent of progress for the peoples whom the fate of conquest has established among them.

Sober, industrious, intelligent and honest, it demands only liberty in order to be able to give scope to its activity. Though conquered by the Turk, the Greek,

in his turn, won the upper hand by his intellectual superiority. The Turk, who has become accustomed to the Greek way of living and thinking, and has adopted many of his habits, among the most prominent of which is the respect for woman and the sanctity of the home, will be happy to live under the administration of his Greek compatriot, with whom he was perfectly satisfied when the Turkish Government, before the chauvinistic Young Turk party had established its fierce tyranny, renounced the services of the Greek functionaries.

An interesting side of this dwelling together of Greek and Turk is the respect that the Anatolian Turk habitually professes for the Orthodox religion. Sometimes the Mussulman even has recourse to the offices of the Greek priest, either to have a mass chanted, or in order to touch the holy sacraments, the saints' pictures, etc., so as to be cured of some illness, or to obtain some benefit which his ascetic religion does not afford him.

If the Turkish Government by its misrule had not provoked the driving out of the Mussulman populations of Europe (a course which has gradually reduced the territory of the Ottoman Empire), the uprisings experienced periodically would not have been so frequent. These numerous fanatics who had lived since the time of the conquest by exploiting the Christian populations, transported their methods to Asia Minor, and, seconded by a government whose materialism knew no limits, they undertook the extermination of the Christian populations of Asia Minor in order to rob them of their property.

When one realizes that, under an administration which existed only to mulct the worker by taxation, these populations have succeeded, in spite of numberless persecutions, in making so formidable an effort in order to secure their spiritual needs, it is easy to imagine what progress in civilization and wealth awaits this

country, when an era of liberty and security shall be introduced under a paternal administration.

The Anatolian Mussulmans will be the first to profit by this. Patient workers, loving the land, and living in harmony with their Christian compatriots, they will be happy to secure the product of their labor, of which the Turkish functionary constantly robbed them, so that he finally made them dislike all labor, and urged them on into the path of crime.

This living together as friends, on a footing of equality, will perhaps make Christianity flourish anew in this land which was the first to be saved from paganism, and whose fruits, transplanted to the rest of the world, have caused the springing forth of that glorious civilization which Prussian megalomania is now staining with blood.

II. HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR

By KARL DIETERICH

Translated from the German
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PREFACE

By THEODORE P. ION, D.C.L.

THE German dream of dominion from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf has naturally attracted the attention of the world to Asia Minor, a country which has been for centuries in a dormant condition on account of its subjection to a moribund state. Conquered and reconquered by Asiatic hordes, its wealth ravaged and pillaged many and many times, its cities, towns and villages razed to the ground more than once, and its inhabitants having been subjected again and again to massacres *en masse,* Asia Minor has been and will naturally continue to be the reservoir, so to speak, of European civilization for the Great East.

From ancient times the rays of civilization which shone on this peninsula were not Asiatic but European, that is Hellenic, the civilizing influences of the language of Homer and Plato having been kept alive even during the rule of the Mohammedan Arabs.

As is well known, the Arabian Caliphs of Bagdad were always surrounded by Hellenists and considered the books of the Greek sages more valuable than gold.*

* See authorities for these statements in an essay by the present writer, published in the *Michigan Law Review,* vol. VI., 1907-1908, pp. 50-52, and entitled, "Roman Law and Mohammedan Jurisprudence," Part I.

Hence came the great impetus given to Arabian philosophy and positive science through the translation of the writings of the Greeks, which were subsequently transplanted to Europe by the Moors even before the time of the renaissance.

The darkest epoch of Asia Minor began undoubtedly with the advent of the followers of Osman, who, ever since their irruption into that country, have wrought havoc among its people, and within a comparatively short space of time have reduced that fair land to barbarity and desolation. The ancient seats of learning, the theaters, the stadia, the treasures of art and other tokens of Hellenic civilization are now nothing but heaps of ruins, inarticulate witnesses to the ancient glory of Hellenism.

It is a remarkable phenomenon that beneath these smoldering ruins civilization was not entirely destroyed, for in spite of the slowly burning fire Hellenism continued to exist, and toward the close of the 18th century began to show clear signs of that vitality and vigor which blossomed forth so quickly in the following century, and, in our own time, have produced such far-reaching results.

Hence the apprehension shown by the Turkish conquerors during the tyrannical régime of Abdul Hamid. Hence the great efforts made by that potentate to bring from the confines of Russia Mohammedan hordes such as Circassians and other unruly tribes and freebooters in order that they might roam about or settle there according to their fancy, with the view to offsetting the ever-increasing Greek population of Asia Minor. Hence the inrush to that country of Mohammedan emigrants from the territories which have been wrested from the Turk ever since the events of 1878, it being immaterial whether these Mussulman fanatics gave themselves to robbery, murder and massacres of the Christians in the land, or settled there in order to de-

velop the great possibilities of agriculture in the country.

The diplomacy of Europe, having been satisfied with the platitudes embodied in the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 as to the introduction of reforms by the Sublime Porte, both in its European and Asiatic provinces, has let things take their natural course, the first outcome being the Armenian horrors of the Hamidian era, which were continued under the "constitutional régime of the Young Turks" and culminated in the scientific extermination, by starvation, of that highly gifted Armenian nation, carried out under the high patronage and guidance of the Germano-Turanians, whose diabolical activities during the present world war have overwhelmed in a like catastrophe the Hellenic population of the Ottoman Empire and particularly of Asia Minor.*

From the time that the present German emperor resolved to make the Near and perhaps the Far East the great market for Teutonic trade, German scientists of all kinds have been dispatched to Asia Minor to study the country from every point of view, so that the German Government may, at the opportune moment, be ready to seize the "golden fleece."

As a result there have appeared various essays dealing with Asia Minor from different points of view, and in particular the one with which we are here concerned, by Dr. Karl Dieterich, forming the principal part of the present publication of the American-Hellenic Society.†

* See Publication No. 3 of the American-Hellenic Society, entitled *Persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey since the Beginning of the European War*, June, 1918.

† The present writer, in carrying on researches dealing with Asia Minor, came upon Dr. Dieterich's study, and, after reading it, thought that it would be better to publish this essay than to write a new one, inasmuch as he noticed that, with the exception of a few observations which were to be expected from a German writer, the author gives, on the whole, an accurate and impartial account of the condition of things in Asia Minor, and does not seem to share the views of many of the civil and military officials of Germany, who consider that the existence of the Hellenic element there is detrimental to the interests of Deutschtum. It seemed, therefore, that no better testimony could be found than that adduced by a subject of Kaiser Wilhelm on the material and intellectual strength of Hellenism in Asia Minor, which is the latest bugbear of the Teutons and the target of Turkish cruelty.

It is worth noticing that the German essayist describes in a vivid manner the vitality and the potentialities of the Hellenic population of Asia Minor, and, unlike the ruling class of Germany and many of his compatriots, he speaks favorably of the Greek populations of Anatolia.

Dr. Dieterich, referring to the persecution of the Greeks, says erroneously that these "systematic persecutions," as he admits them to be, began with the spring of 1914 (see p. 19), while, as a matter of fact, they commenced on the very day that the Young Turks consolidated their power (1908-1909), when, in spite of their much heralded formula of "equality, justice and fraternity," they designed and instituted a well-organized method for the annihilation of the Christian populations, the Adana massacres of the Armenians in April, 1909, being the precursors of all the subsequent horrors.

Nor did these would-be "reformers," or "constitutionalists," conceal their plans for the Turkification of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, for they openly resorted either to forced conversions to Mohammedanism or to the annihilation of those who seemed unlikely to submit to be "Ottomanized." Thus, as early as September, 1908, one of the moving spirits of the Committee of Union and Progress, namely, Dr. Nazim, during his visit to Smyrna, at a social gathering held in the house of a British subject, spoke freely about this matter.*

The Young Turks having thus initiated, under the very eyes of Europe, a systematic extermination of the Armenians,—whom the bloody hand of Abdul Hamid had not completely destroyed,—turned their attention to the "more dangerous Greeks."

It was this plan for the destruction of the Christian

* See an account of this interview in a Greek pamphlet entitled *How Germany Destroyed Hellenism in Turkey*, by G. Mikrasianou, 1916, and particularly the confidential letter of the Turkish Minister of the Interior, Talaat Bey (now Prime Minister), dated May 14, 1914, to the Governor of Smyrna, reproduced in *Le Temps* of July 20, 1916, and the English translation of it in Publication No. 3 of the American-Hellenic Society, p. 70.

nations that, in 1912, brought together the Balkan States, who saw that under the new régime in Turkey the peoples of these various nationalities would gradually be annihilated, if they did not take some preventive steps. The result was the war of these States against Turkey, the complete defeat of the latter and the freeing from the Turkish yoke of hundreds of thousands of people. As a further consequence of this war, there began on the part of Turkey a wholesale expulsion of the Greek population from the coast of Asia Minor simply because the neighboring islands of the Ægean had been incorporated with the Greek Kingdom. Up to the declaration of the present world war hundreds of thousands of Greeks were expelled from Turkey, having been, at the same time, deprived by the Turks of all their movable and immovable property. All these unfortunate people took refuge in Greece and gave no little embarrassment to the Greek Government.*

It is therefore incorrect to say, as the German writer alleges, that the persecutions of the Greeks began with the outbreak of the present war (p. 19).

The difference, however, between the *ante-bellum* persecutions and those perpetrated subsequently is this, that while in the former cases the Greeks were expelled from their native country and were deprived only of their wealth and their property generally, in the latter not only were they compelled to abandon everything they owned, but they also perished through untold hardships and starvation. (See details about the tragical condition of the Greeks in Publication No. 3 of the American-Hellenic Society cited above.)

Nor did the Turks in carrying out this cruel work care whether Greece was friendly or unfriendly to Turkey. As a matter of fact, these persecutions were in full swing during the "régime of Constantine" (see dates

* Supplement to the Greek White Book, entitled *Ministère des Affaires Étrangers, Documents Diplomatiques, Supplément,* 1913-1917, Nos. 1 and 4.

in *Persecutions of the Greeks,* etc.) when that potentate was in close relationship not only with the Germans, but also with the Bulgarians and the Turks, and consequently the persecutions of the Greeks had nothing to do with the alleged projected territorial compensations to Greece; besides, Turkey was assured by Germany that Constantine, who then had the upper hand in Greece, would under no circumstances attack Turkey.

Therefore it is not correct to say, as the German writer asserts, that one of the reasons for these persecutions was the promise made to Greece by the Entente Powers in 1915 of territorial concessions in Asia Minor (see p. 19).

An indication that even such an evidently impartial writer as Dr. Dieterich cannot divest himself of the German point of view is his statement that in the struggle for life the Greeks were on the offensive, while the Turks were on the defensive (see p. 19). This, in plain words, means that it suffices for a nation to be intelligent, active, frugal, moral (as he too acknowledges the Greeks to be, p. 50), in order to acquire the odium of carrying on an offensive struggle if another nation living side by side with it happens to be stupid, fatalist, immoral and incapable of holding its ground in the struggle for life.

The writer's theory of the existence of a Greek propaganda in Asia Minor, " forwarded by every possible means," is a gratuitous supposition. Dr. Dieterich evidently misunderstands the conditions in which the Greek populations have been living in Asia Minor and trying to promote or revive their national ideals. As a matter of fact, all the existing Greek schools in Asia Minor,—which is also the case with the Greek educational institutions in every part of Turkey,—have been established and supported by the Greek communities themselves, and if, at times, they have received outside financial aid, this was due to the generosity of

persons who were natives of the country, who had emigrated to foreign lands and acquired wealth abroad. The many names of these benefactors appearing on the Greek school buildings attest the accuracy of this statement.* Therefore the allegation of the writer that a Greek propaganda is carried out in Asia Minor is totally incorrect.

Another supposition of the German author that the Greeks of Anatolia intermarried with the "Seljuk Conquerors" is not a historical fact. On the contrary, judging from the general character of the people and their attachment to the Christian religion, it is certain that the Greeks did not intermarry with the Seljuks, since they invaded Asia Minor after their conversion to Mohammedanism.

That many Greeks, abandoning the faith of their forefathers, embraced Mohammedanism, is an incontrovertible and historical fact, but that Turks or other adherents of Islam could not become Christians and consequently could not intermarry with the Greeks is also a truism. For, according to Mohammedan Law, a "true believer" who abandons Islam is liable to be put to death. Therefore, although many Greeks by becoming Mohammedans lost their nationality, no Turks or other Mussulmans could become Christians and, consequently, Greeks. That has been the strongest shield of Hellenism for the preservation of the Greek nationality.

In the same way his allegation that, as the language of the Greeks in the interior of Asia Minor was Turkish, they "did not share in the national and racial consciousness of their kinsmen on the coast" (p. 52) is equally erroneous. Anyone who has lived in that country and intermingled with these people could not have

* Oftentimes the name of the school embodies that of the donor, as, *e.g.*, Marasleion, Zographeion, Theologeion are named from Marasles, Zographos and Theologos.

helped noticing their intense patriotic spirit and their attachment to Greek ideals, the best evidence of these being the creation of schools for the study of the language of their forefathers, namely Greek. Nor is the other statement of this writer that the Greeks "succeeded in introducing the Greek language in their schools alongside of the Turkish" correct, because, as a matter of fact, these schools were established for the study of the Greek and not the Turkish language, the latter tongue being taught as a foreign language, occupying the same place in the curriculum of the Greek schools as foreign languages hold in European or American schools.

The observation of the author that Germany will have to come to terms with the Greek peasant of Asia Minor, because "he is on a higher moral plane," is worthy of especial notice, and his further remark that "it would be just as perverse as it would be foolish to depend on the Turk to the exclusion of the Greek, who has the controlling hand in trade and traffic, as well as in the cultivation of the soil" (p. 50), confirms the favorable opinion of both German and other writers and travelers as to the vitality of the Hellenic element of Asia Minor.

Thus, a distinguished French geographer,—whose statistics, however, on the populations of Asia Minor are not accurate, since they are presumably based principally on Turkish sources,—referring to the Greeks of the Province of Smyrna, says that "among all the Christian communities of the Province of Smyrna that of the Orthodox Greeks is the most considerable and that it is, in a general way, better educated and more prosperous. It is among them,—apart from the merchants who are best fitted for handling large enterprises,—that are found the most clever mechanics, often excelling in their various callings, and the best agriculturists, their well-known characteristics

being industry and activity." (See Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie, Géographie Administrative,* etc., vol. III., p. 355.)

So, too, the famous English historian of the Crimean War, Kinglake, writing in 1845, refers to Smyrna, which the Turks call, as he says, "infidel Smyrna," in the following terms: "I think that Smyrna may be called the chief town and capital of the Grecian race. For myself, I love the race, in spite of all their vices." * (See *Eothen, or Traces of Travel brought Home from the East,* by Alexander William Kinglake, p. 41, ed. 1876).

Another English traveler, who made the tour of Asia Minor on foot, describing the American College in the city of Marsovan and referring to the Greek students there, says: "Like all Greeks, whether of Europe or of Asia, they have a quality which always compels interest. In general intelligence, in quickness of perception, in the power of acquiring knowledge, they are said, as a race, to have no equals among their fellow-students—nor in their capacity for opposing each other and making mountains of difference out of nothing. Watching them, it grows upon the observer that traditional Greek characteristics have survived strongly in the race, and that Asia Minor Greeks of today are probably not different from the Greeks of twenty centuries ago." (See W. J. Childs, *Across Asia Minor on Foot,* p. 55, 1917.)

An English general, who during the administration of Lord Beaconsfield was sent to Asia Minor on a special mission after the conclusion of the Cyprus Convention of 1878, after referring to some of the well-

* A much earlier and well-known English traveler calls Smyrna "the lovely, the crown of Ionia, the ornament of Asia." (See *Travels in Asia Minor and Greece,* by Richard Chandler, ed. N. Revett, vol. I., p. 73, ed. 1825.)

known characteristics of the Greeks of Anatolia as an enterprising, keen-witted people, well gifted with a rare commercial instinct, goes on to say:

"Profuse expenditure on education is a national characteristic, and to acquire a sufficient fortune to found a school or hospital in his native town is the honorable ambition of every Greek merchant. . . . The Anatolian Greeks generally are active and intelligent, laborious and devoted to commercial pursuits. They learn quickly and well, and become doctors, lawyers, bankers, innkeepers, etc., filling most of the professions. They are good miners and masons, and villages are generally found near old lead and copper mines. They have much of the versatility, the love of adventure and intrigue, which distinguished the ancient Greeks, and a certain restlessness in their commercial speculations which sometimes leads to disaster. The democratic feeling is strong; the sole aristocracy is that of wealth, and ancient lineage confers no distinction. The children of rich and poor go to the same schools and receive the same free education" (Sir Charles W. Wilson, *Murray's Hand-book for Travellers in Asia Minor,* 1905, pp. 70-71).

A brilliant French Hellenist and scholar, in referring to the Greeks of Smyrna, gives the following picturesque description of them. "They are," he says, "so numerous in that city, that they consider it as part of their domain. Wide-awake, lively, playfully sly and always interesting, they are here the tavern-keepers, the grocers, the boatmen. These are the three trades that most of the Greeks of the poor class prefer, just as the profession of lawyer and that of physician are particularly popular among the Greeks of the well-to-do class. As tavern-keepers they talk all day long; they keep up with the news, they discuss politics, they run down the Turks, they are always stirring, bustling and struggling, in their way, for the 'grand idea.'"

"As grocers they sell a little of everything. They do business as money changers, an infinite happiness for a Hellene. As boatmen they have the sea, this old friend of the descendants of Ulysses, as their constant companion; they go right and left in the hustling of the port, they see new faces; they question the travelers who come from afar; they dispute with them about the boat-fare, which is yet another rare pleasure for the Greeks. An amusing race, sympathetic, on the whole, notwithstanding its faults; patriotic, persistent, sober, mildly obstinate in its indomitable hope."

"Because of their constant activity and their wit, the Greeks have supplanted the Turks in many places in Turkey." *

The vivid description of Hellenism in Asia Minor given by the German author, and corroborated by numerous other writers and travelers, shows the important rôle that the Hellenic element is destined to play if that unfortunate country is ever favored with the blessings of good government.

The Hellenic State should undoubtedly be the natural inheritor or at any rate the executor of the estate of the Sick Man of the East; if not of all of Asia Minor, at any rate of a great part of it, *i.e.*, western Anatolia. But if the Ottoman sway in Anatolia is prolonged, it is to be hoped that the country will, at least, be under the joint tutelage of some civilized states which will take into consideration the wishes and aspirations of the Hellenic people.

* See Gaston Deschamps, *Sur les routes d'Asie*, 1894, p. 152.

HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR*

By KARL DIETERICH,

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THE political unrest in the Near East which preceded the present world war and accompanied its beginnings has turned attention once more to the existence of the Greek element in the population of Asia Minor. Two factors in particular have entered into this feeling of unrest: first, the systematic persecutions of the Greeks by the Young Turks, which have been going on ever since the spring of 1914, and secondly, the recent communications in the press dealing with alleged promises on the part of the Triple Entente to indemnify Greece through extensive territorial concessions in Asia Minor—the talk was of an extent of 100,000 to 120,000 sq. km.—in order to repay her for her intervention in the war. However one may feel as to both these points and their justification, this much is clear, that the Turks believed that they were in the presence of a Greek peril.†

There was thus started, in Asia Minor, a defensive struggle on the part of the Turks that was just as sharply defined as the offensive which this Greek element had for a long time been actually carrying on against the Turks of this region; with this difference, however, that the Turkish defensive has only recently acquired sufficient strength to make its action felt, while

* Das Griechentum Kleinasiens, von Dr. Karl Dieterich, in *Länder und Völker der Turkei* (Schriften des Deutschen Vorderasienkomitees, herausgegeben von Dr. jur. et phil. Hugo Grothe, Leipzig, 1915).

† A political treatment of the "Greek Question" was presented in a pamphlet of the Vorderasienkomitee, under the title, *Die asiatische Turkei und die deutschen Interessen,* Leipzig, 1913, S. 23-26.

the Greek offensive has for decades been quietly at work getting the upper hand economically, culturally and nationally in that land where they once ruled for a period of more than a thousand years. Granted that the Greek propaganda, which has, for a considerable time, been forwarded in Asia Minor by every possible means, has in many particulars been carried on too bitterly, and has injured the sensibilities of the Ottomans, the fact remains that the Greeks in Asia Minor economically and culturally have control of Asia Minor even now, not as an outside or foreign element in the population, though the movement has been forwarded from the outside, but as something that has developed from within on the very soil of the country itself, something that has in centuries of growth become a historic fact and that is only to be understood when one has fully grasped what has gone before.

To do this one must go back into times which are long since past, though their resultant forces, far from having ceased to operate, seem just now, as a matter of fact, to be renewing their strength.

Asia Minor was in prehistoric times a field for Greek colonization. Long after its littoral had, in early Hellenic times (dating back, in fact, to the 10th century B.C.), been bordered with a fringe of Greek settlements, which were the basis of the old Ionic and Æolic civilizations, this coast colonization had, in later Greek times, been extended and developed through the victorious eastern expeditions of Alexander the Great into a real colonization of the interior.

Just as had been the case in the whole of the western regions of Asia Minor, there arose in the 4th to 2nd centuries B.C., in the interior of the country as well, a whole series of new Greek cities, which from that time on have constituted firmly fixed centers for the Hellenizing and civilizing of the land. This began with Byzantine and Turkish times and has extended up to

the present, forming a sure testimony to the stubborn endurance of this late Greek civilization. One needs only to think of towns like Nicæa, Nicomedia, Prusa, Pergamon, Philadelphia, Thyatira, Laodicea, etc., which were all founded in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. and were named after the Diadochi * or their wives. After the fall of the states founded by the Diadochi, the Romans came in and conquered Asia Minor. Without having succeeded in permanently Romanizing it, they gave it a solidity which enabled the Byzantine emperors, after the later Hellenizing of the Eastern Roman Empire, to advance farther and farther into the interior and toward the east, accompanying the victorious advance of Christianity: in Cappadocia, the home of Greek monastic life in the East, there was firmly established in Cæsarea, in the 6th century, a new outpost of Greek civilization.

Thus, throughout the centuries, by a process of colonization that was forwarded now by peaceful means and again by war, Hellenism forced its way steadily eastward, and on the basis of the older indigenous population a new sphere for Greek colonization was opened up which developed its own peculiar cultural strength only after the passing away of the ancient Greek civilization, in Christian, that is, and Byzantine times. Up to the end of the first millennium of the Christian Era, at a time when the Balkan Peninsula, including Ancient Greece, had long since lost its ancient city-life and culture beneath the inroads and devastations of Goths, Avars and Slavs, Asia Minor was still a populous and blooming land with countless large cities, whose inhabitants combined Hellenistic culture with Christian fervor. Intellectual traditions, associated with the names of Arrian, Dio Cassius, Strabo, Galen and Epictetus, were still living and were perpetuated in the writings of the Byzantine historians of the 10th–14th centuries, the

* The successors of Alexander the Great.

most famous of whom came from Asia Minor.* At that time the strongly ascetic ideals of Greek monastic life were still in full vigor, as they had been first preached and practiced by the three great Church Fathers, Basil of Cæsarea, the Cappadocian, and the two Gregories of Nyssa and Nazianzus, and as they had assumed controversial form in the monastic castles of Asia Minor (the forerunners of the monasteries of Mount Athos), built on the Bithynian Olympus, which is still called by the Turks Keshish-Dagh, *i.e.*, Monks' Mount, on the Auxentios (also in Bithynia), on Mounts Sipylus, in Lydia, and Latmos, in Caria. In ecclesiastical architecture, too, Asia Minor was an originator: the so-called "Domed" Basilika, which reached its greatest perfection in St. Sophia in Constantinople and its most perfect reproduction in St. Mark's in Venice, owes its development to Asia Minor.†

Finally there arose in Asia Minor a new folk-poetry that dealt with the deeds of heroes. What the Nibelungen is to the Germans, the Chanson de Roland to the French, and Beowulf to the English, that, to the Greeks of the Middle Ages, was the romantic epic of Akritas (*i.e.*, Count) Basilios. Discovered only a few decades ago, though scattered widely, wherever Greek is spoken, in countless fragments of folk-poetry, it is a sort of crystal precipitate in verse of those struggles which the Byzantine Counts were forced to wage against the Saracens on the eastern confines of their realm, in Cappadocia. The poem has for us a double value: first, as proving that the national center of gravity of Hellenism lay then in Asia Minor, and second, as

* So Michael Psellus (11th-12th century) of Nicomedia, Michael Attaliates (11th century) from Attalia in Pamphylia, Nicetas Acominatos (12th-13th century) from Phrygia, Georgius Pachymeres (13th-14th century) of Nicæa; Nicephoros Gregoras (14th century) from Pontus. The two latter are, also, our chief source of information about the invasion of Asia Minor by the Turks. Cf. K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur*, 2, München, 1897, §§ 126 and 128.

† Cf. J. Strzygowski, *Kleinasien, ein Neuland der Kunstgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1903.

enlightening us as to the ethnological relations of the country, for its hero is the son of a Greek woman by an Arab Emir (hence his surname Digenis, that is, born of two races).*

From a political as well as a cultural point of view, Asia Minor formed a center of Hellenism. From here sprang all the great ruling families, which from the 8th century to the 13th constantly renewed the kingdom: the Isaurians (717-867), the Armenians (867-1057), the Comneni (1057-1185), the Laskarides (1204-1261), the Palæologi (1261-1453). They are all rooted in the feudal nobility of Asia Minor, which is comparable with our east Elbe colonial nobility. If it had not been for these powerful and energetic noble families the Byzantine Empire, and with it Hellenism as well, would long ago have been destroyed, and if the Greeks in Asia Minor had not succeeded in these struggles, that lasted 300 years, in stemming the advance of the Turks, their hordes would have poured over the Balkan Peninsula and Hungary centuries earlier than they did. We must briefly review these wars, for in no other way can the present ethnical and cultural constitution of the country and the position of Hellenism in it be fully understood. The annihilation of Hellenism and the coincident erection, one after the other, of two Turkish empires came in two great phases: the first, at the end of the 11th century, in the conquest by the Seljuks, and the second, at the beginning of the 14th century, in that by the Ottomans. The geographical situation of the capitals of these two kingdoms, Iconium (Konia) and Prusa (Brussa), is in itself an indication of the swinging of the Turkish center of gravity from the east toward the northwest.

Although the Seljuk kingdom did not embrace the whole peninsula within its boundaries, it threatened, at

* K. Krumbacher, *Gesch. der byzantin. Litteratur*, 2, § 358.

first, with that terrific thrusting strength of the Mongolian conquerors, to reach out far beyond its boundaries, and to wrest from the Greeks that northwestern part of Asia Minor that was so greatly coveted. In 1080 the Seljuks were already in the extreme northwest in Bithynia, and in possession of Nicæa and Nicomedia, and were ranging the whole coast regions from Smyrna to Attalia (Adalia) as pirates. The Greeks, who were at first purely on the defensive, joined in with the Crusaders, and succeeded, after twenty years of stubborn fighting, in thrusting the Turkish conquerors back of a line which corresponds pretty closely to that of the Eskishehr-Karahissar-Akshehr railroad line of today. This was in the early part of the 12th century (1117). A second thrust by the Greeks (1139) drove them back upon their old base and center, Iconium. Western Asia Minor was thus again rescued to the Greeks and nearly forty years of quiet followed. This time was utilized by the Greek emperors to build a strong line of fortresses against possible further attacks; all strategically important points were defended by strong forts, especially the valley of the Sangarios, which formed the corridor of attack against Constantinople. Even today, as one travels over the railroad from Ismid-Eskishehr, he sees numerous, fairly well preserved ruins of these Byzantine forts which served the same purpose of border-defense as those of today in the valley of the Saal in our own land.* They bear Turkish names, but he who has studied into these things knows that these are only literal translations of old Greek names: Inegeul, shortened from Angelokome = Angelstown; Kupruhissar, from the Greek Gephyrokastron = Bridgefort; Karadjahissar = Greek Melangeia (Turkish, karadja = blackish). They mark, therefore, the boundary between Byzantine and Turkish history.

Thanks to these fortresses, the Greeks succeeded in

* Cf. Von der Goltz, *Anatol. Ausflüge*, Berlin (1896), S. 70 ff.

repulsing the Turkish assaults, so vehemently renewed in 1177, until, by the Latin conquest of 1204, the Byzantine Empire was entirely restricted to Asia Minor, where, in the so-called Nicæan Empire, it experienced such a promising rebirth that it soon embraced the whole northern half of western Asia Minor. This new kingdom secured to the Greeks the mastery in Asia Minor for 125 years more, and it would have secured it to them for an even longer period if the Mongol invasion of 1241 and the consequent weakening of the Seljuks had not tempted the ambitious Greek emperors to stretch out their hands once more toward that fatal Constantinople, instead of using their whole strength in maintaining their hold on Asia Minor; for the Greek Empire of that time was no longer strong enough to hold control over two continents that were so seriously threatened, especially since a new avalanche was already rolling in from the east, the mighty Ottomans, who rose up in the strength of youth among the ruins of the fallen empire of the Seljuks. What the Seljuks in 240 years had failed to accomplish, the Ottomans were destined to bring about in a single generation, the ruination of Hellenism in Asia Minor.

It was in 1299 that the petty Turkish feudal prince, Osman, broke through the fortified region of the Sangarios, and after sixteen years of desperate fighting succeeded in forcing his way through to Nicæa, the chief defensive point of the Greeks, in order to lay the foundations of that great Ottoman Empire that was to be the mighty successor to the Byzantine Empire. He still met with almost invincible resistance; Nicæa with its mighty walls could not be forced, and it was only in 1326, the year of his death, that Prusa, after a ten-year siege, fell, and under the name of Brussa became the first Ottoman capital. In 1330, and after a siege of fifteen years, came the fall of Nicæa, and later that of Nicomedia. The hardest part of the task had thus been

done, the first great breach had been made in the stronghold of the Greek Empire, and the conquerors now turned to the south. Pergamon fell in 1335, Sardis in 1369, and Philadelphia (Alashehr), the last of the Greek cities of the interior, which, according to the expression of a Greek chronicler, stands like a star in a clouded sky, was captured in 1391. Smyrna, the old Greek acropolis, had already fallen a prey early in the 14th century to the Seljuks, who had found in Aïdin, the ancient Tralles, a last support for their sinking power. Apart from Trebizond in the extreme northeast, which up to 1461 maintained itself as the capital of the little coast state which was also called Trebizond, all Asia Minor was now in the hands of the Turks. The Greeks, as a political factor, had ceased to play any part. The question as to whether they had ceased to be of any importance as a civilizing and cultural factor we must now attempt to investigate.

Byzantine sources show clearly enough that Asia Minor, even in the 11th century, was suffering from decrease in its population. This was caused partly by the endless levies of troops, necessitated by the struggles against the Bulgarians in the Balkans, and partly by agrarian conditions in Asia Minor, of which I have yet to speak. The consequences of this systematic depopulation first became evident when the country collapsed under the inroads of Seljuks, Mongols and Ottomans; for the defensive military strength that was for a while maintained could not disguise the fact that the national strength of the Greeks was already broken when the inroads of these peoples began. Furthermore, there was no longer any means at hand to renew this strength which had been for centuries so systematically drained. On the contrary, the depopulation went on from bad to worse, and it took place in different ways according to the varying character of the three conquering peoples.

The Seljuks, who were bent chiefly on gaining new

pasturing grounds, seem to have drawn the Greek population closer to themselves and to have made them of some service, instead of attempting to drive them out by force. This is proven by the accounts of voluntary or forced submission to the conquerors, into which the inhabitants were driven by the unsound agrarian conditions in Asia Minor, which were characterized by an ever-growing tendency toward larger and larger estates, a tendency against which, even in the 10th century, the clear-sighted emperors had vainly enacted the strictest laws. The consequences appeared at the time of the inroads of the Seljuks; evidently with full knowledge of these conditions, they promised the oppressed peasants in the conquered regions complete freedom in return for the payment of a head tax, if they would yield to their control. Thus great masses of the Greek population went over to the Turks and were lost to Hellenism. Emperor John Comnenos, on one of his campaigns against the Seljuks of Iconium (1120), was forced first to fight bitterly with the Greeks of that region, who had either been already half Turkified, or were, at any rate, strongly Turcophile. We see, then, that at that time large intermixtures of the native Greeks (or of the Hellenized native population) with the Seljuks must have taken place, for only through such intermixture is the fact to be explained that the Anatolian population of today, both Christian and Mohammedan, instead of showing a distinct racial stamp, rather presents strongly modified features which cannot be described as either Aryan or Mongolian.*

The Ottomans were less bent on peaceful assimilation than on forcible subjection and extermination. In their character as masters they sought to make the conquered

* As to the type of the Anatolian Turks, see L. Heermann, *Rückerinnerungen aus dem Orient* (Aschaffenburg, 1886, S. 13, 126); A. Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*, 2, (Leipzig, 1906, S. 197); H. Gelzer, *Geistliches und Weltliches aus dem griechisch-türkischen Orient* (Leipzig, 1900, S. 185); R. Fitzner, *Anatolien* (Leipzig, 1902, S. 19).

as harmless as possible, and they used to this end a means that they had learned from the Byzantine emperors; they transplanted, from the conquered cities that had a large Greek population, large numbers of these Greeks to other cities where the Greeks were less numerous, so that everywhere the Greeks were forced into a minority. Furthermore, the Greeks were no longer permitted to live in the large cities that were at that time still strongly walled, but were compelled to settle outside in the suburbs. From these suburbs there gradually developed later, as the Greek population increased, entirely new towns, which crowded the old city-center from its predominating position and established itself in its place. This system, as we shall see, resulted in strengthening rather than weakening the Greek element. And yet, in this Turkish conquest, a great part of the Greeks in the towns were constantly being forced to leave Asia Minor and to take refuge in the European part of the Empire, for the Byzantine historians of that time (the 14th century) tell of mass emigrations to Europe, of homeless refugees crowded in and around Constantinople, and of growing insecurity in the neighborhood of the capital. This exodus from the towns betokens a second essential difference as compared with what had happened in the Balkan Peninsula. While, in the Balkans, the cities appear as the supporting centers, the bulwarks, of the Greeks against the Slav inundation, forming a base of operations for winning back the open country that had become Slav, in Asia Minor not only the country regions but the towns as well fell into the hands of the conquerors, evidently because the Turks were better trained soldiers and more familiar with the art of besieging towns than were the Slavs, who were accustomed only to campaigns in the open. The degree to which the Greek communities of Asia Minor suffered under the Turkish conquest is shown by the old Church Acts which are still preserved in the

Patriarchate in Constantinople.* While Asia Minor before the Turkish invasion counted no less than fifty seats of Metropolitans (the highest church dignitaries) it has today only twenty.† Of these, twelve alone are distributed in the western provinces, while the other provinces have only eight. Even of these the greater part are maintained only for the sake of the names. These numbers show better than anything else how seriously the Greek town-population in the interior of Asia Minor melted away as a result of the Turkish conquest, for every withdrawal of the seat of a Metropolitan, and every uniting of several such seats in one, presupposes a decided decrease in the population of a district.

The greatest direct losses of the Greeks were caused by the two great Mongolian invasions of the years 1241 and 1402, especially the latter under the much-feared Timur. These hordes found their only joy in burning, murdering and pillaging, and poured forth like a plague of locusts "in separate bands over Galatia, Phrygia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, the coast region of Caria, Lycia and Pamphylia in such a way that it seemed as if the whole Tartar army was billeted in every separate province, so numerous were they." So says one of the last Byzantine historians (Dukas), who pictures also, in vivid colors, the consequences of this predatory incursion in the words, "Timur left neither living men, nor weeping children, nor barking dogs, nor crowing cocks, but everywhere nothing but the stillness of death." Thus every one of these three Turkish inundations had in its own way contributed to decimate the Greek population of Asia Minor.

Only in two greater districts have compact groups of

* On these old Church Acts is based the instructive investigation of A. Waechter, *Der Verfall Griechenthums in Kleinasien im 14. Jhd.*, Leipzig, 1903.

† TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: There are at present twenty-two Metropolitans in Asia Minor, or better, including that of Tarsus and Adana, which is under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch, twenty-three.

Greeks of considerable extent preserved their nationality, their speech and, in part, their religion, that is, in Middle Cappadocia, in the interior of eastern Asia Minor, and in Pontus, in the extreme northern coast region; in the former as a relic of the old church settlements and in the latter as the last remains of that latest Greek effort at establishing a state in Asia Minor, the Empire of Trapezus. The Greek population of these two districts can therefore serve to bring clearly before us the Asia Minor Greeks of the Middle Ages, in their physical as well as their linguistic character.

Before proceeding further I must state that these peoples, like those of the Balkan Peninsula, must already have acquired their present physical stamp in the early Middle Ages, at any rate, before the Seljuk-Turkish conquest, for the modified, ethnically but slightly distinguished type of the western Anatolian peasant population is not characteristic of these Greeks. Rather do the Cappadocian Greeks show unmistakable Armenian influence, especially in the broad and extraordinarily high skull, and the large fleshy nose, as well as in their compact and sturdy build, while those of the mountainous coast region of Pontus have retained the more finely cut features of the Greeks and their more graceful form. Some claim to find a third type in the Greeks of southeastern Asia Minor, a type which shows strikingly Semitic features, and which is probably to be traced back to the numerous Syrian immigrations into Asia Minor during the supremacy of the Isaurian Dynasty of Byzantium, 717-867. In the same way the Armenian type of the inland Greeks is to be traced back to the extensive intermingling of Byzantine Greeks and Armenians during the 9th and 10th centuries, when the Byzantine Empire received a strong quickening of Armenian blood. A dynasty of Armenian origin at that time gave the Byzantine imperial throne a new hold and lent renewed strength to the new kingdom

and a great Byzantine province of Asia Minor was called "the Armenian Province." In any case, we must be on our guard against deriving our present ethnographical picture of Asia Minor directly from the old racial divisions into Hittites, Phrygians and Lydians. The fact that Asia Minor served as a bridge between Asia and Europe prevented such a preservation of the old ethnical relations, as had been the case in the Balkan Peninsula, that great reservoir of people in migration; here as there, in judging of ethnological characteristics, we should, far more than has up to now been the case, start out from Byzantine times, which completely transformed the ancient ethnological nature of both peninsulas.* That we have to do, however, in the case of the Cappadocian and Pontic Greeks with autochthonous remains of pre-Turkish times, and not with later immigrants, is shown not only by their racial type but by their dialect. This belongs to the very oldest forms of the Modern Greek language, if one leaves out of account the still more ancient Tzakonian, and enables us to conclude that it broke away from other Greek at a very early period, and followed a separate development of its own. This is particularly true of the Pontic dialect of Samsun (Amisos), Œnoe (Unieh) and Ophis; there is in the phonetics of the dialect, as well as in the vocabulary, so much that is peculiar that it is almost unintelligible to those conversant with the ordinary Modern Greek. But this holds true also of the dialect of some twenty Cappadocian towns—for with only twenty are we here concerned—a dialect which is still quite on the level of the Greek of the early Middle Ages, evidently going back to the time of the settlements in the country of the old monks, which can be proved, in the region of Cæsarea, to go back in many cases as far

* On the question of the racial characteristics of the Greeks of Asia Minor, cf. A. von Luschan, *Verhandlungen d. Gesellsch. f. Erdkde. zu Berlin*, 15 (1888), S. 47-60; *Archiv f. Anthropol.*, 19 (1889-90), S. 31-53; *L'Anthropologie*, I., p. 679 ff., II., p. 25 f.

as the 4th century B.C. These dialects,* however, are, as compared with those larger and continuous regions where common Greek is spoken, only small and distinct islands of the Greek speech, which are constantly wearing away and giving up ground, more and more, although the proportion of Greeks in these regions is much higher than elsewhere. The ratio is highest in Pontus, where there are nearly 250,000 Greeks (25 to 30 per cent of the population), and where they form a large percentage even of the city population, especially in Trebizond and Samsun. On the contrary, in Cappadocia they are to be found settled only in a large number of villages, comprising altogether something like 40,000 souls.† The number of these Greeks in Pontus as well as in Cappadocia is, furthermore, all the harder to fix accurately, because there are among them many communities of Christians who conceal the fact that they are Christians, and, for political reasons, pass as adherents of Islam (even making use of the Turkish language), but who are really devoted to Christianity and have kept up their Greek national feeling. In Pontus they are especially to be found in the districts of Tonia and Ophis, where in the seventies of the last century they were estimated at about 14,000, while in other districts, as in Krom and Torul, a strong process of Christianizing them anew has taken place.‡

Apart from these two isolated areas of Greeks, the Turks have inundated the whole peninsula, subjecting it to the Turkish nationality and to the Turkish lan-

* Specimens of the Pontic and Cappadocian dialects of today are to be found in A. Thumb's *Handbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache*, 2 (Strassburg, 1910), S. 294-298. Grothe, in his treatise, *Meine Vorderasienexpedition 1906 u. 1907*, Bd. II., S. 175, calls attention to the dialect of the Greeks of Farash in the southern Antitaurus.

† Exact statistics as to the number of Greeks in Cappadocia are given by R. M. Dawkins, in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 30 (1910), pp. 109-132, 267-291.

‡ For more exact information, see H. Kiepert, *Die griechische Sprache im pontischen Küstengebirge, Zeitschr. d. Gesellsch. f. Erdkde. in Berlin*, 25 (1890), S. 317 ff.

guage, while Hellenism, though not entirely destroyed, has been so seriously broken up and shattered that it has been obliged to give up even its language and its religion, that is to say, has completely lost its national consciousness. The numerous Greek names of rivers, villages and mountains have, with very few exceptions, all disappeared, being replaced by Turkish names.* As far as administration and ways of living were concerned, the Turkish conquest produced very few radical changes. The very towns which under Greek control had formed commercial and administrative centers, continued to be such under the Turks, keeping, for the most part, their old Greek names as a proof of the strength of 1500-year-old traditions. Towns like Smyrna, Prusa, Pergamon, Magnesia, Attalia, Adana, Tarsus, Iconium, Ancyra, Cæsarea, Amasia, Castamuni, Trapezus, Sinope, Amisos and others experienced a new quickening under their old names, which the Turks altered only slightly. Not only did they continue to be the capitals of their various districts for purposes of administration, but their names were extended so as to apply to the entire districts of which they were centers. Practically all the vilayets and sanjaks of Asia Minor received their names from these old centers of city-civilization and comparatively few have Turkish names, the ancient Tralles, Philadelphia and Dorylæum, for example, bearing the Turkish names Aïdin, Alashehr and Eskishehr respectively. On this weighty point, therefore, the Turks, as an unhistoric people, have been as little able to interrupt the continuity of civilization as in the Balkan Peninsula, where the larger towns likewise have kept their Greek names.

Just as the Turks in Asia Minor have taken over the way of living of their predecessors in power, so too

* Only the two largest rivers of western Asia Minor, the Mæander and the Sangarios have, in a characteristic manner, kept their old names in the form of Menderes and Sakkaria.

have they accepted almost unchanged their social relations. Two points alone deserve special mention here, the possession of large landed estates and the feudal system. The Turkish landowners, the Beys, are nothing but the direct successors of the Byzantine archontes, and the Turkish peasants have been forced to render compulsory service to the Beys just as the Christian peasants did to the archontes. That strongly developed feudal system, too, which has existed from Byzantine times, especially ever since the 11th century, with its distinction between the little and large fiefs for foot soldiers and cavaliers, respectively, was taken over by the Turks, and was by them even more highly developed.

In this accommodation to the conditions and institutions of the subject peoples did the strength, as well as the weakness, of the new masters consist: in so far as they found before them fast-bound customs, which they simply took over, they were obliged to accept, along with their advantages, their drawbacks as well. The only real advantage that they received came from their acceptance of feudalism, while the retention of cultural and social conditions in town and country was bound gradually to weaken their power, because these conditions either outlived them or, at any rate, were not suited to them. The first statement applies to agrarian relations, and the latter to commercial relations in the towns. This free shepherd and peasant race (for this they had previously been) lost its free character through taking over the Byzantine provincial nobility without, however, in doing this, developing a genuinely urban civilization, which is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for trade-activity. Thus the Turkish peasantry went backward without a Turkish bourgeoisie arising. At any rate, only a limited town-folk arose which made its living by handicraft but did not know how to conquer economically the regions that it had subdued politically. There existed here, therefore, a twofold, dangerous breach in the social

organism of Mohammedanism, and into this breach sprang the ever-alive and ever-enterprising Greek, first the Greek trader, and then the Greek farmer. Both had in the west coast of Asia Minor and in the islands, regions where Greeks have always lived, a field for their activity that, though at first modest, has slowly but steadily broadened out.

In the first place, Greek trade in Asia Minor was destined to have an awakening. The impulse to this came from the trade policy inaugurated in the Levant by Colbert, the gifted Minister of Louis XIV. A special trade-society was founded for this purpose (1664), the consular system was reformed, French merchants were united in permanent corporations and a state system of control was arranged between the most important harbors of the Levant and Marseilles. An interesting account has been preserved, dating back to the year 1733, which tells of measures taken to increase the trade of Smyrna as over against its rival Constantinople, and one from the year 1778, containing a regulation decided upon by the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce for the French merchants of Smyrna.*

The number of firms there that represented French houses had, in the period from 1752 to 1783, already increased to twenty-nine as against eleven in Constantinople and eight in Salonika. This French trade-policy was systematically based on a strengthening of Smyrna, with the evident purpose of driving the rival trade of Italy out of the field. In this it must have succeeded, for in the forty years from 1750 to 1789 the value of French goods imported from Smyrna to Marseilles rose from 5,629,000 pounds to 12,805,000 pounds and, at the same time, the export from Marseilles to Smyrna rose from 4,250,000 pounds to 9,500,000 pounds. This increase in the trade of Marseilles naturally postulated a

* These texts, so interesting for the history of trade, are reproduced by D. Georgiades in *La Turquie actuelle*, Paris, 1892, pp. 197 ff., 218 ff., 224 ff.

similar increase in the trade of Smyrna; this attained even in 1787 no less a figure than 52,750,000 Turkish pounds, in which figures is included the rapidly increasing trade with Russia which resulted from the latter's position as Turkey's protector since 1774. Smyrna thus became a new and important reloading place in the trade of the Levant, and although, at the beginning of the 18th century, it had numbered hardly 30,000 inhabitants, it had, in the year 1803, 100,000, of whom about a third were Greeks. The new blood was mostly to the advantage of the Greeks. In fact, one may say that the new enlargement of Smyrna, which had formerly been the center of Hellenism in Asia Minor and became so in an increasing degree from now on, opened a new period of prosperity to the Greeks of Asia Minor; from all parts of the Greek Orient a stream of enterprising Greeks gathered together here, so that the old capital of Ionia soon became once more an almost purely Greek city; in 1850, of about 125,000 inhabitants, 60,000 were Greeks, in 1880 of about 160,000, 75,000 or 80,000 were Greeks, and in 1910, over 100,000 inhabitants of the city's 225,000 were Greeks. On the contrary, the number of Turks has, in the last 100 years, dropped from 75,000 to 60,000, or, according to some authorities, to 50,000, while the number of Greeks has almost quadrupled.* The trade of Smyrna has correspondingly increased, especially since the opening up of the interior through the railroads that go out from Smyrna into the valleys of the Hermos and Mæander. Though the trade in 1839 amounted only to 53 million francs, it had increased in 1855 to 120 million, and by 1881 had even reached the figure of 220 million francs. It had already surpassed the commerce of Constantinople, and the Turks therefore call Smyrna too, mingling envy and

* The statistical data are based on Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1890-95), II. and III., completed from Baedeker, *Constantinopel und Kleinasien*, 2 (1914).

scorn, "the infidel Smyrna" (Giaour Ismir). For Hellenism in Asia Minor, however, it became a new and firm support for its interests and a source of prosperity. Even in the year 1818 the Greek merchants of Smyrna were able to build at their own expense a beautiful casino, intended alike to serve business and social ends. This proved, however, to be a tender blossom that had come out prematurely and was soon destroyed by the storms of the Greek War for Independence (1821-1829), though it did bloom forth all the more strongly after the war's fortunate ending.

For Hellenism began to spread over the west coast in a large number of little places, which were in part old Hellenic sites, and in part places settled during the Middle Ages, or in later Turkish times. Among the very old sites is Phocæa, which through a strange play of circumstances has formed the beginning and the ending of a development that has embraced the world. Famous as the metropolis of Marseilles (Massilia), it was, after a long period of decay, revived in modern times by the reflux movement from her daughter of old, a movement that affected Smyrna first, and then its neighbor Phocæa as well, for this too, in spite of its changing political fortunes, had always been a bulwark of Christianity and was again destined to experience a new, though modest, rejuvenescence. Although, during the first half of the 19th century, the Greeks there were still in the minority, as compared with the Turks, constituting two-fifths of the population (2,000 out of 5,000), the relation has in the intervening decades so changed that now out of 8,000 inhabitants, 6,000 are Greeks, so that these now form three-quarters of the inhabitants. This increase is due to the vigorous local shipping trade which centers here and which numbers annually something like 3,000 ships. The most remarkable thing is, however, that this rejuvenated Old Phocæa has already become once more the mother-city of a young

Phocæa (New Phocæa), which is about ten kilometers northwest of the old and although only a few decades old already has about 5,000 inhabitants of whom about 4,000 are Greeks. New and Old Phocæa then, taken together, already number about 10,000 Greek inhabitants as compared with 3,000 Turks. Working the salt pits and exportation of raisins constitute the chief sources of livelihood of the two cities.

The two other important harbors north of Smyrna are, like Phocæa, of recent origin and are therefore purely Greek; I mean Dikeli and Aivali. Dikeli may really be described as founded by the German archæologist Karl Humann, who in 1869 had the road that led to this place from Pergamon rebuilt, in order the better to transport the Pergamene sculptures excavated by him. Enterprising Greek merchants have taken advantage of this road in the exportation of the products of the country, and have built up here a trading place which in 1880 had 3,000 exclusively Greek inhabitants but which now contains 5,000 such.* Owing to this fact the older harbor of Chandirli, situated more to the north, has steadily diminished in importance. The chief exporting harbor of northwest Asia Minor is, however, Aivali, newly built in the third decade of the 19th century on the site of an older Greek settlement named Cydonia, a name which, like Aivali, means "quince." It is an almost unique example, on Asia Minor soil, of a large, purely Greek and practically self-governing community, with 25,000 to 30,000 inhabitants, a yearly export business of ten to twelve million francs and a shipping of over 3,000 vessels. It has thoroughly modern business institutions as well as a Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture and an Agricultural Bank. It is the seat of three consular agents,

* In a similar way, in more recent times, the German excavations of Priene and Miletus have benefited the neighboring Greek settlements. Cf. H. Gelzer, *Geistliches und Weltliches*, S. 231.

those of England, France and Italy. Through Aivali's growth the ancient Adramit (Adramyttium), which was formerly on the coast but is now further inland away from the bay, has been put into the background and now contains about 6,000 inhabitants. As compared with these three ports, the three that are situated on the west coast, south of Smyrna, are by no means so important, perhaps just because they are older settlements, in which Hellenism has had to force its way against the Turks, who were here numerically superior. This is particularly true of Chesme, which lies on the projecting west point of the peninsula of Clazomenæ.* It is a town of about 6,000 inhabitants, which prospers through its raisin trade. The Turks, to be sure, form the majority of the population (about two-thirds), but the shipping (2,500 ships annually) is entirely in Greek hands. The chief place of export for the products of the Mæander valley is Scalanova, settled in the Middle Ages and named by the Turks Kush-Adassi, by the Greeks New Ephesus. The Greeks, 3,000 to 4,000 in number, are constantly forcing the Turks, who are settled in the old walled town and are about equal to them in number, further into the background, and in commerce they completely control the field. Lastly, Budrum, a Turkish settlement on the site of the ancient Halicarnassus and still inhabited by about 3,000 Turks, has become Hellenized in proportion as the growing importance of the place as a center of export for southwest Asia Minor—the ancient Caria—has been appreciated by the Greeks. Their number, which twenty years ago was a little over 2,200, may since then have come to equal that of the Turks, or may even have surpassed it.

The other little seaport towns on the southwest coast, as Marmaras, Macri, Levisi, Kalamaki and Phœnix,

* Also called Kuru-Chesme, *i.e.*, "dry fountain." The place seems to have a Greek name, Ξεροκρήνη as its prototype, though no place of this name is provable in Byzantine times.

since they are not connected by railroad lines with the interior, are as yet without any commercial significance and are of importance only in connection with local coast-shipping. None of them has more than 3,000 inhabitants, but these are overwhelmingly Greek.

With these constantly increasing Greek settlements on the west coast, settlements which have their economical support in the great islands just off the coast, Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Rhodes, the settlements on the extended, exposed and less indented north and south coasts of Asia Minor can bear no comparison either in number or in importance, and this is true particularly of the south coast. The chief places here are the ancient Adalia (Attalia) founded in Hellenistic times, with about 30,000 inhabitants, and the entirely modern Mersina, founded in 1832, with about 22,000 inhabitants. In Adalia, which was an important station for the fleet in Byzantine times, and is now the chief emporium for the whole interior of the southwest, there live about 10,000 Greeks, *i.e.*, about a third of the total population, while in Mersina they form the majority. This city, too, owing to the fact that it is connected with the Bagdad railroad by the Mersina-Adana line, has obtained the commercial supremacy on the south coast; it had in 1911 an import and export business of some twelve to thirteen million francs, while Adana had a business of only two and a quarter million. Here too, therefore, the more flourishing condition of the cities is in direct ratio with the increasing number of Greeks. On the north coast, which is twice as long as the southern, no new Greek settlements have developed, but those that have existed since antiquity have maintained their importance, thanks to the fact that they have preserved their Greek element, which from these bases has controlled the trade of the Black Sea. Trebizond, Kerasunda (Kiresun), Œnoe (Unieh), Amisos (Samsun), Sinope (Sinop), Ionopolis (Ineboli),

Heraclea (Eregli) are still strong supporting and gathering points of the Greeks, who constitute in Trebizond half of the population (about 25,000 Greeks out of 50,000 inhabitants), while Samsun, the greatest trade center of the north coast, with an export business of about forty million francs, has even a larger proportion of Greeks.

Economically developed in quite another way, because more blessed by nature and more highly favored by its nearness to Constantinople, and on these accounts from of old, more densely populated, is the northwest coast of Asia Minor, the littoral of the Sea of Marmora. Here are situated on relatively shorter stretches of coast, no less than seven important old seaports which also belong completely to the Greek sphere of influence. There lie first, at and on the peninsula of Cyzicus, the old cities of Panormos (Panderma) and Artake (Artaki). The former is the more important as being the chief place of export for the sheep of Asia Minor, the value of which, even in 1893, amounted to fifteen million francs. Since then, the town, which has about 12,000 inhabitants, of whom 2,000 are Greeks, has become the terminus of the road that branches off from Manissa, and will take a sudden jump as soon as it has direct steamer connection with Constantinople. Artaki, an almost purely Greek town of about 7,500 inhabitants, subsists, in great part, from its manufacture of wine, liqueurs and cognac. In particular, the white wines produced here are highly esteemed in Constantinople. In the southeast corner of the Sea of Marmora are situated Mudania and Gemlik, the former, the old Apamea, the point of departure of the railroad to Broussa, having about 4,000 Greek and 2,000 Turkish inhabitants; the latter, the ancient Kios, which the Greeks have once more renamed by its old name, being an almost purely Greek town of 5,000 to 6,000 inhabitants, which, like Aivali, enjoys an almost complete independence. The

chief exports are chromium-ore and tobacco (Kios-cigarettes!). Finally, in the deep bay of Ismid, besides Ismid itself, are at one and the other side of the city Karamursal (the ancient Prænetus) and Gebize (the Byzantine Dakibyza). Both are the capitals of districts in which the Greek population already surpasses the Turkish (1893: 15,000 Greeks and 11,000 Turks), although in the towns themselves the Turks are still in the majority (Gebize has about 4,000 Turks and 2,000 Greeks). Alongside of these places, however, especially along the line of the Haidar-Pasha–Ismid Railway are to be found many Greek places whose Greek population increases, in a very striking way, the nearer one gets to Constantinople. So, for example, Daridsha, the Byzantine Aretzu, which is now once more inhabited exclusively by Greeks, and Cadikioi, the ancient Chalcedon, which now numbers 30,000 to 35,000 inhabitants, who consist in almost equal numbers of Armenians, Greeks and Turks, while at the beginning of the 19th century it was inhabited almost entirely by Turks.

Coming now to the last of these places, Ismid (the ancient Nicomedia), we find that this has lost its old significance as a place of transfer, toward Constantinople, of the products from the rich Bithynian plain, since the Anatolian Railroad has drawn this business in great part to itself, and its exports, which in 1893 amounted to thirty-two million francs, have since then decreased proportionately with the decrease in the number of its inhabitants, which furthermore is fluctuating greatly, being now reported as 40,000, again as 25,000, and again as only 20,000. The number of the Greeks up to twenty years ago, when they numbered 6,000, was constantly increasing, for in the first half of the 19th century they were estimated at not more than 1,000.

The whole Greek population of these sixteen towns is about 240,000, of which number about half are found in Smyrna, so that the other fifteen comprise a number

about equal with that in Smyrna. But the number of Greek inhabitants of the coast has not yet been fully enumerated. For if we add the number of those who are settled in the districts of the various provinces that border on the coast, we arrive at almost twice this number, *i.e.*, 450,000. There must then be living in these coast regions, scattered outside the cities in the country, more than 200,000 Greeks. These make their living by fishing, and grape and fruit raising, and extend in almost unbroken stretches between the towns along the whole coast, so that the whole Greek population of the coast consists in about equal proportions of city and country dwellers, a ratio that we shall also find obtaining in the interior as well.

This fringe or wreath of Greek colonies which extends toward the south as well as toward the north forms not only a strong economical force, but also a no less strong spiritual force. This is usually underestimated, as is too, in general, that idealistic element which is co-existent in the Greeks with that confessedly very prominent materialistic element, and this even in the times of its deepest national humiliation it has never lost. This idealistic element is rooted in a very strong national feeling, which has been nourished by the recollection of a great intellectual past and which finds its finest and most effectual expression in the fostering of Greek schools. This desire for schooling is implanted in the Greek nature from the times of late antiquity, and though it often savors rather strongly of scholasticism, it has prevented the Greeks from losing their national consciousness, as have the Jews and, to a certain degree, Armenians. Even the church is held so sacred by the Greeks only because she has been the bearer of national ideals in the times of slavery and has, at the same time, been a powerful political organ of administration, forming the only means in Turkey of putting through the national demands for schools.

The relation of church and school is therefore, in the Greek Orient, quite different from that in Catholic or even Protestant Christian lands. The church regards itself not as the mistress of the school but rather as her servant and patron. This fact must be clearly understood in order rightly to estimate the relations now to be considered. If, for example, a Greek community wishes to establish a school on Turkish soil, the council of the community informs the bishop of the diocese of this desire and the latter communicates it to the superior bishop, who then acquaints the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople with the matter. The latter is the religious head of the Greeks in Turkey and must therefore represent their educational interests. It is his task then to obtain the Sultan's permission to establish the desired school, and in obtaining this, money plays a not unimportant rôle. The richer the community is, therefore, the more easily does it obtain the permission, and since the Greek communities of the coast of Asia Minor have always been, for the most part, very rich, they were able to proceed to establish their own schools at an early date. The oldest are those in Smyrna, Aivali and Chesme, and those that first came into existence were not common schools but higher institutions of learning, corresponding to the development of the times and the aristocratic character of the Greek merchants. The oldest and most famous of these schools, and the only one which still exists, is the so-called Evangelical School in Smyrna. It goes back to 1708, but the year 1733 is really to be regarded as the year of its foundation. Existing under English protection since 1747, and being therefore absolutely autonomous, it was, in 1810, recognized by the Sultan as a fully authorized gymnasium, and after being twice reorganized—in 1810 and 1828—the Greek Government, too, gave it full recognition. Although supported entirely by the funds of the community and benefactors' gifts, and demanding for

its upkeep more than 100,000 francs, it still maintains in Smyrna two great affiliated schools. Its significance for the intellectual life of Smyrna rests in its ancient museum and in its rich library (30,000 volumes and 200 manuscripts), the only one on Asia Minor soil.*

In Smyrna too is still published the first Greek newspaper to appear on Turkish soil, *Amalthea,* which has existed now for almost seventy-five years. Alongside of this old school for advanced studies there were in Smyrna in 1894 other Greek schools, and in particular seventeen grammar schools, two trade schools (the oldest having existed since 1857), four private girls' schools and one large girls' college with three associated schools and more than 2,000 pupils in all. The largest Greek school community in Asia Minor, next to that of Smyrna, is that of Aivali, the second largest Greek colony of the west coast. It supports more than twenty grammar schools, two intermediate schools, a gymnasium and a girls' boarding school, which in 1892 were attended by more than 1,100 pupils. Then comes Chesme, known for its old advanced-school, which at that time possessed only eleven schools but showed the largest number of pupils (675). Nearly equal to this were Phocæa with nine schools and 560 pupils, Adramit with nineteen schools and about 600 pupils, Artaki with twenty-two schools and 700 pupils, Panderma with fifteen schools and 536 pupils, Gemlik (Kios) with nine schools and 530 pupils, Mudania with eight schools and 330 pupils, Gebize with thirteen schools and 1,000 pupils. Although the wide dissemination, as well as the prosperity and the intellectual development of the Greeks on the north part of the west coast is reflected in the large number of Greek schools, that of the southern part is in this particular far more backward. Apart from Scalanova with five Greek schools and 440

* Details about the history of this school are to be found in K. Krumbacher, *Populäre Aufsätze* (Leipzig, 1909), S. 251 ff.

pupils, Adalia on the south coast is alone worthy of mention with its ten schools and 600 pupils. Taken all together these sixteen cities have more than two hundred schools with more than 17,000 pupils,* a number, the significance of which can only rightly be appreciated when compared with the corresponding Turkish figures, which show, to be sure, that the number of schools is a hundred larger but that the number of pupils is 6,000 less than that of the Greeks. There are therefore nearly three times as many pupils per school in the Greek schools as in the Turkish. The Greek settlements on the north and south coasts are to be distinguished from those on the west coast not only through their smaller number, but also through the fact that only scanty and weak settlements in the inland correspond to them. In the west, on the contrary, as we have already seen, Greek colonization has, since late antiquity, extended up into the interior, and the consequences of this have been felt even up to the present time, or, at any rate, have been made anew noticeable, owing to the fact that the Greeks of the west coast have for several decades been pressing farther and more vigorously into the interior, and have settled there more definitely. This region that has at present been occupied by them only in its chief centers is, in general, bounded by a line which may be drawn from Ismid in the north, past Eskishehr, Afiun-Karahissar, and Isbarta to Adalia. All that lies between this line and the west coast may be regarded as within the Greek sphere. The second phase of these Hellenizing efforts of today begins with this forward push into the interior of this region. Just how far and in what way has this succeeded?

If we start on the basis of the actual facts of the case, we find that in thirty towns of the western interior of Asia Minor of more than 5,000 inhabitants, the Greeks have a share in the population of from 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. Arranged according to the ratio of this

* These statistics about the schools are derived from Cuinet, as above cited.

share in the population, these cities fall into different groups, as follows:

First, a Greek majority is found in only two cities, Michalitsh (about 7,000 Greeks out of a total of 8,000) and Koplu (about 5,000 out of 8,000). Second, in nine cities the Greeks form between one-half and one-third of the population: Baindir (4,500 out of 10,000), Tireh (6,000 out of 14,000), Edemish (3,000 out of 7,000), Menemen (about 3,000 out of 10,000), Bergama (5,500 out of 14,500), Isbarta (7,000 out of 20,000), Sokia (4,000 out of 12,000), Soma (2,000 out of 6,000), Manissa (11,000 out of 35,000). Third, in four cities the Greeks form about a fourth: Inegeul (about 2,000 out of 8,000), Kassaba (6,000 out of 23,000), Kermasti (1,200 out of 4,800), Aïdin (8,500 out of 35,000). Fourth, in five cities they form from a fifth to a sixth part: Kutaiah (4,000 out of 22,000), Dimetoka (1,300 out of 7,000), Alashehr (4,500 out of 22,000), Milas (2,000 out of 12,000), Bigha (1,600 out of 10,000). Fifth, in five cities the Greeks form from a seventh to a ninth of the total population: Kirkagatch (2,000 out of 18,000), Ushak (1,500 out of 12,500), Balukiser (1,300 out of 10,000), Sabandsha (1,000 out of 7,500), Kyrkagatch (about 200 out of 18,000). Sixth, less than a tenth in seven cities: Denizli (1,600 out of 17,000), Soyut (1,500 out of 18,000), Nazilli (1,700 out of 21,000), Brussa (6,000 out of 80,000), Adabazar (1,600 out of 24,000), Eskishehr (1,150 out of 19,000), Nugla (1,100 out of 15,000).

From this combination of facts several interesting conclusions may be drawn as to the distribution of the Greek population in the interior itself, and as to the relation between the Hellenization of the interior as compared with that of the coast regions.

If we group the cities named above according to their distribution in the various provinces and districts, we find that only fifteen of these fall within the province

of Aïdin, the largest province of the west coast of Asia Minor, and the one that is held to most stubbornly by the Turks. Of these fifteen, again, only thirteen come in the district of Smyrna, Sarukan and Aïdin, which form the most populous part of this province. These are Menemen, Manissa, Kassaba, Alashehr; Kirkagatch, Soma, Bergama; Baindir, Tireh and Odemish; Sokia; Aïdin and Nazilli. Now these thirteen towns, with the exception of Bergama, all lie, as the above grouping indicates, on the four railroad lines which go out in four directions from Smyrna, that is in those regions of the province which belong economically to Smyrna. At any rate, the significance for the Greek settlements of the economic factor is clearly evidenced in these towns, for they are, almost without exception, "capitals," so to speak, of smaller districts, and are therefore important distributing and collecting centers for the local trade to and from Smyrna. With the increase of this trade the number of the Greeks in this group of interior cities is bound to increase quickly or has already done so.

Most of the other towns named above are in the province of Hodavendikiar, which lies due north of that of Aïdin; and once more is it true that they are in the most densely inhabited parts of the province, Brussa, Ertogrul and Kutaiah. Of the nine cities that belong here, five, again, are found on the line of the Anatolian Railroad, namely, Biledjik, Soyut, Eskishehr, Kutaiah and Ushak; one, Brussa, on a branch road and three on no railroad at all, though within reach of the Michalitch-Kirmasti-Inegeul Railroad. Here, too, therefore, the cities which are more or less decidedly Greek in their population lie along the main railroad lines, though they are not quite so strongly Greek as those in the province of Aïdin; for we are here in the very heart of Turkey, and its greatest city Brussa, which more than all the other cities of this region has preserved its Turkish character more purely. It is always

to be borne in mind that the Anatolian Railroad goes out from Constantinople and that this, with its strong Greek population, is as important a gate of entrance to the northwest of Asia Minor as Smyrna is for the west.

Although up to this time it is impossible to speak of a Hellenizing of the great interior cities of western Asia Minor, since these are (thus being quite different from the coast cities) very far from succumbing, either numerically or culturally, to the Greek invasion—the number of Greeks is the largest in Manissa—yet, if one looks into the matter narrowly, he gains the impression that in the interior the Hellenizing influence comes from the smaller towns. This supposition, to be sure, is opposed to the view, still broadly accepted, that the Greek element is purely a city element, and that the country-folk consist only of Turks. This view, which, as we have seen, does not hold even in the coast regions, is, however, absolutely false and is only to be explained as arising from the impressions of superficial travelers who have rarely penetrated into the remoter regions with a predominantly rural population. Anyone who has, for example, visited the larger Greek islands of the Asiatic coast, like Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Rhodes, knows that these dense populations live in great measure from grape and fruit-raising or from silk culture, and only in a very small degree from trade. Farming plays no very large part, simply because of the lack of arable land. Since now, as we have said, these very islands for something like fifty years have become very densely populated or even in part overpopulated (as, for instance, Samos), there have been periodical emigrations of the island peasants, in considerable numbers, over to the mainland, where they have, in particular, settled in the fruitful valleys of the Mæander and the Hermos in the western parts of Asia Minor and in that of the Sangarios, farther north. In part, it is the descendants of the former Greek land-

owners who have been reduced to socagers or serfs, who, on getting possession of some little capital, have now, in their turn, driven back the Turks by buying them out or by working the soil more scientifically, a process in which they were helped by the immigrant islanders. If a sufficient number of them is thus found settled together, they try to obtain the Sultan's firman permitting them to settle in a town. Thus the English traveler Hamilton, states that the Greeks in a little town of Lydia (Singerli), in which they had settled ten years before, had, in his time (1837), increased to 40-50 families and were busied with building a new market. In this way numerous new and dense settlements came into existence in the midst of the more scattered Turkish populations, and the higher fecundity of the Greek settlers, combined with their industry, their intellectual keenness, their frugality and their community-feeling, helped always by the retrogression of the Turkish population itself, have contributed to extend the Hellenizing process more and more to the country districts.*

In particular have they taken possession of the regions adapted to silk culture, like that of the lower Sangarios Valley, and also of such regions as are adapted to raising grapes. More recently, Greek industrial enterprises, too, especially silk-spinning mills, cognac factories and steam oil mills, have sprung into existence, meeting with no rivalry on the part of the Turks. With this Greek peasant of Asia Minor, who is on a higher moral plane, and who is therefore more congenial to us Germans than the Greek trader or innkeeper in the coast-towns, our German spirit of enterprise which is seeking to get the economic control over Asia Minor, will have to come to terms, and it would be just as

As to the decrease of the Turkish population of Asia Minor and its causes, see L. Heermann, *Rückerinnerungen aus dem Orient* (Aschaffenburg, 1886), S. 128 Anm.; R. Fitzner, *Anatolien*, S. 20 f.; on the increase of the Greeks: K. Humann, *Verhandlgn. d. Gesellsch. f. Erdkde. zu Berlin*, 7 (1880), S. 249-252; R. Fischer, *Mittelmeerbilder*, N. F. (Leipzig, 1907), S. 401 f.

perverse as it would be foolish to depend on the Turk to the exclusion of the Greek, who has the controlling hand in trade and traffic, as well as in the cultivation of the soil.*

Even to a traveler of a hundred years ago the great difference between the Greeks of the cities and the peasants was especially noteworthy. The former were subservient and cringing like the Armenians, while the latter were energetic and intelligent, irreconcilable in their hatreds and by no means lacking in courage. And it is to these praiseworthy qualities, and not to their much-bruited craftiness, that they owe their progress in the interior of Asia Minor.†

As to the numbers of the Greek inhabitants of the interior of Asia Minor, only an indirect estimate can be made. The whole number of all the Greeks in the interior of the two provinces of Brussa and Aïdin, exclusive of the inhabitants of the coast regions, even twenty years ago, amounted to 200,000, *i.e.*, less than half as many as in the coast regions. About 100,000 of these lived in places with a population of more than 5,000, so that about 100,000 were scattered among the villages and towns. The distribution of this interior population is very uneven. The densest Greek populations have gathered in the Prefecture of Aïdin and here chiefly in the sub-prefecture of Smyrna, with its five districts (Sarukan, with four districts, and Aïdin, with only one). These three sub-prefectures, therefore, in their ten districts, comprised, twenty years ago, a fifth part of the entire population. In the province of Brussa

* Hugo Grothe, too, in *Die Asiatische Türkei und die deutschen Interessen* (*Der neue Orient*, S. 25, 9 Heft), pleads for a closer feeling between the Germans and the Asia Minor Greeks. So, too, Blankenburg, Heft 1 of the *Schriftensammlung des Deutschen Vorderasienkomitees, Die Zukunftsarbeit der deutschen Schule in der Türkei.*

† It is to be remembered that the higher professional places in the towns of Asia Minor are filled almost exclusively by Greeks. Teachers, doctors and engineers are for the most part Greeks and therefore among the higher engineering and administrative officials of the Anatolian and the Bagdad railways there are many Greeks.

the number of districts with a considerable Greek population was only five, in the sub-prefecture of Ertogrul, three; in those of Brussa and Kutaiah, one each. There were the largest numbers in the district of Eskishehr, the ancient Dorylæum, where they comprised two-fifths of the population, and in Michalitch, where they formed one-third of the total. In fifteen of the twenty-five districts of the interior of the two prefectures fifteen, therefore, already contained a considerable part of the population. To speak in greater detail, these districts may be classified as follows, with relation to the proportions of their Greek inhabitants: The Greek population is densest in the districts of Magnesia (Sanjak Sarukan), and Eskishehr (Sanjak Kutaiah), where they constitute a fifth of the population; less dense in the district of Sokia (Sanjak Aïdin), with about a third; next comes the district Michalitch (Sanjak Brussa), with from a fourth to a third; and then those of Bergama, Menemen, Baindir, Tireh and Odemish (Sanjak Smyrna), where they form about a fourth; next those of Alashehr (Sanjak Sarukan) and Yenishehr (Sanjak Ertogrul) with about a fifth; and finally those of Inegeul, Biledjik (Sanjak Ertogrul) and Soma (Sanjak Sarukan), with a sixth to a seventh of the entire population.

What made the estimating of the numbers of these Greeks in the interior so very difficult was the fact that up to a few years ago they spoke Turkish and therefore did not share in the national and racial consciousness of their kinsmen on the coast, and also the fact that they do not essentially differ in physical type from the Ottomans, who have become assimilated to the race type of the conquered people and have lost their special Turkish characteristics. This state of affairs began to change when the Greeks, with the help of their church, succeeded in introducing the Greek language in their schools alongside of the Turkish. Since then, that is,

since the seventies of the last century, the national propaganda has made great progress among them, and the number of schools has greatly increased.

In the thirty cities of the interior of this region (prefectures of Aïdin and Brussa) they possessed in the last decade of the 19th century more than 400 schools with about 25,000 pupils, while the Mohammedans in their thousand schools had only 20,000 pupils. The number of pupils in each Greek school therefore averaged 60, while those in the Turkish schools averaged only 20, a disproportion which is to be explained by the fact that the Mohammedan schools are almost exclusively poorly attended mosque-schools, while the Greek schools are community-schools that are very well attended. The religious character of the Turkish educational system is just as prejudicial to the Turks as the nationalistic tendency of the Greek schools is beneficial to the Greeks. There are towns in which, in spite of the Greeks being in a minority, more Greek children attend the schools than Turkish children. So Sokia, with 180 Turkish and 218 Greek children in school; the same is true of Bigha (125: 140) Alashehr (250: 525), Nazilli (162: 220), Menemen (220: 325), Biledjik (1,100: 1,113). In other towns, such, for example, as Bergama, Magnesia, Milas, Soyut, the number of the Greek pupils almost equals that of the Turkish, and in most of them the number is more than half as large as that of the Turkish pupils, even in that stronghold of Mohammedanism, Brussa, where there are something like 2,500 Greeks, as compared with 5,000 Turkish pupils, although the Greeks comprise here only ten per cent of the population. These are figures which more than anything else are indicative of the activity and capacity for education of the Greek part of the population. The intellectual superiority of the Greeks is set forth in an even stronger light when one compares the sum total of the Greek schools and of their pupils in both prefectures with that

of the Turkish. For we find that even in 1894 there were 540 Greek schools, with about 30,000 pupils, as compared with 1,900 Turkish schools, with about 42,000 pupils. The slight numerical superiority of the Turkish scholars is, to say the least, entirely disproportionate to the large majority of Turks in the population.

According to recent statistics, which are, to be sure, taken from Greek sources * and are, therefore, perhaps a little too optimistic in their tone, the number of Greek schools has since then risen to more than 700 and that of the pupils to more than 100,000 (69,274 boys and 48,468 girls), which leads one to conclude that the Greek population numbers a million, a number which, compared with the 650,000 of twenty-five years ago, does not seem to be too high an estimate, particularly if we take into account the great increase of the Greeks through a higher birthrate and through immigration. Thus, the sum total of the Greeks in both prefectures, which have together a population of about three millions, would be about a third of this number and would, at any rate, not fall far below this.

With this rapidly increasing Greek population of the west coast and interior, the prefectures of Brussa and Aïdin, and that in the mountains of Pontus (prefecture of Trebizond) and Central Çappadocia (prefecture of Angora), which number together a million and a third more, we have not exhausted the list of Greeks of Asia Minor. There are, as a matter of fact, large numbers scattered through the interior and along the south coast, chiefly in the prefecture of Sivas and Konia, where their number in 1890 approximated 75,000. Next comes the prefecture of Adana, with about 50,000, and, least strongly Greek, the prefectures Angora (about 30,000) and Kastamuni (about 25,000). It has, however, been observed that the number of Greeks in the middle and eastern provinces is always decreasing, which is doubtless

* The "Association d'Orient" in Athens.

due to the fact that they wander away into the livelier and more fruitful regions to the westward.* These are in this way becoming more and more solid nuclei for the process of crystallization for Hellenism in Asia Minor, which is thus once more, as it did in late antiquity, shifting its center of gravity toward western Asia Minor, as though it felt that here is ever that original free-flowing source to which it now for the fourth time owes its strengthening and rejuvenation: the first being when in the last centuries before the Christian Era the native Lydians and Phrygians were assimilated; the second, when in early Byzantine times it turned back the Romanizing process which had been going on since the beginning of this era; the next, when in the 7th to the 10th centuries it averted the threatening Arabic peril, and finally when, though apparently defeated by the Turkish conqueror, it has after 500 years of relaxation again regained its vigor and strength in order to fulfill its old historical mission, which consists not in forcing its way on with the wild alarum of weapons, but through the peaceful weapons put in its power by nature, *i.e.*, by material and spiritual civilizing agencies, that do their work quietly. This mission Mohammedanism must meet through appropriate measures in administration and education, if it desires to secure its political control even in the western part of Asia Minor, now and in the future.

* See, for example, E. Naumann, *Vom Goldnen Horn zu den Quellen des Euphrat* (1893), S. 208.

III. HELLENIC PONTUS, A RESUME OF ITS HISTORY

By Demosthenes H. Oeconomides

[Among the most interesting of the irredenta regions of Asia Minor, from many points of view, is Pontus, on the southeast coast of the Black Sea. So strong is the anti-Turkish feeling in this intensely Hellenic land that a strong movement has recently arisen among her expatriated sons to establish an independent Republic of Pontus. Its mountainous inland districts have been so isolated from the rest of the Greek world and its coast regions have so strongly preserved their individuality that language, blood and national feeling have been maintained in quite a different way from elsewhere in the Greek world. It has seemed fitting that Pontus therefore should receive special consideration in this number of the American-Hellenic Society's publications, and we are glad to present this scholarly treatise by Demosthenes E. Oeconomides, a philologian of no mean repute, who is a native of this region and has written amongst other things an authoritative treatise on the Pontic dialect entitled: *Lautlehre des Pontischen*, Leipzig, 1908.]

Pontus is bounded on the north by the southeast shore of the Euxine or Black Sea, on the east by the Phasis River and Iberia, on the south by the Argaeus and Antitaurus mountains, and on the west by the Halys River. The whole country has at several epochs been variously divided and has gone under different names, thus, for example, in the time of the Parthians, the region that extended from the Phasis to the Bosporus was called the Kingdom of Pontus; in the time of the Romans, preserving the same boundaries, it was called the Polemoniac Pontus. The best known cities of Pontus are Rizus, Trapezus, Kerasus, Kotyora, Oenoe, Amisos, Sinope, Inepolis and Heraclea, all of which are coast cities, while in the interior are Amasea, Paphra, Neocæsarea, Nicopolis, Argyropolis, etc. Ecclesiastically it is divided into six, or if Cæsarea be included, into seven Metropolitan districts: Trapezus, Rhodopolis, Chaldia, Neocæsarea, Amasea, Cæsarea

and Colonia. Of the many monasteries in Pontus, the most important is that of Mela (now called Soumela) founded by the Athenian monks, Barnabas and Sophronios, in 376 A.D. in the time of Theodosius the Great.

Since Trapezus, even in ancient times, was the most important of the Pontic cities and in the Middle Ages was, in fact, the capital of the Trapezuntian Empire of the Comnenes, we must give a brief sketch of its history.

Trapezus, which was founded by a colony of Sinopians 756 B.C. on a site peculiarly adapted to the cultivation and development of commerce, is a most ancient and illustrious city. "The city Trapezus," as Eugenicus says, "most ancient and best of all the cities in the East," and "most venerable of all" according to the expression of Besarion (MS. Ven. p. 133). We learn from Xenophon's "Anabasis" (Book V. 5, 10) that Trapezus paid tribute to its metropolis Sinope. Since, according to this historian, neither the Colchians nor Chaldians recognized the Persian sovereignty, we may infer from this that the Trapezuntians never submitted to the Persians. Xenophon also furnishes us historical and geographical information about Trapezus and the countries and peoples round about it, for he was hospitably entertained there for thirty days on the return of the 10,000. The fine coins of gold and silver struck both before and after the time of Alexander the Great testify that it was a free and prosperous city. It certainly maintained its independence and freedom under Alexander the Great, for it is well known that he drove out the Persian satraps and rulers wherever these existed in Pontus and left all the districts and cities autonomous, among which, under Persian rule, Amisos (Samsun) had been deprived of its democratic government. During the time of the Diadochi, (Alexander's successors), there are recorded as ruling in Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and a part of Pontus as far as Trapezus, Eumenes (322-315 B.C.), Perdiccas, Mithridates and in particular Seleucus I, called Nicator (312-208 B.C.), until the Mithridates again gained control up to 63 B.C., when upon the final dissolution of their empire, Pontus, under the Romans, entered upon a new period of life.

From that time there was sent there by them annually a special governor until in 46 B.C. Polemon from Tralles in Phrygia was established as king of Pontus from Bosporus to Colchis. Many of the coast cities which had been the allies of the Romans dur-

ing the wars waged by them from 89-63 B.C. against Mithridates VII, called Eupator, and among them Trapezus, were, however, still left autonomous. The Polemoniac Empire lasted till 63 A.D., when Nero made Pontus a Roman province.

After a short period of decline Trapezus rose again in the time of Julian in 333. It had accepted Christianity from the first apostle, Andrew, who came there from Samsun in 34 A.D. and transmitted it to the surrounding peoples. Its first bishop was Eugeneos, known as the patron and protector of the city, who endured martyrdom in 216 under the reign of Diocletian (a Byzantine church, still existing, preserves his name). He was succeeded by a long line of bishops who honored the Church. In fact, some of them participated in Ecumenical Synods.

In the time of the great Constantine, Trapezus continued to be a provincial city under a pro-consul, as also in the time of Justinian (6th century). As such it belonged, along with Cerasus, to Polemoniac Pontus, the capital of which was then Neocæsarea. From then up to the time of Leo the Isaurian, unfortunately, we know nothing about it, but in the time of the Isaurians it appears as a starting point for political and warlike operations undertaken against the Persians, the Turcomans and the Arabs, having become the metropolis of the large and important "thema" (district) of Chaldia, while it was, at the same time, and even before the time of the Isaurians, a home of learning, as the Siracene Ananias, a trustworthy Armenian writer of the 7th century, testifies.

With regard to the thema of Chaldia (the eighth in Asia Minor), it is to be noted that this originally extended as far as Colonia, Kamak and Keltzene, but in the time of Leo the Wise the two last districts were added to the thema of New-Mesopotamia. We know that the archons and dukes of Chaldia in the 11th century, seeking little by little to free themselves from Byzantine rule, began to call themselves dukes of Trapezus and their country Trapezousia. One in particular, Theodore Gabras, from a noble family in Trapezus, and most skillful in war, saved Trapezus and the surrounding country from two invasions, one by the Seljuk-Turks in 1049 and the other under David, the king of Georgia. He, therefore, regarded the country as his own private possession and held it up to his death, as a prince, independent of Byzantium. Of these Gabrades dukes of Trapezus, Theodore's son Gregory and his grandson Constantine Gabras are

known to us. In the time of the former Trapezus was again made dependent on Byzantium, but in the time of the latter, since the dukes had offered important services to the Byzantine Empire, it gained its independence again and held it till Manuel I (Comnenos) 1143-1180, succeeded in attaching it to his realm by taking advantage of a faction that had risen there against the Gabras family, and from that time on Trapezus continued to be dependent on Byzantium until its capture by the Latins, because at that time the Trapezuntian Empire of the Comneni was established.

From the foundation of this new empire until its fall through the capture of Trapezus by the Turks, that is from 1204-1461, the following rulers occupied the throne:

(1) Alexios I, the great Comnenos, the son of Manuel, Sebastocrator and the founder of the Trapezuntian Empire 1204–1222
(2) Andronikus I. Ghidus, son-in-law of the preceding 1222–1235
(3) John I. Axouchus 1235–1238
(4) Manuel I., the great Comnenos, who built the beautiful church of St. Sophia in Trapezus (still existent) 1238–1263
(5) Andronikus II., oldest son of the preceding ... 1263–1266
(6) George I., brother of the preceding 1266–1280
(7) John II., brother of George I. 1280–1297
(8) Theodora 1285
(9) Alexios II., the great Comnenos 1297–1330
(10) Andronikus III., oldest son of Alexios II. 1330–1332
(11) Manuel II. 1332
(12) Basil 1332–1340
(13) Irene, Palæologina 1340–1341
(14) Anna, Comnenos 1341–1342
(15) John III., Comnenos 1342–1344
(16) Michael I. 1344–1349
(17) Alexios III., the great Comnenos 1349–1390
(18) Manuel III. 1390–1417
(19) Alexios IV. 1417–1446
(20) John IV., Kalogiannes 1446–1458
(21) David Comnenos, brother of John IV. and last emperor in the Trapezuntian Empire of the Comneni 1458–1461

The fall of Trapezus which occurred a few years after the capture of Constantinople dealt the final deadly blow to Hellenism as a whole. At this time, in the very nature of things, it was impossible for the Trapezuntian Empire to escape its fate, being compelled, as it was, to fight against innumerable and well organized enemies, while previously, during the 257-year period of its life, it had repulsed many barbarian invasions and had shown great political and military efficiency. But even in her fall she contributed not a little to the dissemination of the seeds of civilization and literature in the West through her illustrious sons, such as Bessarion, George the Trapezuntian and other learned men. By a strange coincidence the two last emperors of Hellenism, Constantine Palæologus of Byzantium and David of Trapezus, fell as soldiers, the first fighting for his fatherland like a hero on the fortifications of his capital, the second for his religion in Constantinople itself, preferring with nobility of soul and true Christian fortitude to see his children fall beneath the ax of the executioner and then to fall himself exclaiming, "Just art Thou, O Lord, and righteous are Thy judgments" rather than to forswear his faith as proposed by the conqueror Mohammed.

As everywhere, so, too, in Pontus, the Greek, though subjected to harsh slavery, did not lose courage and hope, but by uniting the strength left him and taking courage anew, he endeavored, just in so far as he could, to render his living with his conquerors as endurable as possible, an attempt in which he succeeded by enlisting their sympathy and esteem whenever they made use of him for high positions, or in the arts and trades in which they needed his help. Those that had special skill in iron-working in Chaldia and others in other places were even granted special privileges.

The services rendered to the Ottoman Empire by the Hypsilanti, Mourouzae and Carotsades of Pontus, were indeed invaluable, services which brought honor and profit to their own fatherland and the Greek race in general. Thus, Hellenism in Pontus partly by its steadily honorable and sincere character, and partly by its intellectual superiority generally, has made its impress on the conquerors and has succeeded in distinguishing itself in education, in trade, in the arts and sciences as the only element that makes for civilization. Unceasingly cultivating Greek letters under the shield of the Greek church, now in the monasteries or under the roof of the church, now in special

schools, it keeps alive the national feeling and sentiment, which it has preserved and is preserving in a high degree, with the hope of a more auspicious future, and of some day recovering its full freedom.

Never has it forgotten its glorious past. Glorying in this, with beating heart it sings, as it has always sung, of the Greek name and of Greek courage. A clear testimony of this is the preservation of the name "Hellene" and the words "Hellenic spear" in the demotic songs of the period after the fall of Constantinople. Having succeeded in preserving even in the times of slavery its language and nationality and the faith of its fathers, it takes pride in this and cherishes unshaken the conviction that at the proper time the historical rights that it possesses will not be overlooked.

The Greek Dialect as Spoken in Pontus

Of the many dialects of Modern Greek, that spoken in Pontus has taken a prominent place in the investigation into Modern Greek in general ever since linguistic scientists have undertaken to study it. And this is certainly justified, for this study contributes substantially to the elucidation, explanation and solution of many linguistic phenomena in the other dialects and in the Κοινὴ διάλεκτος in general, for many forms and many words which were formerly inexplicable from the point of view of phonetics or semantics have been most happily explained by the comparison of corresponding forms or words in the Pontic dialect. This, too, is derived from the Koine, but owing to an admixture of certain Ionic elements, and to the fact that in taking shape in the Middle Ages it admitted new Byzantine words, it has so developed and grown that its use on the one hand of sounds unknown to the common Greek, and, on the other, the astounding variety of phonetic changes and modifications (which appear in different forms) which it presents, its manifold transformations on the basis of analogy, its not infrequent syntactic peculiarities (which are due especially to the influence of the Turkish language), and the large number of nouns, verbs and adverbs formed from Turkish words or Turkish roots through the use of Greek terminations, render it incomprehensible to many. This evolution and the great difference between the Pontic language and the common Greek are perfectly natural, both on account of the

Ionic elements which have been preserved from of old, and of the Turkish elements which the language has received through the conquest of Pontus by the Turks, and thirdly from its geographical position which separates its inhabitants from the great masses of the Greek people and thus limits the assimilating influence of modern Greek on the Pontic dialect.

This form of the language has great importance for the reason that in the variety and richness of its vocabulary it has preserved a rich and extremely valuable store of forms and ancient words, some wholly unchanged in form and signification, and some modified, to be sure, but perfectly capable of being reduced to their original form by the philologist.*

* For complete details and examples illustrating these relations, see D. E. Oeconomides' above cited work, pp. vii and viii.

ASIA MINOR
SCALE OF MILES
0 25 50 75 100 125 150
Railroads
Railroads Proposed
Canals
Capitals
Boundaries of Countries
Size of type indicates relative importance of places
HEIGHT OF LAND
Sea level to 328 ft.
328 to 984 ft.
984 to 1640 ft.
1640 to 3281 ft.
3281 to 4921 ft.
4921 ft. and over
BLACK SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CONSTANTINOPLE
CYPRUS
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
JERUSALEM
ALEXANDRIA
Mouths of the Nile
SYRIAN DESERT
ARABIA
PERSIA
TIFLIS
TABRIZ
Lake Van
Lake Urmi
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AMERICAN-HELLENIC NEWS

THE first anniversary of the entrance of Greece into the great World War was officially celebrated in New York City by a banquet tendered by His Excellency, George Roussos, the Minister of Greece at Washington, to about forty prominent and representative citizens of New York at Delmonico's, and these guests were invited to participate later in an imposing celebration in the Century Theater.

Many thousands of Greeks and Americans formed most enthusiastic and appreciative listeners to speeches made by Mr. Roussos (whose address is given below in full), Francis M. Hugo, Secretary of State of New York, who came in behalf of His Excellency Governor Whitman; Richard Enright, Commissioner of Police of New York City, who represented the Mayor of the city; Demetrios Verenikis, Consul General of Greece and recently appointed Minister of Greece to Japan; William Fellowes Morgan, President of the Merchants' Association, and Constantine Voicly, President of the Pan-Hellenic Union in America. The invocation was pronounced by the Rev. Demetrios Callimachos of the Greek Church.

Among those guests at the banquet, who were also present at the theater, were the Honorable Cunliffe-Owen, who presided and felicitously introduced the various speakers; the Countess Cunliffe-Owen; Baron de Sadelaer, formerly Minister of State of Belgium; General Daniel Appleton, U. S. A.; Colonel DeWitt Clinton Falls, commanding the Seventh Regiment; General W. A. White, C. B., of the British War Mission; Commodore Lionel Wells, of the Royal British Navy; General William A. Mann, U. S. A., commanding Gov-

ernors Island; Colonel George W. Burleigh, of the Governor's Staff; Captain L. Rebel, of the French Navy; J. K. Ohl, editor-in-chief of the New York *Herald;* Pay Director Charles W. Littlefield, U. S. N.; David Penny, vice-president of the Irving National Bank; Robert Grier Cooke, president of the Fifth Avenue Association; Hon. Byron B. Newton, collector of the Port of New York; J. S. Alexander, president of the National Bank of Commerce; R. C. Veit, vice-president of the Standard Oil Company; Elbert H. Gary, Samuel W. Fairchild, A. E. Stevenson, H. W. Sackett, George T. Wilson, Colonel Benda of the Italian Army, and Commodore Morrell, U. S. N.

The members of the Executive Committee of the American-Hellenic Society participated in both parts of the great celebration, which had been so ably organized and effectively carried out by Mr. Cunliffe-Owen, a member of our Committee as well as one of the Board of Governors of our Society.

The sentiment so eloquently uttered by Commissioner Enright that Constantinople, which has always been an essentially Greek city, should, at the round table of the peace delegates, be returned to Greece, was greeted with cheers and the loudest applause.

Speech of George Roussos, the Minister of Greece

There are certain anniversaries, such as that of today, that fully deserve to be celebrated, for they contain such reassuring lessons that they are justly brought into prominence.

We cannot help admiring the heroism of little Belgium, which stood out so boldly against the outrageous demand of a militaristic power that had resolved to trample upon morality, and to violate justice.

We are compelled to extol that superhuman calmness with which peace-loving France accepted the challenge

which the German Colossus launched at her, bidding her forget her sworn faith and all the principles which she had taught and which gave her her beauty.

We must honor, too, Great Britain, which, simply because, in the person of Belgium, international right had been outraged, entered into the war so gallantly at its very start, and sent her children—an act unparalleled in history—by millions to offer their lives voluntarily for the defense of the right.

The Japanese, faithful to their alliance with Great Britain, followed.

It is an indisputable fact that these countries have saved the world, for the example that they have thus given humanity was so grand and glorious that it has carried other nations with it.

There have been moments of uncertainty and doubt, in the face of the colossal strength of Germany, and the ferocity of her attacks. In view of the destruction which seemed so certain, the instinct of self-preservation, for a considerable time, dominated the peoples not immediately touched by the war.

But the cruelty of Germany and of her accomplices has finally roused all the nobler and more generous nations. One after another they have become involved, for their revulsion of feeling at her atrocities is such that it has silenced every other sentiment.

Italy was the first to set the example by turning away from an alliance, the evil aims of which had been revealed to her, and she was soon followed by Rumania.

The Great Republic of the United States, after having for a long time hoped to induce Germany to respect international treaties, has resolutely entered into the great conflict.

Greece was the last European state to enter into the fight. I say, the last, although, in fact, she really takes her place next to England. For it is a well-known fact that in August, 1914, before the battle of the Marne had taken place, at the time when the Germans were at the gates of Paris, Greece, through her government, had offered her aid: perhaps if at this moment the Allies had understood aright the situation in the Orient,

if they had taken advantage of this offer, many disasters might have been averted.

This mistaken policy on the part of the Allies permitted Germany to utilize the instruments that she had been preparing for a long time in the Orient. Two years had been lost: disasters had been piled on disasters, before the necessary measures were taken and the Greek people had become free to act according to its aspirations. There, too, we see the same reassuring results. Noble sentiments obtained the upper hand over feelings of self-interest. These feelings were so strong that they silenced the doubts and fears even of timid souls. We must recall that in June, 1917, Rumania was defeated, the Russian collapse was complete and the German armies free to turn against Greece. On the other hand, the dissension caused by German propaganda in Greece seemed so deeply rooted, that even the friends of Greece did not believe that she was capable of taking any important part in the struggle.

Under the inspiring influence of the man who knows Greece best, because he embodies all the better qualities of the Greek nature, Eleutherios Venizelos, Greece refused to see the danger; she became united and filled with an eager enthusiasm, and in less than a year her troops have obtained appreciable results.

What this renaissance cost in effort the world cannot yet know. When the facts are known, when they can be fully studied, the Greek people will receive the credit that it deserves, because what it has achieved is due only to its patriotism and self-sacrifice.

From the close of 1916, when Greece, though still divided, began the struggle, up to today, when, as a united people, she is carrying on the fight, she has sacrificed thousands of her children for the triumph of the common ideal, and is arming herself more fully day by day, to pour out her blood to the last drop in order to secure the victory for freedom and right. She is paying forth freely without having demanded anything in return.

These facts prove our superiority to our enemies. A superiority which consists in the fact that we are

fighting for principles created and imposed by a civilization which began with the beginnings of history, principles that we wish to apply even to our enemies and which, moreover, are free from any selfish motives.

It is this absence of egotism in our aims which assures our perfect union and, through this, our victory.

If you wish to appreciate the palpable difference between us and the others, look at what is today taking place in a hostile country which I refrain from naming.

Four peoples, that had formed a coalition, took from their neighbors all that they could get. Now, in dividing the spoil, because of their distrust of each other, they are taking precautions against one another. One of the peoples against whom these precautions are being taken becomes sulky and shows signs of wanting to go over to the other side, because all Dobrudja (of which a large part is acknowledged to be Rumanian by the official representative of this people in the United States) is not given to her; because all Greek Macedonia is not declared to be hers; because Serbia is not today obliterated from the map.

When people are associated in order to bring about some good result, good faith is preserved in the partnership, but when, on the contrary, an evil act is accomplished and unlawful gains are obtained, disunion necessarily results, for "honor among thieves" is, after all, extremely rare.

Permit me a parenthesis, at this point.

I have read lately with regard to this quarrel that the hope exists that this country to which I have referred may become detached from her allies and join in with us.

I am convinced that this supposition cannot be realized. I insist, however, in protesting even against the reasoning based on such an hypothesis.

Whatever may be the practical result that we can expect from the perfidy of our enemies, our feelings revolt against profiting by such treachery. Our cause is so just that it admits of no compromise.

Should the country of which I am speaking show her repentance, by restoring all that it has taken from its neighbors, it can find a place at our side. But to admit in our circle of nations one who flees from the enemy camp against which we are fighting because his part in the booty is not that which his appetite has fixed, is impossible. In fact, such an act would constitute the negation of the principles for which we are fighting.

We have no need of weakening ourselves. We are materially and, above all, morally, far superior to our enemies. We must conserve the dignity of our cause if we wish the results to be commensurate with our efforts.

This is what stands forth preëminently in the celebration of such anniversaries. They show to us that our civilizations, the Greco-Latin as well as the Anglo-Saxon, have deep roots, and that they have created conditions which are essential to our existence.

That when these aspirations thus created in us are threatened, we are willing to submit to any sacrifices, no matter how great they may be, in order to defend them.

That our ideals have conquered the greater part of the world, creating strong bonds of solidarity between the peoples who are impregnated with them, permitting us to face with confidence the creation of the league of nations which will assure to the world an era of happiness in freedom through law.

Let us continue the fight; let us win, maintaining our principles without compromise. We shall thus be sure of winning the commendation of humanity.

But we must understand that in order to achieve this result, the complete liberation of the world, we must submit to great sacrifices of men and of money.

It is the need of our making these sacrifices which are being utilized by the German propaganda in order to obtain an immediate peace which is to the Germans an absolute necessity.

Through its secret agents, she tries to convince us that in order to obtain the victory against her, our sacrifices

will be enormous, while, if we satisfy some of her aspirations, she will be ready to respect the liberty of the world.

We must close our ears to these insidious suggestions. Everything that comes from the enemy camp must arouse our distrust, for Germany wishes indirectly to obtain what she has originally sought when she let loose upon the world the dogs of war.

Russia lies prostrate, and Germany wishes to reanimate her, but to raise her with a German soul. When she has at her disposal the enormous power of Russia, organized with Prussian efficiency, a more terrible war awaits the world. The sacrifices to which we shall then be obliged to submit will be much more terrific.

If we wish to put our programme into operation, we must set ourselves to change the German mind, showing the ruins that its inhumane conceptions have accumulated, and the fall of German power that must result from it. We have to do with fanatics of a peculiar kind, whom only reality can bring to their senses. The Germans are fighting in order to impose their civilization on the world by establishing a domination like that of the Mussulmans, who have slaughtered the Christians in order to assure their happiness in the future life. If our victory is incomplete, if the liberty of the nations is not completely restored, we shall have simply an interlude between acts. The curtain will rise upon a more terrible tragedy.

Let us endeavor to see beyond the limits of the present. Let us rise to meet the emergency. The responsibility of our rulers is tremendous, but they are endowed with the necessary ability to rise to these heights.

Let them not be influenced by these crafty serpents which are subtly attempting to weaken our moral fiber, for the confidence of the leaders will maintain the strength of our peoples, which up to the present nothing has been able to affect, and which constitutes our best means to win.

Following the example of the countries that for four years have been shedding their precious blood to conquer the monster, and consenting to undergo the same sacri-

fices, we can be absolutely sure that our victory will be complete.

In the name of the Government which I have the honor to represent, I can assure you that Greece's determination to see the struggle through to the bitter end, is unshakable.

OBJECTS OF THE SOCIETY

The American-Hellenic Society is organized for the general purpose of extending and encouraging among the citizens of the United States of America an interest in the cultural and political relations between the United States and Greece; and in particular to promote educational relationships, including the establishment of exchange professorships in the Universities of the United States and Greece, as a means to diffuse knowledge of the literature and political institutions of the United States throughout Greece, and to encourage in America the study of the ancient and modern Hellenic language and literature; and further to defend the just claims of Greece in particular and of Hellenism in general.

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